Lesson summary of Romania in the First World War. Romanian army on the fronts of the First World War Romanian front of the Russian army in 1917
In 1914, Russian representatives in Romania noted that attitudes towards them had changed. Previously unfriendly, it became emphatically friendly. Previously, Bucharest focused on Austria-Hungary and Germany - there was an alliance agreement with them back in 1883. However, Romanians began to declare that they did not consider themselves bound by them. In August, the war began - Berlin and Vienna demanded to take their side, but Bucharest refused.
By this time, Bucharest had decided that it was better to be in the anti-Austrian coalition. Victory as part of this coalition promised participation in the division of Austria-Hungary. Romania hoped to seize, among other things, Transylvania, where several million Romanians lived. This meant not only the national task of reunifying the Romanians. Transylvania was richer than Romania itself, there was something to put your paws on. In addition, the Romanians really wanted to appropriate the property of German shareholders in their country.
Started big war caused an ambivalent attitude in Bucharest - both fears and hopes. The war offered a chance to achieve territorial gains by joining the winning side. But who will win? The Romanian elite were very afraid of making a mistake - of speaking on the side that would lose. Bucharest is at a crossroads. If the Entente had won, then by joining it, it would have been possible to get Transylvania. But what if the Central Powers had won? Then it was possible to join them and take Bessarabia. But it was necessary to join someone.
The majority of Romanians wanted the Entente to be the winning side. The idea of acting on the side of the Entente attracted large demonstrations and had a lot of activists and administrative support. There were also supporters of speaking on the side of the Central Powers, but they were few and uninfluential. As an example, the Romanian king (named Hohenzollern) is given - who did not even influence his own anthantophilous wife.
In the fall of 1914, news arrived about the victories of the Entente in the Battles of the Marne and Galicia. The defeated Austro-Hungarian army retreated. Russian troops occupied Bukovina. This additionally excited Bucharest, since it itself was counting on Bukovina, the southern part of which is populated predominantly by Romanians. Romanian newspapers shouted: “Let's cross the Carpathians! The hour has struck! Let's free the brothers!"
The Romanians began negotiations on the topic of their entry into the war on the side of the Entente. They sought to sell their performance at a higher price and bargained with gypsy passion. The Romanians wanted to get all of Bukovina, as well as Transylvania, even Hungary up to the Tissa bend, the Serbian part of the Banat, and that’s not all. And all this is not for entering the war on the side of the Entente, but for neutrality, simply for not opposing the Entente. However, the Entente countries responded irritably: Romania could only hope for territorial gains by going to war against the Central Powers.
Negotiations dragged on. Even after receiving concession after concession, the Romanians did not agree to specific agreements. At the same time, they continued to maintain contacts with the Austro-Germans. The Romanian representatives willingly listened to promises that they would receive rewards for speaking on the Austro-German side. Romania provided its territory for the transit of military cargo for Turkey.
However, there were also objective reasons that restrained Bucharest from immediately speaking out for the Entente, but directed it towards the path of double-dealing, bargaining and profiteering. One of the reasons was Bulgaria. In 1913, the Romanians stabbed the Bulgarians in the back, taking advantage of the fact that the Bulgarian army was pinned down by its opponents in the 2nd Balkan War. As a result of the attack, part of the Bulgarian territory was captured - southern Dobruja. After this, the Romanians were afraid that the Bulgarians would do the same to them - stab them in the back when the Romanians concentrated against Austria-Hungary.
During the negotiations, the Romanians insistently demanded that their border with the Bulgarians be secured. Specifically, this meant: if the Bulgarians speak out against the Romanians, then Russia must speak out for the Romanians against Bulgaria. Of course, no one in Russia was happy to fight for the Romanian conquests.
Another problem for Romania was the poor equipment of its army. The country's own military industry was rudimentary. Plus there is corruption - the budget allocated for the army did not reach it in full.
Another problem for the Romanians was the problem of the Black Sea straits. Romanian trade was mainly carried out by sea - through the straits. If Russia established itself in the straits, then Romanian imports and exports would be under Russian control. Therefore, the prospect of Russia establishing itself in the straits alarmed Bucharest no less than London. But in the spring of 1915, Anglo-French operations began in the straits and Bucharest calmed down a little.
1914 turned into 1915. Negotiations continued. Meanwhile the scales fluctuated. The Serbs pushed back the Austro-Hungarians with a counterattack. Information came from Italy that this “Latin sister of the Romanians” was also inclined to act against Austria-Hungary. Romanian supporters of entering the war for the Entente launched a noisy campaign. But the ruling group, led by Prime Minister I. Bratianu, decided to wait a little longer. And on May 2, 1915, the Austro-German offensive began on the Eastern Front. The Russian army was forced to retreat. The Allied operation in the Dardanelles ended in defeat. Bulgaria entered the war on the Austro-German side; Serbia was defeated. Romanian pro-Entente enthusiasts became quiet.
Bucharest decided to remain neutral for now. Instead of marching through the Carpathians, the Romanians took up trade. The war inflated the prices of grain and livestock, which, together with oil, were the main items of Romanian export. The Austro-Germans bought everything. Romania became a country like Denmark - neutral, profiting from trade with desperately needy warring countries. However, it was not entirely Denmark that profited from Danish deliveries to Germany. Specifically, a bunch of so-called goulash barons got rich, but the people got only difficulties from someone else’s war. After all, food prices have risen not only for German importers, but also within the country. In Romania these contrasts were even stronger; Only an oligarchic handful profited from Austro-German imports.
The year 1916 arrived; in May-June, Russian troops made the Brusilov breakthrough. The defeat of Austria-Hungary was spectacular. And then in Bucharest they were afraid of being late for the war. After all, Austria-Hungary (or even just Hungary) could have concluded a separate peace with the Entente - and why then would anyone need the Romanians?
Negotiations about Romania's participation intensified. The Russian General Staff was against this - they believed it was more advantageous to maintain Romania's neutrality. But the Western Allies, especially the French, insisted on involving the Romanians at any cost. Moreover, it was not them who had to pay. France's human resources were close to exhaustion; a new front in the Balkans was supposed to divert at least some enemy forces. The Romanians received consent to their terms of entry into the war. But then Bratianu began to extort more concessions, and it took another two months to agree on them. Meanwhile, the Brusilov breakthrough fizzled out, the Austro-Germans stabilized the front. On August 4, 1916, Romania finally joined the Entente. On August 14, Bucharest declared war on Austria-Hungary, hoping that this would be all. But on August 19, Germany and then Bulgaria declared war on Romania.
The Romanian command divided its forces: 370,000 men and 185 batteries north against Austria-Hungary; 140,000 men and 80 batteries to the south, against Bulgaria; 50,000 made up the reserve in the middle. In total, 1,200,000 people were mobilized during the war.
“The generals are preparing for the last war” (W. Churchill). The last war for the Romanian generals was the attack on Bulgaria in 1913. Then the Bulgarian army was tightly constrained on other fronts, there was no one to field against the Romanians, and they met practically no resistance. In 1916, the Romanians were counting on something similar - not battles, but a victorious walk, while the Austro-Hungarians were pinned down on other fronts. At first it was like that. But then complications quickly began to grow, turning into a disaster.
