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Philosophical studies on the essence of human freedom and related subjects. F. W. J. Schelling

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Philosophical studies on the essence of human freedom and related subjects. F. W. J. Schelling.
Since the essence of spiritual nature primarily includes reason, thinking and
knowledge, then the opposition between nature and spirit is natural
was first considered from this aspect. Firm belief that the mind
characteristic only of people, the conviction in the complete subjectivity of everyone
thinking and cognition and that nature is completely devoid of reason and
thinking abilities, along with the mechanical type dominant everywhere
representations - for the dynamic principle, newly awakened by Kant, passed
only into some higher form of mechanical and was not cognized in its
identity with the spiritual principle - sufficiently justify such a move
thoughts. Now the root of the opposite has been torn out, and the affirmation is more
the correct view can be calmly left to the general
forward movement towards higher knowledge.

The time has come to reveal the supreme or rather the true opposite
– the opposition between necessity and freedom, consideration of which
only leads into the deepest center of philosophy.

After the first general presentation of his system (in the Journal of Speculative
physics”), the continuation of which was, unfortunately, interrupted by external
circumstances, the author of this work limited himself only to natural philosophical
research; therefore, apart from what is stated in the work “Philosophy and
religion” of the beginning, which remains due to the ambiguity of the presentation is not enough
distinct, in this work for the first time he sets out with complete certainty
his concept of the ideal part of philosophy; so that the first essay
has acquired its significance, it is necessary to accompany it with this research, in
which, by virtue of the very nature of the subject, must inevitably contain
deeper conclusions about the system as a whole than in any other
research of a more specific nature.

Despite the fact that the author has so far been nowhere (except for his work
“Philosophy and Religion”) did not express his opinion on the main problems,
that will be touched upon here - about free will, good and evil, personality, etc.
etc., this did not stop some people from attributing to him in their own opinion
opinions, even in their content, completely inconsistent
the work mentioned, apparently left without any attention.
There is a lot that is incorrect on a number of issues, including those discussed here,
was expressed allegedly in accordance with the main provisions of the author also
by his uninvited so-called followers.

It would seem that only the
an established, complete system. This kind of system the author still
never brought it to the attention of readers and developed only some of it
sides (and they are also often only in one particular, for example
polemical, communication). Thus, he believed that his writings should be
considered as fragments of the whole, it is possible to discern the connection between them
with greater insight than is usually characteristic of supporters and greater
goodwill than their opponents. Since the only scientific presentation
his system remained unfinished, it turned out to be not understood by anyone in its
genuine tendency or understood by very few. Immediately after appearance
this fragment began to be discredited and distorted, on the one hand,
explanations, revisions and translations - on the other, and the greatest evil was
transposition of the author's thoughts into some supposedly more brilliant language (since
It was at this time that a completely unbridled poetic spirit took over the minds
dope). Now it seems that the time has come for more sensible impulses.
The desire for loyalty, diligence, and depth is revived. People start
to see in the emptiness those who dressed themselves up in the maxims of the new philosophy, becoming like
heroes of the French theater or rope dancers, what they are in
reality. As for those who in all markets repeated like tunes
under the barrel organ, the new thing they grabbed, then they finally caused such a universal
disgust that soon they will no longer find listeners, especially if the critics do not
those who, however, seek to cause harm will stop asserting when listening
each incomprehensible rhapsody, which included several turns of the famous
writer that it was written in accordance with his basic principles. Already
it is better to consider such rhapsodists as original writers, because in essence
they all want to be them, and many of them, in a certain sense, are
are.

Let this essay serve to eliminate a number of preconceived opinions, with
on the one hand, and empty, irresponsible chatter on the other.

Finally, we would like those who have spoken out openly or covertly
against the author in this matter, would have expressed their opinion in the same way
frankly, as it is done here. Full mastery of the subject makes
its free, clear presentation is possible - artificial techniques
polemics cannot be a form of philosophy. But even more we wish that everything
the spirit of common aspirations became more firmly established and too often took possession of
among the Germans, the sectarian spirit did not hinder the acquisition of knowledge and views,
the full development of which from time immemorial was intended for the Germans and
to which they, perhaps, have never been closer than now.

The task of philosophical research on the essence of human freedom can be
be, on the one hand, identifying its correct concept, for, no matter how
The immediate property of every person is the feeling of freedom, it
is not at all on the surface of consciousness and even in order to simply
to express it in words requires more than ordinary purity and depth
thinking; on the other hand, these studies may be aimed at linking
this concept with the scientific worldview in its integrity. Because
a concept can never be defined in its individuality and acquires
full scientific completeness only by establishing its connection with
whole, and this primarily refers to the concept of freedom, which,
if it has reality at all, it must not only be subordinate or
a secondary concept, but also one of the dominant central points
systems, then both named sides of the study here, as elsewhere,
match up. True, in accordance with the ancient, but by no means forgotten legend
the concept of freedom is generally incompatible with the system, and any philosophy
claiming unity and integrity inevitably leads to denial
freedom. It is not easy to refute general statements of this kind, because it is completely
it is unknown what limiting representations are associated with the word
“system”, as a result of which the judgment may turn out to be completely correct, but
to express something quite ordinary. This opinion may also come down to
that the concept of a system in general and in itself contradicts the concept
freedom; then how can one allow it - since individual freedom
still in one way or another connected with the universe as a whole (regardless of
whether it is conceived realistically or idealistically) - existence
any system, even if only in the divine mind, a system, along with
in which freedom also exists. To assert in general that this system will never
cannot be comprehended by the human mind, which means again nothing
assert, because depending on the meaning given to this statement, it
may be true or false. It all depends on the definition of the principle,
which underlies human cognition; to confirm
the possibility of such knowledge can be cited by Sextus about
Empedocles: “The grammarian and the ignorant will assume that such knowledge is no more
than boasting and the desire to consider oneself superior to others - properties that
completely alien to anyone who is even in any way involved in philosophy.
The one who starts from physical theory and knows that the doctrine of knowledge
like like is very ancient (it is attributed to Pythagoras, but
found already in Plato and was stated much earlier
Empedocles), will understand that the philosopher claims something similar (divine)
knowledge because he is the only one, keeping his mind pure and not
touched by malice, he comprehends, together with God within himself, God outside himself.”
Those who are alien to science tend to understand it as something completely
abstract and lifeless knowledge, similar to ordinary geometry. Easier and
it would be more convincing to deny the existence of a system in either the will or the mind
primordial being, to assert that in general there are only individual
will, each of which is a center for itself and, according to Fichte,
is the absolute substance of each Self. However, the mind striving for unity and
a feeling that affirms freedom and individuality is always restrained only
violent demands that do not retain their force for long and in the end
are ultimately rejected. So Fichte was forced to testify in his
teaching recognition of unity, albeit in the poor guise of moral
world order, the immediate consequence of which was the opposite and
inconsistency in this teaching. Therefore, it seems to us that, no matter how much
no arguments in favor of such a statement have been given from purely historical
point of view, i.e. based on previous systems (arguments drawn
from the being of reason and knowledge, we have not found anywhere), establishing a connection
between the concept of freedom and the worldview as a whole will always remain
a necessary task, without the solution of which the very concept of freedom will remain
uncertain, and philosophy devoid of any value. For
only this great task is an unconscious and invisible driving force
every desire for knowledge, from its lowest to its highest forms; without
the contradictions between necessity and freedom are not only philosophy, but also
in general, any highest command of the spirit would be doomed to destruction, which is
the lot of those sciences in which this contradiction does not find application.
Refusal of this task by renunciation of reason is more like
flight than victory. After all, with the same success one could refuse
freedom, turning to reason and necessity - both in one and the other
In this case there would be no basis for triumph.