Bulgaria remembered 1913 well. The Bulgarian troops were generally not superior to the Romanian ones opposing them. However, the Bulgarians concentrated against several points - attacks against them were successful. The Romanian headquarters panicked, and the offensive in Transylvania was stopped. The Central Powers were given time to transfer reserves to the Romanian front. Their counter-offensive began in October.
The Romanians were caught in a pincer movement from the north and south. In November, the forces of the central bloc launched an attack on Bucharest. The Russian command recommended that the Romanians preserve the army, which means retreat, giving up Bucharest without a fight. The Romanian generals hesitated, but still gave battle and were defeated again. On December 6, 1916, the Germans entered Bucharest. The Romanian army collapsed; as of December 17, 70 thousand people remained in the divisions at the front.
The remnants of the Romanian army rolled back to the northeast, to Moldova. Millions of civilian refugees flocked there. The flight began in the autumn thaw, then winter frosts hit. Most of the food supplies went to the advancing enemy, so famine began. Following hunger and cold came a typhoid epidemic.
In general, the Romanians won and won, but they still made a mistake with the moment they entered the war. If they had come out in June 1916, they would have taken part in consolidating Brusilov’s success. But they delayed too long; Having set out in August - when the Brusilov breakthrough was already stuck - the Romanians received quick revenge from the central powers.
Although Romania entered the war later than others, it suffered no less than others. Its population numbered more than 7 million people; Losses are not exactly known, but lowest grade, 220,000 military personnel died (120,000 killed in battle and died from wounds, 30,000 from disease, 70,000 died in captivity), as well as 270,000 civilians (120,000 from hostilities, 150,000 from famine and epidemics). Other estimates say more than 300,000 military personnel and more than 400,000 civilians died—about one in ten.
Captured Romanians under Turkish escort.
By the beginning of 1917, a threat arose that, pursuing the fleeing Romanians, enemy troops would invade the southern regions of Russia. A huge number of Russian troops were transferred to the Romanian front, stopping the advance of the Central Powers.
The defeat and occupation of most of the country was, of course, a terrible shock for the Romanians. The answer was determination to continue the fight for their country. The Romanian army still did not disappear. About 200,000 soldiers went to Moldova, as well as 80,000 recruits who were mobilized, but did not have time to arm them. In the confusion of the defeat, many could have deserted, but did not. Mobilization was carried out in unoccupied territory. Having received a respite behind the back of the Russian army, the Romanians reorganized, trained and equipped their army with the help of the Entente. By the summer of 1917 there were 460 thousand people there.
The year 1917 brought new problems. In February, a revolution took place in Russia, after which progressive decomposition began in the Russian army. Thanks to him, the Austro-Germans won the battle on the Russian front in the summer of 1917, after which they decided that it was time to end Romania. On August 6, their offensive began. But the Romanian troops resisted quite stubbornly. Finishing off Romania, as it turned out, required a considerable price - more than what the Central Powers were willing to pay on a front that was secondary to them. Their losses grew, and they were forced to stop the offensive. There was a lull on the Romanian front. The Germans began to transfer their troops to the Western Front.
But Romania was threatened not only by the onslaught of enemy armies from the west, but also by a social storm from the east. The Bolsheviks, who were victorious in Russia, expected that the revolution would spread to other countries. Romania seemed to be the ideal link for the world revolution - exhausted by war, with the Russian army already propagandized on its territory, and long suffering from poverty and social inequality.
Romanian statistics in 1903 recorded the following situation: 7,780 large landowners own 51% of the country's agricultural land, and more than 1,250,000 peasant families own the remaining 49%. Another 300,000 peasant families had no land at all. So the agrarian question in Romania was no less acute than in Russia. And also the peasant soldier deeply hated the gentlemen officers.
The revolutionary committees of the Russian units stationed in Romania called on Romanian soldiers to join the revolution. If the revolutionary ferment had spread to the Romanian army, then the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power in Romania would have been a done deal.
The Romanian elite demonstrated will and unity in difficult times. There was no split like the Russian one. Politic system Romania was different from Russia, with its tsar who clung to absolutism. Romania had a constitutional monarchy with an already established parliamentary form of government. In fact, of course, it was an ordinary oligarchy. But there was still the appearance of a legal opportunity to achieve change through elections, and not by destroying everything.
The king, government and parliament agreed on a decision: “Let us tell the peasant that by fighting for Romania, he is also fighting for his political and economic liberation.” On April 5, 1917, King Ferdinand addressed the soldiers, promising to carry out radical changes immediately after the end of the war: introduce suffrage for everyone and redistribute landowners' lands in favor of the peasants (without mentioning the conditions - redemption).
The Romanian rulers managed to maintain their army. There were a huge number of deserters, self-harmers and defectors - but against the backdrop of the collapse of the neighboring Russian army, the Romanian one still remained combat-ready and controllable. Either the Romanian soldier turned out to be more nationally conscious and steadfast than the Russian, or (which is most likely) the Romanians still missed the first two years of the war. And the Romanian authorities were much harsher in repression. There was also another factor at work: the majority of Romanian peasant soldiers had houses and land behind the front - in occupied territory. The Russian soldier had his home and land behind the front, his craving for peace, his native village, family and economy contributed to his susceptibility to propaganda and the collapse of the front. The Romanian soldier had to free him to get home. Hatred of the occupiers and the desire to liberate the homeland prevented disintegration, since it required organization and discipline.
At the beginning of December 1917, the Romanians concluded a truce with the enemy - immediately after the truce between Russia and Germany. And then the Romanians turned their army in the other direction. In December 1917 they began to seize Russian army warehouses; They also surrounded Russian units, taking them away; those who resisted were immediately shot. The Russian units did not expect an attack, and due to the collapse, organized opposition was excluded. The Romanians disarmed Russian army on the territory of Romania and captured its huge reserves. And in January 1918, the Romanian army invaded Bessarabia. She broke the resistance of scattered detachments and this region Russian Empire was occupied.
In January 1918, the Germans demanded peace (that is, the surrender of Romania and its separate withdrawal from the Entente and the war). The Romanian government had to enter into negotiations on terms. In May, the so-called Peace of Bucharest was concluded. His text was sent to the king, but he hesitated to sign.
The autumn of 1918 arrived. The position of the Central Powers rapidly deteriorated. Entente troops launched a successful offensive in the Balkans. The Bulgarian army collapsed and capitulated. The Austro-Hungarian army was falling apart, its units left Bukovina. The Romanians hastily moved their troops to Bukovina, since Ukrainian troops began to take the place of the Austro-Hungarians there. Germany evacuated its troops from the occupied part of Romania. But still, Romania did not dare to enter the war again for a long time, although this no longer threatened a clash with any enemy troops. On November 10, 1918, the Romanians announced their entry into the war - just one day before its end.
Romania formally retained its status as an ally of the Entente at the peace conference in Paris. At first, this did not bring her any bonuses. The hosts of the conference - the French and the British - simply ignored the envoys from Bucharest. The Romanians discovered that the 1916 agreements with the Entente meant nothing. But then their shares rose amid events in Eastern Europe– the revolution in Russia could not be stifled; the revolution also occurred in Hungary.
The Romanians were lucky with their rescue by the Russian army at the beginning of 1917. Then they themselves managed to preserve their army and state in difficult conditions. Thanks to this, at the end of the war they were a big winner, increasing their territory. The “State Council” of occupied Bessarabia in March 1918 proclaimed unification with Romania. In occupied Bukovina, some kind of meeting was also organized, which voted for unification in October. After the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the dissolution of its army, Romanian troops entered Transylvania - and on December 1 they proclaimed a union with Romania. Versailles recognized all annexations, interpreting the proclamations as the right of peoples to self-determination.
Romanian troops in Transylvania.
Having discussed the state of the Russian Imperial Army on the threshold of 1917, we move on to a direct consideration of the events in which the army took part.
The disposition of the parties on the Riga bridgehead before the Mitau operation.
As mentioned earlier, Nicholas II himself refused to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers, and even more so the Russian elites, who had been dependent on the elites of France and Great Britain for several decades. Russia, which entered the war as the “sick man of the planet,” a country torn apart by acute social contradictions, plunged into an ideological crisis, by 1917 had fallen in the eyes of the “allied” powers to the position of a semi-colony. The Empire continued to participate in the war, which was not only alien to it and its people, but also destructive and hopeless.
On November 15-16, 1916, the next conference of military leaders of the Entente powers was held in Chantilly. It was developed general concept actions of the allied armed forces in the approaching year 1917. As before, the leading role at the November conference of the countries of the Concord belonged to the main interest in the war, the state that had the most combat-ready and best-organized army among the entire Concord - the French Third Republic. Accordingly, most of the ideas included in the plans for the 1917 campaign belonged to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, Marshal of France Joseph Jacques Césaire Joffre: the man who thwarted the entire German war plan in 1914, the winner of the First Battle of the Marne. Joffre, an ardent patriot of France, remained true to himself and his Fatherland in military planning. As at previous conferences, he continued to subordinate the actions of the Allies in every possible way to the will and interests of the Third Republic. 
Marshal of France Joseph Jacques Césaire Joffre.
The Entente campaign plan in 1917 was based mainly on the idea of using as quickly as possible the superiority in forces and means achieved by the Allies over the Central Powers. In accordance with this idea, the military leaders of the Entente decided to go on the offensive in all major theaters of military operations, and greatest forces it was supposed to be used on the Somme at the beginning of 1917. The Allies were in a hurry to inflict powerful blows on their main enemy, the German Empire, before the 13 divisions being formed in the depths of Germany joined the Reichsheer.
General Joffre divided the 1917 campaign into two periods. In the first, winter, the armies of the countries of the Agreement had to conduct active actions of a local nature with the main goal of preventing either counterattacks from the Quadruple Alliance or the withdrawal of even a small part of the enemy forces into reserve for further operations- in a word, the Entente troops had to pin down the enemy, not even allowing the possibility of them seizing the initiative. Finally, in the second period, a decisive offensive by the Entente forces was planned on all main fronts, while local actions continued on secondary fronts in order to pin down and divert the forces of the Central Powers.
At the same time, there was no talk among the leaders of the Entente about the imminent victory, which monarchists and White Guards of all stripes so love to talk about. At the top of the Entente they were aware of the military power of Germany and the rest of the Central Powers, and therefore they did not count on a quick triumph, but believed, by holding the initiative, taking advantage of superiority in resources and the naval blockade of Germany, to deliver successive blows until the Quadruple Alliance was weakened to the point of losing its capabilities to resistance.
True, the events that followed at the end of 1916 showed that the Entente overestimated its strength and the weakness of the Quadruple Alliance. The defeat of the Entente troops in the Romanian theater of operations, allowed by Alekseev and the Russian Headquarters, made a strong impression on the leaders of the Consent. The defeat of the new ally was perceived especially painfully in France, where significant changes in government followed as a result of the Romanian events. Marshal Joffre, around whom all sorts of intrigues had long been woven, was removed from the post of Commander-in-Chief, and in his place, French Prime Minister Aristide Briand appointed Divisional General Robert Georges Nivelle, who gained fame as a capable commander who skillfully used artillery, final stage Battle of Verdun. At the same time, the role of the Commander-in-Chief was henceforth limited only to the troops directly in France - the general leadership of the Armed Forces of the Third Republic in all theaters of war was assigned to the War Ministry, a body more political and administrative than military, which left its mark on the actions of the French troops on Thessaloniki and other secondary fronts. 
Divisional General Robert Georges Nivelle.
However, the general concept of the 1917 campaign, despite personnel changes in France, did not undergo radical changes.
On December 30-31, 1916, a meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief of the fronts was held at His Imperial Majesty's Headquarters in Mogilev, at which the leaders of the Russian Imperial Army, in accordance with the general plans of the Entente, developed the main provisions of the campaign of Russian troops in 1917. According to these provisions Armed Forces Russia had to carry out private operations on all fronts in the winter, and in the spring launch a massive offensive with the forces of the Northern and Western Fronts - the Southwestern Front, exhausted by the Kovel massacre, had to replenish its forces for a long time, as did the Romanian Front after the defeat of November-December 1916 . True, almost nothing concrete was decided regarding the spring large-scale operation - all efforts were focused on private operations upcoming in the near future. In preparation for a future large-scale offensive, the Headquarters still continued to be guided by old templates and stencils, completely compromised by the course of the war; the rich experience of two and a half years of war was practically not analyzed and, as a result, was not used; chimeras that had long been revealed, such as a long-term artillery thresher of enemy positions they did not brush aside the attacks before attacks - on the contrary, in relation to the same artillery preparation they tried in every possible way to increase its temporary length, as if point-blank without understanding that artillery preparation reveals the area of the upcoming offensive to the enemy and every additional hour is an extra hour for the enemy to pull up reserves. At the same time, they also did not think much about the depth of destruction of enemy positions by artillery fire.
The situation was different in the preparation of one of the private operations planned for the very beginning of the year. This operation, later called Mitavskaya, was assigned to the 12th Army of the Northern Front. Commander-12 Radko-Dmitriev, together with his headquarters, decided to move away from hackneyed harmful patterns and take a closer look at the experience of other military leaders.
At the turn of 1916-1917, the 12th Army of Radko-Dmitriev held the Riga bridgehead - a position on the southern approaches to Riga, the front line running south from the Gulf of Riga through the Tirul swamp and further along the left bank of the Aa and Western Dvina rivers. 
Infantry General Radko Dmitrievich Radko-Dmitriev.
The idea of the operation was to break through the defenses of German troops on a 29-kilometer section between Tirul and the Riga-Mitava railway with the further task of reaching the Aa and Ekau rivers, the Tukum-Mitava-Kreutzburg railway line and the subsequent capture of Mitava. Radko-Dmitriev, realizing that the longer the artillery preparation, the more time the enemy had to bring up reserves to the battle area, he made an unusual decision. By that time, many military commanders had already experimented with the duration of preliminary artillery fire - just remember that at the beginning of the Brusilov breakthrough, artillery preparation in Lechitsky’s 9th Army took only 8 hours, and in Sakharov’s 11th Army - even 6 hours. However, Radko-Dmitriev went even further and risked taking an unexpected and daring step - he decided to attack without artillery preparation at all, relying on the surprise of the strike.