This opinion was expressed more clearly in the statement: only
a possible system of reason is pantheism, but pantheism is inevitable
fatalism. Similar general names that immediately define the whole
the totality of views is undoubtedly a magnificent discovery. If
for a system a suitable name is found, then everything else
comes naturally, and there is no need to waste effort on detailed
a study of what makes a given system unique. Even a layman
can, as soon as these names are given to him, make his own judgments about the
deep in human thinking. However, when making such an important
statement, the point is still a more precise definition of the concept. After all, if
pantheism means nothing more than the doctrine of the immanence of things in God, then
it could hardly be denied that every rational view must
or in another sense, gravitate towards this teaching. However, it is the meaning that makes up
here is the difference. Undoubtedly, pantheism may also be associated
fatalistic view; however, that it is not connected with him in its
essence, it is clear from the fact that many came to pantheism precisely in
the result of their very living sense of freedom. Most if
it wanted to be sincere, it would admit that, in accordance with its
ideas, individual freedom contradicts almost all
properties of a supreme being, for example his omnipotence. Recognition of freedom
forces us to recognize outside of divine power and along with it power, in our own way
unconditional principle, which, according to these concepts, is unthinkable.
Just as the Sun extinguishes all the celestial bodies in the sky, so does
still more, infinite force extinguishes every finite force.
Absolute causality in a single being leaves everything else only
unconditional passivity. Added to this is the dependence of all beings
peace from God and the fact that even the very continuation of them
existence is only a constantly renewed creation in which
the finite being is produced not as some indefinite universal, but as
this is a certain individual with such and not other thoughts, aspirations and
actions. The assertion that God refrains from manifesting himself
omnipotence, so that man can act, or that he allows freedom,
explains nothing: if God had refrained from
manifestations of his omnipotence, man would cease to exist. Does it exist
any other way out that overcomes this argument other than confidence in
that to save man and his freedom, since his freedom is unthinkable in
opposition to the omnipotence of God is possible only by introducing man and
his

Schelling F V

Philosophical studies on the essence of human freedom and related subjects

F. W. J. Schelling

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES ON THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM

AND RELATED SUBJECTS

(WARNING). 1809

The following presentation requires, in the author's opinion, only a few preliminary remarks.

Since the essence of spiritual nature primarily includes reason, thinking and cognition, the opposition between nature and spirit was naturally considered first in this aspect. A firm belief that reason is characteristic only of people, a conviction in the complete subjectivity of all thinking and knowledge and that nature is completely devoid of reason and the ability to think, along with the mechanical type of representation that dominates everywhere - for the dynamic principle reawakened by Kant passed only into a certain the highest form of the mechanical and has not been recognized in its identity with the spiritual principle - sufficiently justify such a course of thought. Now the root of the opposition has been torn out, and the establishment of a more correct view can be calmly left to the general forward movement towards higher knowledge.

The time has come to reveal the highest or, rather, the true opposition - the opposition between necessity and freedom, the consideration of which alone introduces us into the deepest center of philosophy.

After the first general presentation of his system (in the Journal of Speculative Physics), the continuation of which was, unfortunately, interrupted by external circumstances, the author of this work limited himself only to natural philosophical research; therefore, apart from the beginning made in the work “Philosophy and Religion”, which remained insufficiently clear due to the ambiguity of the presentation, in this work he for the first time sets out with complete certainty his concept of the ideal part of philosophy; In order for that first work to acquire its significance, it is necessary to accompany it with this study, which, by virtue of the very nature of the subject, must inevitably contain deeper conclusions about the system as a whole than in any studies of a more specific nature.

Despite the fact that the author has never expressed his opinion anywhere (except for his work “Philosophy and Religion”) about the main problems that will be touched upon here - about free will, good and evil, personality, etc., this is not prevented some from attributing to him, according to their own understanding, opinions that, even in their content, were completely inconsistent with the mentioned work, apparently left without any attention. Much that is incorrect on a number of issues, including those discussed here, was also expressed allegedly in accordance with the author’s basic principles by his uninvited so-called followers.

It would seem that only an established, complete system can have supporters in the proper sense of the word. The author has never yet offered this kind of system to the attention of readers anywhere and has developed only its individual aspects (and these are also often only in some separate, for example polemical, connection). Thus, he believed that his writings should be considered as fragments of a whole, the connection between which can be discerned with greater insight than is usually characteristic of supporters and greater goodwill than that of opponents. Since the only scientific exposition of his system remained unfinished, it was not understood by anyone in its true tendency, or understood by very few. Immediately after the appearance of this fragment, its discrediting and distortion began, on the one hand, explanations, revisions and translations, on the other, and the greatest evil was the transposition of the author’s thoughts into some supposedly more brilliant language (since it was at this time that a completely uncontrollable poetic intoxication took over the minds) . Now it seems that the time has come for more sensible impulses. The desire for loyalty, diligence, and depth is revived. People begin to see in the emptiness those who dressed themselves up in the maxims of the new philosophy, likening the heroes of the French theater or rope dancers, for what they really are. As for those who in all the markets repeated, like tunes to a barrel organ, the new things they had seized, they finally aroused such universal disgust that soon they will no longer find listeners, especially if critics, who, however, do not seek to cause harm, stop asserting when listening every incomprehensible rhapsody, which included several turns of a famous writer, that it was written in accordance with his basic principles. It is better to consider such rhapsodists as original writers, since in essence they all want to be one, and many of them, in a certain sense, are such.

Let this essay serve to eliminate a number of preconceived opinions, on the one hand, and empty, irresponsible chatter, on the other.

Finally, we would like those who have openly or covertly opposed the author in this matter to state their opinions as frankly as has been done here. Full mastery of a subject makes it possible to express it freely and clearly; artificial methods of polemic cannot be a form of philosophy. But we wish even more that the spirit of common aspirations should be more and more established and that the sectarian spirit that too often took possession of the Germans would not hinder the acquisition of knowledge and views, the full development of which from time immemorial was intended for the Germans and to which they, perhaps, have never been closer than now .

The task of philosophical research about the essence of human freedom can be, on the one hand, to identify its correct concept, for, no matter how immediate the property of every person is the feeling of freedom, it is by no means on the surface of consciousness and even in order to simply express it in words, more than ordinary purity and depth of thinking is required; on the other hand, these studies can be aimed at connecting this concept with the scientific worldview in its entirety. Since a concept can never be defined in its individuality and acquires complete scientific completeness only through the establishment of its connection with the whole, this primarily applies to the concept of freedom, which, if it has reality at all, must be not only a subordinate or secondary concept , but also one of the dominant central points of the system, then both named sides of the study here, as elsewhere, coincide. True, in accordance with an ancient, but by no means forgotten legend, the concept of freedom is generally incompatible with the system, and any philosophy that claims unity and integrity inevitably leads to the denial of freedom. It is not easy to refute general statements of this kind, because it is completely unknown what limiting ideas are associated with the word “system”, as a result of which a judgment may turn out to be completely correct, but at the same time express something quite ordinary. This opinion can also be reduced to the fact that the concept of a system in general and in itself contradicts the concept of freedom; then how can one admit - since individual freedom is still in one way or another connected with the universe as a whole (regardless of whether it is thought realistically or idealistically) - the existence of any system, even if only in the divine mind, a system, along with with which freedom also exists. To assert in general that this system can never be comprehended by the human mind is again to assert nothing, for depending on the meaning given to this statement, it can be true or false. Everything depends on the definition of the principle that underlies human knowledge; to confirm the possibility of such knowledge, we can cite what Sextus said about Empedocles: “The grammarian and the ignorant will assume that such knowledge is nothing more than boasting and the desire to consider oneself superior to others - properties that are completely alien to everyone who is even in any way engaged in philosophy. Anyone who starts from physical theory and knows that the doctrine of the knowledge of like by like is very ancient (it is attributed to Pythagoras, but is found already in Plato and was expressed much earlier by Empedocles), will understand that the philosopher claims to have similar (divine) knowledge because he alone, keeping his mind pure and unaffected by malice, comprehends, together with God within himself, God outside himself.” Those who are alien to science tend to understand it as some completely abstract and lifeless knowledge, similar to ordinary geometry. It would be simpler and more convincing to deny the presence of a system in the will or mind of the primordial being, to assert that in general there are only separate wills, each of which is a center for itself and, according to Fichte, is the absolute substance of each I. However, the mind striving for unity and the feeling that affirms freedom and individuality is always checked only by violent demands, which do not retain their force for long and are ultimately rejected. So Fichte was forced to testify in his teaching to the recognition of unity, albeit in the wretched appearance of the moral world order, the immediate consequence of which was the opposition and inconsistency in this teaching. Therefore, it seems to us that, no matter how many arguments in favor of such a statement are given from a purely historical point of view, that is, based on previous systems (we have not found arguments drawn from the essence of reason and knowledge anywhere), the establishment of a connection between the concept of freedom and the worldview as a whole will always remain a necessary task, without the solution of which the very concept of freedom will remain uncertain, and philosophy will remain devoid of any value. For only this great task is the unconscious and invisible driving force of every desire for knowledge, from its lowest to its highest forms; Without the contradiction between necessity and freedom, not only philosophy, but in general every highest command of the spirit would be doomed to destruction, which is the lot of those sciences in which this contradiction does not find application. Refusal of this task by renouncing reason is more like flight than victory. After all, one could just as easily renounce freedom by turning to reason and necessity - in both cases there would be no basis for triumph.

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Schelling F V
Philosophical studies on the essence of human freedom and related subjects

F. W. J. Schelling

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES ON THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM

AND RELATED SUBJECTS

(WARNING). 1809

The following presentation requires, in the author's opinion, only a few preliminary remarks.

The time has come to reveal the highest or, rather, the true opposition - the opposition between necessity and freedom, the consideration of which alone introduces us to the deepest center of philosophy.

Let this essay serve to eliminate a number of preconceived opinions, on the one hand, and empty, irresponsible chatter, on the other.

Finally, we would like those who have openly or covertly opposed the author in this matter to state their opinions as frankly as has been done here. Full mastery of a subject makes it possible to express it freely and clearly; artificial methods of polemics cannot be a form of philosophy. But we wish even more that the spirit of common aspirations should be more and more established and that the sectarian spirit that too often took possession of the Germans would not hinder the acquisition of knowledge and views, the full development of which from time immemorial was intended for the Germans and to which they, perhaps, have never been closer than now .

This opinion was more definitely expressed in the statement: the only possible system of reason is pantheism, but pantheism is inevitably fatalism. Such general names, which immediately define the entire set of views, are undoubtedly a magnificent discovery. If a suitable name is found for a system, then everything else comes naturally, and there is no need to waste effort on a detailed study of what makes the system unique. Even a layman can, as soon as these names are given to him, make his judgments about the deepest things in human thinking. However, when making such an important statement, the point is still a more precise definition of the concept. After all, if pantheism means nothing more than the doctrine of the immanence of things in God, then it would hardly be possible to deny that every rational view must in one sense or another gravitate toward this doctrine. However, it is the meaning that makes the difference here. Undoubtedly, a fatalistic view may also be associated with pantheism; however, that it is not connected with it in its essence is clear from the fact that many came to pantheism precisely as a result of the very living sense of freedom inherent in them. The majority, if they wanted to be sincere, would admit that, in accordance with their ideas, individual freedom contradicts almost all the properties of the supreme being, for example, his omnipotence. The recognition of freedom forces us to recognize outside the divine power and along with it a power that is not conditional in its principle, which, according to these concepts, is unthinkable. Just as the Sun extinguishes all the heavenly bodies in the firmament, so, and to an even greater extent, infinite force extinguishes every finite force. Absolute causality in a single being leaves all others only unconditional passivity. Added to this is the dependence of all creatures of the world on God and the fact that even the very continuation of their existence is only a constantly renewed creation, in which the finite being is produced not as some kind of indefinite universal, but as this definite individual with such and not other thoughts and aspirations and actions. To say that God refrains from exercising his omnipotence so that man can act, or that he allows freedom, explains nothing: if God were to abstain even for a moment from exercising his omnipotence, man would cease to be. Is there any other way out of this argument other than the conviction that it is possible to save man and his freedom, since his freedom is inconceivable in opposition to the omnipotence of God, only by introducing man and his freedom into the divine being itself, asserting that is man not outside of God, but in God, and that his very activity enters into the life of God? Starting precisely from this, mystics and religious people of all times achieved faith in the unity of man with God, which, apparently, is necessary for the inner feeling just as much as reason and speculation, if not more. The Holy Scripture itself sees precisely in the consciousness of freedom the imprint and guarantee of faith that we live and abide in God. How can a teaching which so many have applied to man, precisely in order to save freedom, necessarily contradict freedom?