True, Radko-Dmitriev’s ideas did not gain approval at the top of the Northern Front. In August 1916, infantry general Nikolai Vladimirovich Ruzsky was appointed commander-in-chief of the Northern Front instead of Kuropatkin. With all of Kuropatkin’s shortcomings, with his indecisiveness, lethargy and lack of talent as a commander, one cannot help but admit that he also had merits. Alexey Nikolaevich had a strong administrative streak and made efforts to provide for the troops entrusted to him. General Ruzsky, a careerist who became the talk of the town, had a completely different attitude. Ruzsky’s thoughts and actions were always driven by the desire to curry favor, to show himself in the best light. In this endeavor, he decisively compromised himself as a military leader back in 1914. 
Infantry General Nikolai Vladimirovich Ruzsky.
Radko-Dmitriev had to make a lot of efforts to obtain permission from Ruza to carry out the operation. At the same time, Glavkosev allowed the offensive only “in the sense of combat practice for the troops” with the obligation to make do only with the forces of the 12th Army, and abdicated all responsibility for the operation, directly stating to Radko-Dmitriev that the operation was carried out only at the personal risk of the army commander.
In an effort to achieve maximum surprise, Radko-Dmitriev decided to start the battle before the Christmas holidays, when the Germans' vigilance would be weakened. In addition, to mislead the enemy, the transfer of the 6th Siberian Army Corps to Romania was simulated.
Radko-Dmitriev divided the offensive sector into three subsections, each of which was transferred under the responsibility of one of the three strike groups. The Odinga group, consisting of the 6th Special Brigade of the 43rd Army Corps, advanced in the first 6-kilometer subsection; the main strike group, Babitskaya, having at its disposal the 6th Siberian Army Corps and the Latvian Rifle Division, advanced in a 15-kilometer sector; finally, the Olai group, composed of the 2nd Army Corps, operated on the third 8-kilometer section.
It was the main Babite group that had to strike without artillery preparation, while the Odinga and Olai groups had to move on the attack after a short fire raid. The Babit group was significantly strengthened by the presence of the Latvian Rifle Division in it. This division was created as part of the formation of national formations in the Russian Imperial Army. In articles about the Brusilov Offensive, we already talked about the 1st Serbian Volunteer Division, which fought in Romania. Armenian squads fought on the Caucasian front. At the turn of 1916-1917, the 1st Czechoslovak brigade of captured Austro-Hungarian soldiers of Czech and Slovak origin was sent to the Southwestern Front; two more Czechoslovak brigades were at the formation stage; The Polish units, which in the summer of 1916 near Baranovichi were marked by mass transfers of soldiers to the enemy’s side, despite this, it was decided to expand to the scale of a corps. In November 1916, the leadership of the Russian Imperial Army deployed the battalions of Latvians assembled back in 1915, of which there were already 8, into regiments. From the 8 deployed regiments, two brigades of 4 regiments each were created, and these brigades were consolidated into a division numbering more than 36 thousand people. 
Latvian riflemen in the trenches in the Baltic states. Armed, possibly, with Japanese Arisaka rifles (not sure).
In previous battles, the Latvians showed impressive fighting qualities, and even at the beginning of 1917, in the face of a decline in discipline and the almost complete disappearance of fighting spirit in the bulk of the Russian Army, they retained both iron order and subordination, and the determination to fight to the death. True, it should be noted that this preservation of combat effectiveness was not due to some exceptional qualities of the Latvians, but to the fact that they had not yet seen what the Russian infantry had seen, and did not suffer such losses - by the end of 1916, the infantry divisions of the Russian Imperial The armies changed six compositions, and others ten or more. At the same time, the training of the Latvian units was carried out much better than the Russians, just as their weapons and material support were better.
On the night of January 5, 1917, a 20-degree cold set in in the direction of Riga, and a blizzard howled. Under the gusts of a blizzard driven by an icy wind, the riflemen of the 6th Siberian Corps silently moved towards the German positions, in white camouflage suits and covered with snow, hardly distinguishable from the snowdrifts through which they walked. Having passed the no-man's land and overcome the wire fences, the Siberians changed their cautious dashes to a swift rush and burst into the German trenches. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued. In the cramped trenches, the fighting soldiers no longer wielded bayonets, but rifle butts, shovels, axes and anything else they could get their hands on.
The Siberians who emerged from the darkness and fierce blizzard became a real thunderbolt for the Germans. clear skies. The 6th Siberian Corps, which, according to the German command, had left for Romania, attacked German positions near Riga and with its breakthrough completely crushed the German units. The enemy's 105th Division suffered especially heavy losses, losing not only hundreds of soldiers, but also many guns left in positions.
On January 5, the 6th Siberian Corps broke through German positions in two sectors. Latvian also achieved significant results rifle division, which attacked in the Mangel forestry area and broke through the enemy defenses, occupying the Skudr-Grabbe-Skangel area.
The enemy, who did not expect a Russian offensive, had no reserves in the battle area; the lack of artillery preparation in the Babite group zone did not allow the Germans to retreat to the second position, and they, being taken by surprise and forced to take the battle in the first position, suffered heavy losses.
However, if in the zone of the Babite group things developed positively for the Russian troops, then in other areas it took a bad turn from the very beginning. At Oding, the first attack of Russian troops failed, as a result of which the effect of surprise was missed. The 76-mm guns, which made up the bulk of the artillery supporting the Odinga group, were unable to break the barriers created by the Germans in front of their positions from fallen trees entangled in barbed wire, and it was not possible to take away these trees under enemy rifle and machine-gun fire. The 6th Special Brigade repeated the attacks several times, but had no results other than severe losses. An attempt to make a roundabout maneuver along the eastern edge of the Tirul swamp failed due to insufficient energy in action. 
German positions in the Riga direction.
Near Olai, events unfolded completely unexpectedly. In the war-weary units of the 12th Army, political unrest began long ago on the basis of general demoralization, and with the beginning of the Mitavsky battle, the hitherto muted discontent of the soldier masses spilled out: the 17th Siberian Rifle Regiment of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps refused to go on the attack and demanded a constitutional board with a responsible ministry. The unrest started by the soldiers of the 2nd Siberian Corps quickly spread to the 6th. Military uprisings were suppressed using the most brutal measures, 92 soldiers and non-commissioned officers were executed by the verdict of a military court, and hundreds more were sent to hard labor.
The initial successes of the Babite group were not developed. The command of the 12th Army, having proposed bold tactical ideas, was unable to establish interaction between troops at the operational level. Russian operational groups acted in isolation, their individual attacks did not add up to the overall mosaic of a single operation. There were also tactical shortcomings - for example, the artillerymen were sorely lacking data for firing. Radko-Dmitriev had almost no cavalry capable of developing pursuit and preventing the enemy from breaking away, and all his appeals to Ruzsky with a request to send help, as expected, received a negative response.
For several days Radko-Dmitriev carried out attacks, trying to find a weak point in the enemy formations and break through the fortifications, but in vain - only tactical results were achieved. The German command had already brought up reserves, and the fighting became protracted. Finally, on January 11, Radko-Dmitriev sent an encrypted telegram to the corps commanders, in which he ordered “to be content with the results achieved and temporarily suspend the offensive, setting yourself the immediate task of firmly establishing yourself in the occupied new positions, without yielding a single step to the enemy.” Thus, after a week of fighting, the troops of the Russian 12th Army stopped the operation, having achieved only an advance of 2-5 kilometers.
The established calm was interrupted on January 23 by German troops. The enemy's first attack hit the positions of the 43rd Army Corps. Supported by powerful artillery fire, the German infantry made successful attacks along the eastern shore of the Tirul swamp, pushing back the Russian units. In the zone of the 6th Siberian Corps, German artillery conducted murderous shelling all day, starting at 7 a.m. The 38th Infantry Division attached to the corps was attacked by the enemy, the reinforcements sent to its aid were unable to break through the barrage of German guns, and parts of the division, having suffered huge losses, were forced to retreat.
The next day, local battles took place near the Tirul swamps with varying success. The 38th division, with the Latvian regiments attached to it, went on the attack at 9 o’clock in order to restore the previously occupied position, but was able to advance only 400 steps, and the Russian units were fairly thinned out by artillery and machine-gun fire from the Germans. A subsequent counterattack by German forces forced the 38th Infantry Division and the Latvian riflemen to retreat again.
On January 25, units of the Russian 43rd Corps had limited success at the Tirul swamp. The 46th Corps with the troops attached to it retreated under enemy pressure to its main trenches. Thus, the positions on the western bank of the Aa River, lost by German troops at the beginning of the Battle of Mitau, were returned by the enemy. 
German machine gunners in the Baltic states.
The attacks of the German troops continued until February 3, but the Russian troops managed to repel them, and then the Battle of Mitau ended.
In the first week of the Battle of Mitau alone, the losses of Russian troops in dead, missing, captured and wounded exceeded 23 thousand people, including the Latvian division losing 8 thousand people. The tactical success of the Babite group was not developed into an operational one, and therefore the achievements of the Russian offensive turned out to be insignificant. In addition to pushing the enemy back 2-5 kilometers, Russian troops were able to capture a thousand prisoners, 13 guns, 2 searchlights and a certain amount of various military equipment, but the trophies were limited to that. The damage suffered by the Russian troops was not at all justified by such small results, especially since the enemy was able to regain lost positions and, in some places, push back Russian troops.
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Romanian campaign- one of the campaigns of the First World War, which pitted the Romanian and Russian armies against the armies of the Central Powers.
In Western historiography it was considered an episode of the war in the Balkan theater of operations; in Russian (Soviet) - as part of the Eastern Front of the First World War.
Background [ | ]
In the political and military circles of the warring countries, the prevailing opinion was that the entry of small states into the war could significantly change the course of events. Therefore, the Entente tried for a long time to win Romania over to its side. Since the beginning of the World War, the country's government has taken a position of “armed wait-and-see,” although since 1883 Romania has been part of the alliance of the Central Powers; at the same time, it began negotiations with the Entente. Romania, which gained independence in 1877, was in ethnic conflict with Austria-Hungary. Entering the war, she counted on the annexation of Transylvania, Bukovina and Banat - territories of Austria-Hungary, inhabited mainly by ethnic Romanians.
Romanian Army [ | ]
The optimistic attitude of many political and military leaders regarding Romania's entry into the war against the backdrop of the real state of the army of King Ferdinand I was in no way justified. Although its strength reached 650 thousand, this figure hardly reflected its real combat effectiveness. The state of the infrastructure was extremely poor, and a third of the army was forced to serve in the rear in order to ensure at least some supply for the combat units. Thus, Romania was able to send only 23 divisions to the front. At the same time, there was practically no railway network in the country, and the supply system ceased to function several kilometers deep into enemy territory. The weapons and equipment of the Romanian army were outdated, and the level of combat training was low. The army had only 1,300 artillery pieces, of which only half met the requirements of the time. Geographical position further aggravated the strategic situation. Neither the Carpathians in the north-west nor the Danube in the south provided sufficient natural protection against a possible enemy invasion. And the country's richest province, Wallachia, directly bordered Austria-Hungary to the north and Bulgaria to the south and was thus vulnerable to attack by the Central Powers from two sides.
Fighting in 1916[ | ]
Romanian army exercises
Already in August, the Romanian army launched an attack on Hungary, from which the French commander-in-chief Joffre expected to change the course of the war. The 2nd Army under the command of General Grigore Crainiceanu and the 4th Army of General Presan invaded Transylvania and advanced 80 km in places. The advancing 400,000-strong Romanian group had a tenfold numerical superiority over the 1st Austrian Army of Artz von Straussenburg. This advantage, however, was never realized. Supply routes in the occupied territories were extremely poor, which became main problem advancing troops. And although they managed to occupy some important border fortifications, already the first Big City on their way, Sibiu, highlighted the weaknesses of the Romanian army. Even with the extremely small Austro-Hungarian garrison located in the city, the Romanians, due to problems with logistics support, did not even try to capture it. Fearing further supply problems and the prospect of German intervention, both Romanian generals suspended all offensive operations. Thus, already at the beginning of September 1916, the Romanian army was stuck almost in its original positions, being on the periphery of the relatively insignificant Hungarian province, waiting for further events and giving the initiative to the armies of the Central Powers.
Austrian and German counter-offensive
Meanwhile, the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army sent a 50,000-strong group under the command of General A. M. Zayonchkovsky to help the Romanians. Zayonchkovsky repeatedly complained to the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters, General Alekseev, that the forces allocated to him were not enough to complete the assigned task. However, Alekseev believed that it was better to surrender most of Romania than to weaken other sections of the front. As for the Western Allies, their assistance throughout the campaign consisted of sending military missions to Romania, consisting of several senior officers.
The inaction of the Romanian army and its allies led to a crushing defeat for Romania. Austrian 1st Army Straussenburg and 9th german army Falkenhayn easily drove the Romanians out of Transylvania, while the combined German-Bulgarian-Austrian forces under the command of Mackensen began an attack on Bucharest from the south. This strategic offensive was accompanied by diversionary actions by General Toshev's Bulgarian 3rd Army along the Black Sea coast towards Dobruja.
Front after the end of the Romanian campaign
The Romanian command hoped that Russian troops would repel the Bulgarian invasion of Dobruja and launch a counteroffensive, and 15 Romanian divisions under the command of Averescu were allocated to defend Bucharest. However, the Romanian-Russian counter-offensive, which began on September 15, ended in failure. The Bulgarian army turned out to be very motivated, fighting in territory inhabited by Bulgarians. Despite the fact that the Romanians managed to cross the Danube and thus enter Bulgaria, the operation was stopped due to an unsuccessful offensive on the Dobruja front. Russian forces were small in number and, with the exception of the Serbian battalion, insufficiently motivated. As a result, the diversionary actions of the Bulgarian troops turned into an unforeseen strategic success. The Russian-Romanian troops were driven back 100 km to the north, and by the end of October the Bulgarians managed to capture Constanta and Cernavode, thus isolating Bucharest from the left flank. At the same time, Austrian troops completely regained Transylvania and were preparing to attack the Romanian capital. On October 23, August von Mackensen dealt the main blow, crossing the Danube. The Romanians, forced to defend on three directions at once, were unable to provide any significant resistance. On November 29, the attack on Bucharest began.