Another, as is usually believed, a more correct explanation of pantheism comes down to the fact that it consists in the complete identification of God with things, in the confusion of the creature with the creator, from which many other, harsh and unacceptable statements are deduced. Meanwhile, it is hardly possible to find a more complete distinction between things and God than the one we find in Spinoza, whose teaching is considered to be a classic example of pantheism. God is that which is in itself and is comprehended only from itself; the finite is that which necessarily exists in another and can be understood only on the basis of this other. According to this distinction, it is obvious that things differ from God not in degree or in their limitations, as might seem from a superficially accepted doctrine of modification, but toto genere. However, whatever the relationship of things to God, they are absolutely separated from God in that they can only be in another and after another (namely in it and after it), that their concept is derivative and would be completely impossible without the concept of God; on the contrary, God is the only and initially independent, self-affirming thing, to which everything else relates only as something affirmed, as a consequence to a foundation. Only under such a premise are other properties of things, for example their eternity, significant. God is eternal by nature, but things are only with him and as a consequence of his existence, that is, derivatively. It is because of this difference that all individual things taken together cannot, as is usually supposed, constitute God, for there is no connection by which that which is by its nature derivative can pass into that which by its nature is original. , just as individual points of a circle, taken in their totality, cannot form a circle, since it, as a whole, necessarily precedes them in its concept. Even more absurd is the opinion that in Spinoza’s teaching even a separate thing must necessarily be equal to God. For even if we found in Spinoza a sharp expression that every thing is a modification of God, the elements of this concept are so contradictory that it falls apart immediately in its interpretation. Modified, i.e. derivative, God is not God in his own, highest sense; by this single addition the thing resumes its place in which it is eternally separated from God. The reason for such misinterpretations, to which other systems have been subject to a fair degree, is a general misunderstanding of the law of identity or the meaning of the copula in a judgment. After all, it can be explained even to a child that not a single sentence in which, in accordance with the accepted interpretation, the identity of the subject and the predicate is expressed, thereby asserts a complete coincidence or even a direct connection between the two; for example, the sentence “this body is blue” does not mean that the body is blue in that and through that in which and through which it is a body, but only the following: that which is this body is also blue, although not in the same way meaning. However, such an assumption, indicating complete ignorance of what the essence of the copula consists of, is constantly made in our time when we are talking about the higher application of the law of identity. If, for example, the proposition is put forward: “The perfect is the imperfect,” then its meaning is this: the imperfect is not through what and in what it is imperfect, but through the perfect that is in it; in our time, the meaning of this position is this: perfect and imperfect are one and the same, all the same to each other, the worst and the best, stupidity and wisdom. Or the position: “good is evil,” which means: evil does not have the power to be through itself; what exists in it is (considered in itself and for itself) good; this provision is interpreted as follows: the eternal difference between right and wrong, virtue and vice is denied, it is assumed that logically they are one and the same. Or if it is asserted that the necessary and the free are one, the meaning of which is that what (in the final instance) is the essence of the moral world is also the essence of nature, this is understood as follows: the free is nothing more than a force of nature , a spring, which, like any other, is subordinated to the mechanism. A similar thing happens with the statement that the soul and body are one; it is interpreted in this way: the soul is material, it is air, ether, nerve juice, etc., for the opposite - that the body is the soul or that in the previous statement what seems necessary is in itself free is not prudently noticed, although it is with the same basis can be inferred from this statement. Such misunderstandings, if unintentional, indicate a degree of dialectical immaturity beyond which Greek philosophy went almost from its very first steps, and force us to consider it our indispensable duty to persistently recommend a thorough study of logic. The old, thoughtful logic distinguished subject and predicate as antecedent and consequent (antecendens et consequens) and thereby expressed the real meaning of the law of identity. This relation holds even in a tautological sentence, if it is not completely meaningless. He who says: “The body is a body” thinks of the subject of the sentence as something absolutely different from the predicate, namely: the first as a unity, the second as the individual properties contained in the concept of body, which relate to it as antecendens to consequens. This is the meaning of another old explanation, according to which subject and predicate are opposed to each other as collapsed and expanded (implicitum et explicitum).

However, the supporters of the above statement will tell us that in the criticism of pantheism we are not talking at all about the fact that God is everything (it is difficult to evade recognition of this even with the usual understanding of his properties), but about the fact that things are nothing, that this system destroys all individuality. This new definition seems to contradict the previous one; for if things are nothing, then how is it possible to confuse God with them? Then everywhere there is only pure, unclouded deity. Or if outside of God (not only extra, but also praeter Deum) there is nothing, then how is He everything, not only in words; thus, the whole concept as a whole disintegrates and turns into nothing. And in general the question arises whether much is achieved by the revival of such general names, which, perhaps, are of great importance in the history of heresies, but when applied to the creatures of the spirit, where, just as in natural phenomena, minor definitions lead to significant changes, serve only as a crude means. Moreover, it is very doubtful whether the last definition we have given applies even to Spinoza. For even if, in addition to (praeter) substance, he recognizes only its states as such, he considers things to be such, then this, however, is a purely negative concept, not expressing anything essential or positive, but it serves to determine the relationship of things to God, and not to that that they are considered for themselves. From the incompleteness of this definition one cannot conclude that, according to this teaching, things do not contain anything positive at all (although always derivative in nature). Spinoza expresses his thought most sharply as follows: an individual being is substance itself, considered in one of its modifications, i.e., consequences. If we designate the infinite substance A, and the infinite substance considered in one of its consequences as A/a, then the positive in A/a is, of course, A; however, it does not follow from this that A/a = A, that is, that the infinite substance considered in its corollary is the same as infinite substance as such; in other words, it does not follow that - is not a special substance, although it is a consequence of A. This, however, is not present in Spinoza; however, firstly, we are talking here about pantheism in general; then the question must be asked: is this view really incompatible with Spinozism in itself? It is unlikely that anyone would argue this, since it is recognized that Leibnizian monads, which fully correspond to what is A/a in the above expression, cannot be considered as a means of decisively refuting Spinozism. Without this kind of addition, some of Spinoza's statements remain completely mysterious, for example, that the essence of the human soul is a living concept of God, understood as eternal (and not as transitory). Even if the substance existed in its other consequences A/a, A/c... only temporarily, then in that consequence, in the human soul = a, it abides forever and therefore is eternally and imperishably separated as A/a from itself as A.