During the defense of the country's capital, the French General Berthelot, directed by Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre, attempted to organize a counterattack from the flank, similar to the one that saved Paris during the Battle of the Marne in 1914. The energetic ally spent the last reserves of the Romanian army, failing to provide any serious resistance to the Central Powers. On December 6, 1916, Mackensen entered Bucharest. The remnants of the Romanian troops retreated to the province of Moldova, losing another eight of the 22 surviving divisions. In the face of disaster, General Alekseev sent reinforcements to thwart Mackensen's advance into southwestern Russia.
Fighting in 1917[ | ]
Russian troops who came to the aid of the Romanian army stopped the Austro-German troops on the river in December 1916 - January 1917. Siret. The Bulgarian armies remained in the south closer to their homeland and to the former Romanian territories inhabited by Bulgarians who moved to Romania in 1913. Romania's entry into the war did not improve the situation for the Entente. The Romanian Front of the Russian Army was created, which included the Danube Army, the 6th Army from Petrograd, the 4th Army from the Western Front and the 9th Army from the Southwestern Front, as well as the remnants of the Romanian troops. Having lost almost all of its territory and 250 thousand people in the fighting of 1916. killed, wounded and captured, Romania practically dropped out of the war.
To raise the morale of the soldiers, mostly former peasants, legislative activity was resumed after the completion of agrarian and electoral reforms. Parliament adopted the corresponding constitutional amendments, and King Ferdinand I personally promised the peasant soldiers land and the right to vote after the end of the war. And by the summer of 1917, the Romanian army was already much better trained and equipped than in 1916, to which was added the determination of the troops not to miss the “last chance” to preserve Romanian statehood. Active fighting were resumed in July as part of the June Offensive planned by the Russian Provisional Government. In the Battle of Marasti (began on July 22), the Romanian army under the command of General A. Averescu managed to liberate about 500 km² of territory. The retaliatory counter-offensive of Austro-German troops under the command of Mackensen was stopped at the Battle of Măreşesti. It is believed that the heroism of the Romanian soldiers shown there actually saved Romania from being withdrawn from the war, especially since the Russian units in these military operations were rather passive due to the increasing decomposition of the Russian army. By September 8, the front had finally stabilized, and these were the last active hostilities on the Eastern Front in 1917.
Consequences [ | ]
see also [ | ]
Notes [ | ]
Comments [ | ]
Literature [ | ]
Military administration bodies Imperial Main Apartment Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Military Ministry of the Russian Empire Fronts Northwestern in August 1915 was divided into Northern and Western Southwestern Romanian Caucasian incl. Persian Army 11 (Blockade) Danube Caucasian Special (from 08.1916) Corps 1st Guards 2nd Guards Grenadier Gendarmerie Expeditionary Courier Army: | |||
Considerable attention to the foreign policy of the Romanian government was paid to its military potential. In 1914, the Second Balkan War, in which Romania took a direct part, showed strong and weak sides its military potential.
The Romanian army was a large military force, however, cane discipline still reigned in its ranks. Romanian soldiers who could not stand the drill and fled to Russia spoke about beatings and abuse of ordinary soldiers by officers.
Technical equipment and vehicles the armies that were requisitioned from the peasants did not meet the necessary requirements. There was no necessary motorization of the connections; they mainly used carts - karuts, which were not adapted for heavy loads and military transportation; the harness was made from ordinary ropes. Requisitioned from peasants horse composition he was also very poorly prepared for quick maneuvers and long-distance transitions.
The big problem of the Romanian army was the corruption and theft of the officers, because of which only the conscripted reservists were often left without food, having eaten their two to three days' supply of food. New uniforms often did not reach combat units at all. The command staff of the Romanian army was formed from a narrow bourgeois-landowner and intellectual stratum.
The main problems of the Romanian army include the narrowness of Romania's military-industrial base. In 1915, there were no large metallurgical enterprises or large engineering industry in the country. War materials were acquired from the major Central European powers, most of them from Germany and Austria. With so many shortcomings of the Romanian military organization, there could be no talk of full-scale military operations. In this regard, Brătianu, having come to power in 1914, took the portfolio of Minister of War. However, this changed little.
In 1916, according to the calculations of the French military attaché Captain Pichon, the production of rifle cartridges remained at the level of 150 thousand per day, and 1.5-2 thousand shells per day. One cartridge per day accounted for almost 5 thousand soldiers.
Russian military observers highly appreciated the rank and file of the Romanian army, but at the same time were critical of the officer corps and had a very low assessment of the generals, who, according to observers, waged the war according to the templates of the late 19th century. They also noticed the weak technical equipment of the army: the complete absence of mountain artillery, as well as a lack of light and medium artillery. At best, the ammunition could last for two or three months of the war, then Romania would become dependent on the allies.
According to the mobilization schedule, the Romanian kingdom fielded an army of 400 thousand, consisting mainly of 20 strong divisions, 10 primary and 10 secondary. In reality, these 20 divisions barely had about 250,000 men under arms. Moreover, only the first-priority divisions were supplied with rapid-fire artillery and heavy field howitzers; The second-stage divisions were armed with outdated types of guns. The Romanian army was not supplied with heavy artillery and equipment at all.
The only railway passing through the entire territory of Romania was in very poor condition. A long period of peace and absence combat experience made the command staff of the Romanian army completely unprepared for modern warfare. And now in the hands of this small, poorly trained and equipped army it was necessary to occupy the most important theater of military operations at that time, with complete freedom of action there.
Romania's borders presented a military disadvantage. In the south along the Danube and further in a straight line from Turtukai to the Black Sea there was a border with Bulgaria; in the west and north-west, Romania bordered Austria-Hungary along the Carpathians, and in the direction of Focsani, the Austrian possessions extended strongly to the east, and formed a bag between Wallachia and Moldavia. This border line, in addition to its length, was also inconvenient because when striking at Focsani or from the side of Dobrudja, the entire territory of Wallachia could easily be cut off with its protrusion towards the Orsovo side.
The Romanian government understood that they would have to fight in both the north and the south. It wanted to take on an easier task - the occupation of Transylvania. Having crossed the Carpathians, the Romanian army could count on the sympathy of its fellow tribesmen, who made up the majority of the population of this region. Therefore, Bratianu wanted to move the bulk of the Romanian troops in a northern direction in order to put the upcoming peace conference before the fait accompli of the occupation of Transylvania and thereby strengthen the claims to this territory.
However, on southern front the problem was incomparably more complex, the Bulgarian population of Southern Dobruja, captured three years ago, suffered from cruel national oppression and hated the occupiers. In this way, it was possible to foresee a widespread partisan struggle in this territory. Therefore, the Brătianu government decided to hide behind a barrier composed of Russian troops in Dobruja, entrusting them with the defense of the territory recently seized from Bulgaria.
The main command of the Romanian army decided to deploy most of its troops on the border with Transylvania and from this position to launch vigorous attacks in the direction of Budapest. To cover their long border with Bulgaria along the Danube, the Romanians left only insignificant and, moreover, poorly armed secondary units, which should have included a Russian corps, also formed from secondary units. Based on this, the strategic deployment of the Romanian army took the following form:
Northern Army (3.5 divisions, or 68 battalions) from Dorna Vatra, where it linked up with the Russian 9th Army, to the Oitos Pass, covering Moldavia.
- The 1st Army (3 infantry and 1 cavalry division, 36 battalions) covered the passes from Kronstadt and Hermannstadt, occupying the area from the Oitos pass to the Rotenturm pass.
- 1st Army (4 infantry divisions, 64 battalions) concentrated in the area from Rotenturm to Orsov on the Danube.
- -I Army, which was the weakest in its equipment and consisted mainly of secondary units, had only 6 divisions, and covered the long line of the Danube and Dobruja, having a Russian corps on the extreme left flank
Thus, the most combat-ready and powerful groups were formed on the flanks of the Transylvanian theater of operations, which made it possible for the Romanian command to quickly advance the southern group into the Hungarian Valley before the enemy took appropriate retaliatory measures and thereby open the way there for the right flank of the Romanians and the left flank of Russian units. The weak side of this deployment was the insecurity and weak protection of the Bulgarian border, and especially the important and open for invasion of Dobruja, where only one secondary division was left before the approach of the Russian corps [Appendix 2, map 4].
By the time Romania entered the First world war there has been a partial change in the higher command staff German and French armies. So in Germany, the high command actually passed to Hindenburg under the chief of staff of Ludendorff. This appointment established unity of command in the German army, which subsequently extended to the Austrian troops on the Russian front, and even later to the Romanian front. Only on the Italian and Serbian fronts did command remain in the hands of the Austrians. In France, General Joffre was appointed supreme commander of the French forces in all theaters of war, and thus the command of the Salonika front was also consolidated in his hands.
August mobilization began in Romania. On the same day, its government declared war on Austria-Hungary. This ploy came to nothing; a few days later, representatives of Germany, Bulgaria and Turkey reported that they were in a state of war with Romania.
The 1916 campaign did not proceed happily for the Romanian army. The Allies failed to fully fulfill their obligations under the military convention with Romania, which, in addition to the supply of equipment, consisted of the following: the Anglo-French were to launch an offensive from Thessaloniki eight days before the Romanian offensive; The Russians not only sent two infantry and one cavalry divisions to Dobruja, but also put pressure on the enemy in the Carpathian region in advance.
At this time, the German military command expected a quick move by Romania, but at the same time believed that it would take place somewhat later, after the harvest. Consequently, the Romanian army managed to deceive the enemy, the Germans were taken by surprise, and therefore their premeditated plan was carried out late, especially due to the poorly developed rail network. However, the Romanian front for the Central Powers was the only one where their forces could still undertake an offensive operation, and in addition, failure on it threatened them with a break in communications with Turkey. Based on this, Hindenburg decided to strike at Romania, acquire rich provinces with grain and oil and prevent the Entente's attempt to combine operations from Romania and Salonika
The German plan, in general, boiled down to a priority attack by the allied Bulgarian-Turkish troops, which had been assembled in advance, on the territory of Dobruja, thanks to which the German army received a safe right flank for itself. The next step was joint action from the Danube and from the Germandstadt-Kronstadt front line to take possession of the territory of the Principality of Wallachia and thereby cut off the troops stationed there.
In general, there were 3 groups of troops operating on the Romanian front: the Mackensen Group, which by September consisted of about 9 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions of the combined German and Bulgarian-Turkish troops, which were replenished throughout October. The tasks of this group were determined by the need to deliver a strong blow to Dobruja. They were supposed to, hiding behind a natural water barrier - the Danube, push back the Romanian troops north of the Chernovody - Constanta railway. Thanks to this, Mackensen's group secured itself from the right flank and could now freely participate in the general attack on the territory of Wallachia.
The second group of troops on the Romanian front was commanded by General Falkehain, consisting of the 9th German and 1st Austrian armies, in total about 26 infantry and 7.5 cavalry divisions, of which 16 divisions were German. These armies were still at the stage of concentration. The 1st Austrian Army was to deploy on both sides of the Maros - Vasargeli line, the 9th Army was ordered to concentrate in the Karlsburg and Mühlbach area, while having small detachments up to Orsovo.
The third group of troops was in the North, and was already operating against the troops of the Russian Front. This group included: the 7th Austrian Army, which barely held off the onslaught of the 9th Russian Army of General Lechitsky, which was subsequently reinforced by 3 new German divisions that were transferred from the French front. At the same time, the concentration of troops proceeded very slowly, and therefore the Romanian army in September met only advanced units.
Offensive
At the beginning of May, when Kerensky received the portfolio of Minister of War and Navy, feverish preparations began for active operations at the front. Kerensky moves from one army to another, from one corps to another and leads frantic agitation for a general offensive. Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik councils and front committees helped Kerensky in every possible way. In order to stop the ongoing collapse of the army, Kerensky began to form volunteer shock units.
"Advance, attack!“- Kerensky shouted hysterically wherever possible, and he was echoed by the officers and front-line, army regimental committees, especially of the Southwestern Front. The soldiers who were in the trenches, to the “speakers” coming to the front, calling for war and an offensive, They were not only indifferent and indifferent, but also hostile. The vast majority of the soldiers were, as before, against any offensive actions.
"In order to improve the health of the soldier mass", according to Kerensky, it was necessary to pour new ones into it, fresh strength. An institution with a loud name was formed: the All-Russian Central Committee for the Organization of the Volunteer Revolutionary Army. And this institution singled out the Executive Committee for the formation of revolutionary battalions from home front volunteers. To show that this institution “began to live,” it issued an appeal filled with rattling phrases designed to fool the worker-peasant masses, about saving the fatherland and calling for an offensive, etc.
The mood of these masses is illustrated by one of the typical letters from soldiers of that time: " If this war does not end soon, then it seems there will be a bad story. When will our bloodthirsty, fat-bellied bourgeoisie drink their fill? And only if they dare to drag out the war for a little longer, then we will go at them with weapons in our hands and then we will not give mercy to anyone. Our entire army is asking and waiting for peace, but the entire damned bourgeoisie does not want to give it to us and is waiting for them to be slaughtered without exception.". Such was the formidable mood of the mass of soldiers at the front. In the rear - in Petrograd, Moscow and other cities - there was a wave of demonstrations against the offensive under the Bolshevik slogans: “Down with the capitalist ministers!”, “All power to the Soviets!”
Before the offensive on July 1 (June 18), a regrouping took place in both the supreme and high command at the fronts. Brusilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief instead of Alekseev, and soon replaced the latter, i.e. Kornilov was appointed commander-in-chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front with his commissar, Socialist Revolutionary Savinkov.