If we declare that the distinctive feature of pantheism is the denial not of individuality, but of freedom, then many systems that otherwise differ significantly from pantheism will fall under this concept. For in all the systems of modern times preceding the discovery of idealism, both in the Leibniz system and in the Spinoza system, there is no true concept of freedom; As for freedom, as many among us think of it, boasting that they have the most vivid feeling of it - freedom, which simply comes down to the dominance of the rational principle over the sensual principle and desires - then such freedom can be achieved without much effort, quite easily and even with greater deduced with certainty from Spinoza’s system. Consequently, the denial of freedom or its affirmation seems to rest, in general, on something completely different than the acceptance or rejection of pantheism (the immanence of things in God). If at first glance it seems as if freedom, which could not stand in opposition to God, is immersed here in identity, it can still be argued that this appearance is only a consequence of an imperfect and empty idea of the law of identity. The principle of the law of identity does not express that unity which, revolving in the sphere of sameness, is incapable of advancement and is therefore itself insensitive and lifeless. The unity of this law is directly creative. Already in the relation of the subject to the predicate, we have identified the relation of reason to consequence, and the law of reason is therefore as primordial as the law of identity. Therefore, the eternal must be immediately and such as it is in itself, also the ground. That, the basis of which it is in its essence, is therefore dependent and, according to the immanent view, contained in it. However, dependence does not eliminate independence, or even freedom. It does not define the essence, but only asserts that the dependent, whatever it may be, can only be a consequence of what it depends on; dependence does not tell us what this dependent is and what it is not. Each organic individual, as something that has become, exists only through another and is therefore dependent in becoming, but not in being. There is nothing inconsistent, according to Leibniz, in the fact that he who is God is at the same time generated, or vice versa: just as there is no contradiction in the fact that he who is the son of man is himself a man. On the contrary, it would be contradictory if the dependent or that which is the consequence were not independent. Then we would have a dependence without a dependent, a consequence without what follows from it (consequentia absque consequente), and therefore would not have a real consequence, in other words, the whole concept would sublate itself. The same applies to being in another. An individual member, such as the eye, is possible only in the integrity of the organism; nevertheless, however, he has a life for himself, even a kind of freedom, the presence of which is clearly demonstrated by the fact that he is subject to illness. If that which abides in another were not itself alive, then existence would be without the abiding, that is, nothing would remain at all. A much higher point of view arises from such a consideration of the divine being himself, whose idea would be completely contradicted by an effect that is not a generation, that is, the position of an independent one. God is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living. It is impossible to understand how an all-perfect being could be content with a machine, even the most perfect one. No matter how one thinks about the following of people from God, it can never be a mechanical, simple influence or accomplishment, in which what is produced for oneself is nothing; This cannot be considered an emanation, in which what follows remains the same as that from which it follows, and therefore is not something of its own, independent. The consequence of things from God is the self-revelation of God. But God can become revealed to himself only in what is similar to him, in free beings acting from themselves, for whose existence there is no other basis than God, but who are the same as God is. He speaks and they are the essence. If all the creatures of the world were even only thoughts of the divine soul, then by virtue of this alone they would be alive. After all, thoughts are truly generated by the soul; however, the generated thought is an independent force acting for itself; Moreover, she acquires such significance in the human soul that she defeats her own mother and subjugates her to herself. Meanwhile, the divine imagination, which serves as the cause of the uniqueness of world beings, is different from the human one, giving only ideal reality to its creations. That in which the deity is represented can only be an independent being; for what limits our ideas, if not the fact that we see something dependent? God contemplates things in themselves. In itself, being is only eternal, resting on itself, will, freedom. The concept of derived absoluteness or divinity is so consistent that it serves as the central concept of all philosophy. Such divinity is inherent in nature. Immanence in God and freedom do not contradict each other so much that it is only the free, and insofar as it is free, that exists in God; what is not free, and since it is not free, is necessary outside of God.

Although such a general deduction in itself cannot, of course, satisfy those who strive for a deeper understanding, it shows in any case that the denial of formal freedom is not necessarily associated with pantheism. We do not expect that we will be objected to by pointing to Spinozism. Considerable decisiveness is needed in order to assert that any system that has developed in the human mind is a system of reason k a t e z o k h n Let us express once and for all our definite opinion about Spinozism! This system is fatalism not because it believes that things exist in God, for, as we have shown, pantheism does not exclude the possibility of at least formal freedom. Consequently, Spinoza's fatalism must have a completely different, independent basis. The error of his system lies not in the fact that he posits things in God, but in the fact that these are things in the abstract concept of world entities, moreover, of the infinite substance itself, which for him is also a thing. Therefore, his arguments against freedom are completely deterministic, and not at all pantheistic. He considers the will as a thing and quite naturally comes to the conclusion that in any of its actions it must be determined by another thing, which in turn is determined by another, etc. ad infinitum. Hence the lifelessness of his system, the soullessness of the form, the poverty of concepts and expressions, the unyielding rigidity of definitions, which is fully consistent with the abstract nature of the consideration; hence - and quite consistently - his mechanistic view of nature. Can there be any doubt that even a dynamic idea of nature would have to significantly change the basic views of Spinozism? If the doctrine of the existence of things in God is the basis of the whole system, then before it can become a principle of a system of reason, there must at least be brought into it vitality and freedom from abstraction. How general are the statements that finite beings are modifications or consequences of God; what a chasm remains to be filled here and how many questions remain to be answered! Spinozism could be likened in its ossification to the statue of Pygmalion, which had to be spiritualized with the warm breath of love; however, this comparison is not entirely correct, for Spinozism is rather like a creation sketched only in general terms, in which, if it were spiritualized, many missing and incomplete features could be discovered. It can rather be compared with the most ancient images of deities, which seemed the more mysterious the less individual living features were given to them. In a word, this is a one-sided realistic system, and such a definition, which is not the first time, sounds less defamatory than pantheism, and much more correctly reflects the originality of Spinozism.

It would be a shame to repeat here the many explanations of this problem that can be found in the author's first works. The goal of his tireless endeavor was to show the interpenetration of realism and idealism. Spinoza's basic concept, inspired by the principle of idealism (and modified in one essential point), also found a living basis in a higher consideration of nature and the known dynamic unity of the mental and spiritual, from which natural philosophy emerged; as pure physics it could exist for itself, but within the framework of philosophy as a whole it was always considered only as one, namely its real part, capable of rising to a genuine system of reason only when complemented by the ideal part in which freedom reigns. In it (in freedom), the author claims, there is the last potentiating act, through which all nature is transformed into sensation, into intelligence, and finally into will. In the final, highest instance, there is no other existence other than volition. Volition is primordial existence, and only to volition are all the predicates of this existence applicable: groundlessness, eternity, independence from time, self-affirmation. All philosophy strives only to find this highest expression.