Militarily, the plan for the June Offensive was developed at the direction of the Allies even before February Revolution, i.e. the tsarist government. According to this plan, the main blow was supposed to be delivered by the armies of the Southwestern Front, and the Northern and Western Fronts were supposed to actively help the advance of the Southwestern Front. The Western Front was supposed to deliver its main blow with the forces of the 10th Army from the Krevo area to Vilna. The Northern Front was supposed to assist him with a strong blow from the 5th Army from the Dvinsk area, also towards Vilna.
The offensive on the Western and Northern fronts, launched in the second half of July, failed. After an artillery preparation unprecedented in the power and strength of the Russians, the troops occupied the first enemy position with almost no losses and did not want to go further. The withdrawal from the positions of entire units began. All active operations on both fronts north of Polesie ceased.
On the Southwestern Front, the expected offensive took place. The general idea of the operation was to deliver the main attack from the Pomorzany-Brzhezany front to Glinany-Lvov and a secondary attack from the Galich-Stanislavov front to Kalush-Bolekhov. The attack on the Northern direction was supposed to precede the attack on the Southern direction by several days.
Units of the 11th and 7th armies acted against Lvov, of which about 2 corps were supposed to advance from Pomorzhany to Zlochov and Glinany and 4 corps from Březana to Bobrka and further to Lvov. In the southern direction, the XII Corps, consisting of 6 divisions, was supposed to break through the enemy position between Galich and Stanislavov and advance on Kalush, and the XVI Corps was to facilitate this offensive by moving from Bogorodchany to the river. Lomnica.
On July 1, the attack began in the Northern direction. Both armies (11th and 7th) had little tactical success on the first day and occupied several sections of the enemy positions; but the next day the fighting did not have even this success. On July 6, the attack was repeated in some areas, but also without success, and the commander of the 11th Army began regrouping, which was sure sign failures. The fighting in the northern group stopped.
Meanwhile, the southern group, the 8th Army, entered into action, at the head of which the general was recently appointed. Kornilov. On July 6, the XVI Corps launched a auxiliary attack, drove the enemy from his forward positions on the Lyakhovice-Porogi front, captured them and successfully repulsed all enemy counterattacks. On July 7, the XII Corps also attacked. 6 divisions of this corps successfully broke through the enemy’s forward, intermediate and main positions from Yamnitsa to Zagvozdye and captured over 7,000 prisoners and 48 guns. The next day the operation continued, and by July 13, the attacking units of the 8th Army, having occupied Kalush, reached the Kropivnik-r. line. Lomnica. By this time, the offensive impulse of the 8th Army had faded, and this was the end of its successes.
The Russian offensive was still supposed to make a strong impression on the German command. Reserves began to concentrate at the site of the breakthrough, first from the Russian and then from the French fronts. The ease of transferring these latter was facilitated by the behavior of the French command and government. The collapse of the grandiosely conceived April operation and the government's official statement about abandoning offensive operations for the near future gave the German command a free hand. And it took full advantage of this. First of all, 6 divisions were deployed, 2 of which were guards.
The cessation of the Russian offensive and the impressive German forces newly formed on this front aroused among the Germans a natural desire to take advantage of the situation and, if successful, act against the rear of the Romanian Front. In addition, the offensive in this direction brought the Germans into grain-rich Ukraine and Bessarabia.
The German offensive began on July 19, and the breakthrough of a concentrated mass was directed against the 11th Army on the Zvizhen - Pomorzhany front. After a two-day battle, the Russian front was broken here, and the 11th Army rolled back, exposing the right flank of the neighboring 7th Army. The disaster could have been enormous if the Germans had thrown their cavalry into the gap, but they did not.
The rapid retreat of the 11th Army forced the 7th Army to withdraw as well; it in turn exposed the right flank of the 8th Army. This forced the gene. Kornilov, who had already become the head of the Southwestern Front, began the withdrawal of the 8th Army, however, holding the junction with the Romanian Front at Kimpolunga. The whole operation became more systematic.
Following the breakthrough against the 11th and 7th armies, the Austro-Germans went on the offensive in the Carpathians against the left flank of the 8th Army. This direction was especially dangerous for the Russian command, since it could force the right flank of the Romanian Front to retreat, but here it ended happily, forcing only a slight siege of this flank.
The further withdrawal of the Southwestern Front took place almost without enemy pressure, and on July 28, Russian troops not only stopped completely, but even began to launch a series of private counterattacks. By this time, the Russian front, remaining north of Broda on last year’s line, moved south of it, starting from Zlochev east to Zbarazh - Skalat - Grzhilov, then along the river. Zbruch to the Dniester and further to Bayan and Seret for communication with the Romanian Front east of Cimpolunga.
Romanian Front by the spring of 1917. represented a very impressive force. Here, over a distance of about 500 km from Kimpolung to the mouth of the Danube, about 600 battalions of Russian-Romanian troops were located against about 500 battalions of the Central Union operating here.
Interspersed between the 3 Russian armies was one Romanian army (74 battalions), and the other, still being trained in the rear by French instructors, was supposed to occupy a section of the front during the summer. Accordingly, 5 armies of German, Austrian, Bulgarian and Turkish troops were positioned against the Russian-Romanian armies.
The Romanian army was also in a great degree of disorder.
Under such conditions, it was difficult to expect the success of the offensive on the Romanian front, but it still took place and was a success. On July 20-24, in the Focsha direction, units of the 4th Russian and 2nd Romanian armies broke through the enemy front, but in view of events in the north, Kerensky ordered the offensive to be stopped on July 25, setting the main task to preserve the combat effectiveness of the army.
In turn, the Germans, having freed themselves on the Russian Southwestern Front, launched strong attacks on the Foksha and Oknensky directions, starting on August 6, wanting to occupy the rich oil-bearing region here. The most stubborn battles were fought here, as well as in the river valley. Oytuz, against Russian and Romanian troops until August 13 and ended with the pushing of the latter to a very small distance in the Focsani direction, after which the front stabilized again and military operations here ceased until the end of the war.
"An army of maddened, dark people flees“, General Kornilov reported to Kerensky. Thus ended Kerensky’s “famous” offensive on the Southwestern Front, which killed many thousands of soldiers. The unbearable overexertion of the forces of the sick organism of the old army, demanded by this offensive, had one main result - the acceleration of the further collapse of the entire Russian Front Attempts to organize an offensive in the Northern and Western fronts came to nothing.
The old army had reached a dead end, but the Provisional Government of Kerensky did not yet want to notice this (Prince Lvov resigned on July 8, and the place of Chairman of the Council of Ministers was taken by Kerensky, retaining the post of Minister of War) and the Menshevik-SR Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies supporting him . It was they who intended to once again try to restore the combat effectiveness of the old army in order to once again send it on the offensive.
In response to this plan of the Provisional Government, in response to the government’s desire to withdraw revolutionary-minded units from Petrograd to the front, in response to the criminal offensive of July 1 with its consequences in the form of enormous casualties, etc. - the workers, soldiers and sailors took to the streets of Petrograd on July 4-5 with the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” More than 500,000 workers, soldiers and sailors who came from Kronstadt took part in this demonstration.
The operations of the Germans on the Russian-Romanian front did not give them what they could count on in terms of the balance of forces, taking into account not only the number, but also the condition of the armies.
According to the old style, this offensive took place in June and was called the June offensive.