Schelling F V

Philosophical studies on the essence of human freedom and related subjects

F. W. J. Schelling

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES ON THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM

AND RELATED SUBJECTS

(WARNING). 1809

The following presentation requires, in the author's opinion, only a few preliminary remarks.

Schelling F V
Philosophical studies on the essence of human freedom and related subjects
F. W. J. Schelling
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES ON THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM
AND RELATED SUBJECTS
(WARNING). 1809
The following presentation requires, in the author's opinion, only a few preliminary remarks.
Since the essence of spiritual nature primarily includes reason, thinking and cognition, the opposition between nature and spirit was naturally considered first in this aspect. A firm belief that reason is characteristic only of people, a conviction in the complete subjectivity of all thinking and knowledge and that nature is completely devoid of reason and the ability to think, along with the mechanical type of representation that dominates everywhere - for the dynamic principle reawakened by Kant passed only into a certain the highest form of the mechanical and has not been recognized in its identity with the spiritual principle - sufficiently justify such a course of thought. Now the root of the opposition has been torn out, and the establishment of a more correct view can be calmly left to the general forward movement towards higher knowledge.
The time has come to reveal the highest or, rather, the true opposition - the opposition between necessity and freedom, the consideration of which alone introduces us into the deepest center of philosophy.
After the first general presentation of his system (in the Journal of Speculative Physics), the continuation of which was, unfortunately, interrupted by external circumstances, the author of this work limited himself only to natural philosophical research; therefore, apart from the beginning laid down in the work “Philosophy and Religion”, which remained insufficiently clear due to the ambiguity of the presentation, in this work he for the first time sets out with complete certainty his concept of the ideal part of philosophy; In order for that first work to acquire its significance, it is necessary to accompany it with this study, which, by virtue of the very nature of the subject, must inevitably contain deeper conclusions about the system as a whole than in any studies of a more specific nature.
Despite the fact that the author has never expressed his opinion anywhere (except for his work “Philosophy and Religion”) about the main problems that will be touched upon here - about free will, good and evil, personality, etc., this is not prevented some from attributing to him, according to their own understanding, opinions that, even in their content, were completely inconsistent with the mentioned work, apparently left without any attention. Much that is incorrect on a number of issues, including those discussed here, was also expressed allegedly in accordance with the author’s basic principles by his uninvited so-called followers.
It would seem that only an established, complete system can have supporters in the proper sense of the word. The author has never yet offered this kind of system to the attention of readers anywhere and has developed only its individual aspects (and these are also often only in some separate, for example polemical, connection). Thus, he believed that his writings should be considered as fragments of a whole, the connection between which can be discerned with greater insight than is usually characteristic of supporters and greater goodwill than that of opponents. Since the only scientific exposition of his system remained unfinished, it was not understood by anyone in its true tendency, or understood by very few. Immediately after the appearance of this fragment, its discrediting and distortion began, on the one hand, explanations, revisions and translations, on the other, and the greatest evil was the transposition of the author’s thoughts into some supposedly more brilliant language (since it was at this time that a completely uncontrollable poetic intoxication took over the minds) . Now it seems that the time has come for more sensible impulses. The desire for loyalty, diligence, and depth is revived. People begin to see in the emptiness those who dressed themselves up in the maxims of the new philosophy, likening the heroes of the French theater or rope dancers, for what they really are. As for those who in all the markets repeated, like tunes to a barrel organ, the new things they had seized, they finally aroused such universal disgust that soon they will no longer find listeners, especially if critics, who, however, do not seek to cause harm, stop asserting when listening every incomprehensible rhapsody, which included several turns of a famous writer, that it was written in accordance with his basic principles. It is better to consider such rhapsodists as original writers, since in essence they all want to be one, and many of them, in a certain sense, are such.
Let this essay serve to eliminate a number of preconceived opinions, on the one hand, and empty, irresponsible chatter, on the other.
Finally, we would like those who have openly or covertly opposed the author in this matter to state their opinions as frankly as has been done here. Full mastery of a subject makes it possible to express it freely and clearly; artificial methods of polemic cannot be a form of philosophy. But we wish even more that the spirit of common aspirations should be more and more established and that the sectarian spirit that too often took possession of the Germans would not hinder the acquisition of knowledge and views, the full development of which from time immemorial was intended for the Germans and to which they, perhaps, have never been closer than now .
Munich, March 31, 1809
The task of philosophical research about the essence of human freedom can be, on the one hand, to identify its correct concept, for, no matter how immediate the property of every person is the feeling of freedom, it is by no means on the surface of consciousness and even in order to simply express it in words, more than ordinary purity and depth of thinking is required; on the other hand, these studies can be aimed at connecting this concept with the scientific worldview in its entirety. Since a concept can never be defined in its individuality and acquires complete scientific completeness only through the establishment of its connection with the whole, this primarily applies to the concept of freedom, which, if it has reality at all, must be not only a subordinate or secondary concept , but also one of the dominant central points of the system, then both named sides of the study here, as elsewhere, coincide. True, in accordance with an ancient, but by no means forgotten legend, the concept of freedom is generally incompatible with the system, and any philosophy that claims unity and integrity inevitably leads to the denial of freedom. It is not easy to refute general statements of this kind, because it is completely unknown what limiting ideas are associated with the word “system”, as a result of which a judgment may turn out to be completely correct, but at the same time express something quite ordinary. This opinion can also be reduced to the fact that the concept of a system in general and in itself contradicts the concept of freedom; then how can one admit - since individual freedom is still in one way or another connected with the universe as a whole (regardless of whether it is thought realistically or idealistically) - the existence of any system, even if only in the divine mind, a system, along with with which freedom also exists. To assert in general that this system can never be comprehended by the human mind is again to assert nothing, for depending on the meaning given to this statement, it can be true or false. Everything depends on the definition of the principle that underlies human knowledge; to confirm the possibility of such knowledge, we can cite what Sextus said about Empedocles: “The grammarian and the ignorant will assume that such knowledge is nothing more than boasting and the desire to consider oneself superior to others - properties that are completely alien to everyone who is even in any way engaged in philosophy. Anyone who starts from physical theory and knows that the doctrine of the knowledge of like by like is very ancient (it is attributed to Pythagoras, but is found already in Plato and was expressed much earlier by Empedocles), will understand that the philosopher claims to have similar (divine) knowledge because he alone, keeping his mind pure and unaffected by malice, comprehends, together with God within himself, God outside himself.” Those who are alien to science tend to understand it as some completely abstract and lifeless knowledge, similar to ordinary geometry. It would be simpler and more convincing to deny the presence of a system in the will or mind of the primordial being, to assert that in general there are only separate wills, each of which is a center for itself and, according to Fichte, is the absolute substance of each I. However, the mind striving for unity and the feeling that affirms freedom and individuality is always checked only by violent demands, which do not retain their force for long and are ultimately rejected. So Fichte was forced to testify in his teaching to the recognition of unity, albeit in the wretched appearance of the moral world order, the immediate consequence of which was the opposition and inconsistency in this teaching. Therefore, it seems to us that, no matter how many arguments in favor of such a statement are given from a purely historical point of view, that is, based on previous systems (we have not found arguments drawn from the essence of reason and knowledge anywhere), the establishment of a connection between the concept of freedom and the worldview as a whole will always remain a necessary task, without the solution of which the very concept of freedom will remain uncertain, and philosophy will remain devoid of any value. For only this great task is the unconscious and invisible driving force of every desire for knowledge, from its lowest to its highest forms; Without the contradiction between necessity and freedom, not only philosophy, but in general every highest command of the spirit would be doomed to destruction, which is the lot of those sciences in which this contradiction does not find application. Refusal of this task by renouncing reason is more like flight than victory. After all, one could just as easily renounce freedom by turning to reason and necessity - in both cases there would be no basis for triumph.
This opinion was more definitely expressed in the statement: the only possible system of reason is pantheism, but pantheism is inevitably fatalism. Such general names, which immediately define the entire set of views, are undoubtedly a magnificent discovery. If a suitable name is found for a system, then everything else comes naturally, and there is no need to waste effort on a detailed study of what makes the system unique. Even a layman can, as soon as these names are given to him, make his judgments about the deepest things in human thinking. However, when making such an important statement, the point is still a more precise definition of the concept. After all, if pantheism means nothing more than the doctrine of the immanence of things in God, then it would hardly be possible to deny that every rational view must in one sense or another gravitate toward this doctrine. However, it is the meaning that makes the difference here. Undoubtedly, a fatalistic view may also be associated with pantheism; however, that it is not connected with it in its essence is clear from the fact that many came to pantheism precisely as a result of the very living sense of freedom inherent in them. The majority, if they wanted to be sincere, would admit that, in accordance with their ideas, individual freedom contradicts almost all the properties of the supreme being, for example, his omnipotence. The recognition of freedom forces us to recognize outside the divine power and along with it a power that is not conditional in its principle, which, according to these concepts, is unthinkable. Just as the Sun extinguishes all the heavenly bodies in the firmament, so, and to an even greater extent, infinite force extinguishes every finite force. Absolute causality in a single being leaves all others only unconditional passivity. Added to this is the dependence of all creatures of the world on God and the fact that even the very continuation of their existence is only a constantly renewed creation, in which the finite being is produced not as some kind of indefinite universal, but as this definite individual with such and not other thoughts and aspirations and actions. To say that God refrains from exercising his omnipotence so that man can act, or that he allows freedom, explains nothing: if God were to abstain even for a moment from exercising his omnipotence, man would cease to be. Is there any other way out of this argument other than the conviction that it is possible to save man and his freedom, since his freedom is inconceivable in opposition to the omnipotence of God, only by introducing man and his freedom into the divine being itself, asserting that is man not outside of God, but in God, and that his very activity enters into the life of God? Starting precisely from this, mystics and religious people of all times achieved faith in the unity of man with God, which, apparently, is necessary for the inner feeling just as much as reason and speculation, if not more. The Holy Scripture itself sees precisely in the consciousness of freedom the imprint and guarantee of faith that we live and abide in God. How can a teaching which so many have applied to man, precisely in order to save freedom, necessarily contradict freedom?
Another, as is usually believed, a more correct explanation of pantheism comes down to the fact that it consists in the complete identification of God with things, in the confusion of the creature with the creator, from which many other, harsh and unacceptable statements are deduced. Meanwhile, it is hardly possible to find a more complete distinction between things and God than the one we find in Spinoza, whose teaching is considered to be a classic example of pantheism. God is that which is in itself and is comprehended only from itself; the finite is that which necessarily exists in another and can be understood only on the basis of this other. According to this distinction, it is obvious that things differ from God not in degree or in their limitations, as might seem from a superficially accepted doctrine of modification, but toto genere. However, whatever the relationship of things to God, they are absolutely separated from God in that they can only be in another and after another (namely in it and after it), that their concept is derivative and would be completely impossible without the concept of God; on the contrary, God is the only and initially independent, self-affirming thing, to which everything else relates only as something affirmed, as a consequence to a foundation. Only under such a premise are other properties of things, for example their eternity, significant. God is eternal by nature, but things are only with him and as a consequence of his existence, that is, derivatively. It is because of this difference that all individual things taken together cannot, as is usually supposed, constitute God, for there is no connection by which that which is by its nature derivative can pass into that which by its nature is original. , just as individual points of a circle, taken in their totality, cannot form a circle, since it, as a whole, necessarily precedes them in its concept. Even more absurd is the opinion that in Spinoza’s teaching even a separate thing must necessarily be equal to God. For even if we found in Spinoza a sharp expression that every thing is a modification of God, the elements of this concept are so contradictory that it falls apart immediately in its interpretation. Modified, i.e. derivative, God is not God in his own, highest sense; by this single addition the thing resumes its place in which it is eternally separated from God. The reason for such misinterpretations, to which other systems have been subject to a fair degree, is a general misunderstanding of the law of identity or the meaning of the copula in a judgment. After all, it can be explained even to a child that not a single sentence in which, in accordance with the accepted interpretation, the identity of the subject and the predicate is expressed, thereby asserts a complete coincidence or even a direct connection between the two; for example, the sentence “this body is blue” does not mean that the body is blue in that and through that in which and through which it is a body, but only the following: that which is this body is also blue, although not in the same way meaning. However, such an assumption, indicating complete ignorance of what the essence of the copula consists of, is constantly made in our time when we are talking about the higher application of the law of identity. If, for example, the proposition is put forward: “The perfect is the imperfect,” then its meaning is this: the imperfect is not through what and in what it is imperfect, but through the perfect that is in it; in our time, the meaning of this position is this: perfect and imperfect are one and the same, all the same to each other, the worst and the best, stupidity and wisdom. Or the position: “good is evil,” which means: evil does not have the power to be through itself; what exists in it is (considered in itself and for itself) good; this provision is interpreted as follows: the eternal difference between right and wrong, virtue and vice is denied, it is assumed that logically they are one and the same. Or if it is asserted that the necessary and the free are one, the meaning of which is that what (in the final instance) is the essence of the moral world is also the essence of nature, this is understood as follows: the free is nothing more than a force of nature , a spring, which, like any other, is subordinated to the mechanism. A similar thing happens with the statement that the soul and body are one; it is interpreted in this way: the soul is material, it is air, ether, nerve juice, etc., for the opposite - that the body is a soul or that in the previous statement what seems necessary is in itself free is not prudently noticed, although it is with the same basis can be inferred from this statement. Such misunderstandings, if unintentional, indicate a degree of dialectical immaturity beyond which Greek philosophy went almost from its very first steps, and force us to consider it our indispensable duty to persistently recommend a thorough study of logic. The old, thoughtful logic distinguished subject and predicate as antecedent and consequent (antecendens et consequens) and thereby expressed the real meaning of the law of identity. This relation holds even in a tautological sentence, if it is not completely meaningless. He who says: “The body is a body” thinks of the subject of the sentence as absolutely different from the predicate, namely: the first as a unity, the second as the individual properties contained in the concept of body, which relate to it as antecendens to consequens. This is the meaning of another old explanation, according to which subject and predicate are opposed to each other as collapsed and expanded (implicitum et explicitum).
However, the supporters of the above statement will tell us that in the criticism of pantheism we are not talking at all about the fact that God is everything (it is difficult to evade recognition of this even with the usual understanding of his properties), but about the fact that things are nothing, that this system destroys all individuality. This new definition seems to contradict the previous one; for if things are nothing, then how is it possible to confuse God with them? Then everywhere there is only pure, unclouded deity. Or if outside of God (not only extra, but also praeter Deum) there is nothing, then how is He everything, not only in words; thus, the whole concept as a whole disintegrates and turns into nothing. And in general the question arises whether much is achieved by the revival of such general names, which, perhaps, are of great importance in the history of heresies, but when applied to the creatures of the spirit, where, just as in natural phenomena, minor definitions lead to significant changes, serve only as a crude means. Moreover, it is very doubtful whether the last definition we have given applies even to Spinoza. For even if, in addition to (praeter) substance, he recognizes only its states as such, he considers things to be such, then this, however, is a purely negative concept, not expressing anything essential or positive, but it serves to determine the relationship of things to God, and not to that that they are considered for themselves. From the incompleteness of this definition one cannot conclude that, according to this teaching, things do not contain anything positive at all (although always derivative in nature). Spinoza expresses his thought most sharply as follows: an individual being is substance itself, considered in one of its modifications, i.e., consequences. If we designate the infinite substance A, and the infinite substance considered in one of its consequences as A/a, then the positive in A/a is, of course, A; however, it does not follow from this that A/a = A, that is, that the infinite substance considered in its corollary is the same as infinite substance as such; in other words, it does not follow that - is not a special substance, although it is a consequence of A. This, however, is not found in Spinoza; however, firstly, we are talking here about pantheism in general; then the question must be asked: is this view really incompatible with Spinozism in itself? It is unlikely that anyone would argue this, since it is recognized that Leibnizian monads, which fully correspond to what is A/a in the above expression, cannot be considered as a means of decisively refuting Spinozism. Without this kind of addition, some of Spinoza's statements remain completely mysterious, for example, that the essence of the human soul is a living concept of God, understood as eternal (and not as transitory). Even if the substance existed in its other consequences A/a, A/c... only temporarily, then in that consequence, in the human soul = a, it abides forever and therefore is eternally and imperishably separated as A/a from itself as A.
If we declare that the distinctive feature of pantheism is the denial not of individuality, but of freedom, then many systems that otherwise differ significantly from pantheism will fall under this concept. For in all the systems of modern times preceding the discovery of idealism, both in the Leibniz system and in the Spinoza system, there is no true concept of freedom; As for freedom, as many among us think of it, boasting that they have the most vivid feeling of it - freedom, which simply comes down to the dominance of the rational principle over the sensual principle and desires - then such freedom can be achieved without much effort, quite easily and even with greater deduced with certainty from Spinoza’s system. Consequently, the denial of freedom or its affirmation seems to rest, in general, on something completely different than the acceptance or rejection of pantheism (the immanence of things in God). If at first glance it seems as if freedom, which could not stand in opposition to God, is immersed here in identity, it can still be argued that this appearance is only a consequence of an imperfect and empty idea of the law of identity. The principle of the law of identity does not express that unity which, revolving in the sphere of sameness, is incapable of advancement and is therefore itself insensitive and lifeless. The unity of this law is directly creative. Already in the relation of the subject to the predicate, we have identified the relation of reason to consequence, and the law of reason is therefore as primordial as the law of identity. Therefore, the eternal must be immediately and such as it is in itself, also the ground. That, the basis of which it is in its essence, is therefore dependent and, according to the immanent view, contained in it. However, dependence does not eliminate independence, or even freedom. It does not define the essence, but only asserts that the dependent, whatever it may be, can only be a consequence of what it depends on; dependence does not tell us what this dependent is and what it is not. Each organic individual, as something that has become, exists only through another and is therefore dependent in becoming, but not in being. There is nothing inconsistent, according to Leibniz, in the fact that he who is God is at the same time generated, or vice versa: just as there is no contradiction in the fact that he who is the son of man is himself a man. On the contrary, it would be contradictory if the dependent or that which is the consequence were not independent. Then we would have a dependence without a dependent, a consequence without what follows from it (consequentia absque consequente), and therefore would not have a real consequence, in other words, the whole concept would sublate itself. The same applies to being in another. An individual member, such as the eye, is possible only in the integrity of the organism; nevertheless, however, he has a life for himself, even a kind of freedom, the presence of which is clearly demonstrated by the fact that he is subject to illness. If that which abides in another were not itself alive, then existence would be without the abiding, that is, nothing would remain at all. A much higher point of view arises from such a consideration of the divine being himself, whose idea would be completely contradicted by an effect that is not a generation, that is, the position of an independent one. God is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living. It is impossible to understand how an all-perfect being could be content with a machine, even the most perfect one. No matter how one thinks about the following of people from God, it can never be a mechanical, simple influence or accomplishment, in which what is produced for oneself is nothing; This cannot be considered an emanation, in which what follows remains the same as that from which it follows, and therefore is not something of its own, independent. The consequence of things from God is the self-revelation of God. But God can become revealed to himself only in what is similar to him, in free beings acting from themselves, for whose existence there is no other basis than God, but who are the same as God is. He speaks and they are the essence. If all the creatures of the world were even only thoughts of the divine soul, then by virtue of this alone they would be alive. After all, thoughts are truly generated by the soul; however, the generated thought is an independent force acting for itself; Moreover, she acquires such significance in the human soul that she defeats her own mother and subjugates her to herself. Meanwhile, the divine imagination, which serves as the cause of the uniqueness of world beings, is different from the human one, giving only ideal reality to its creations. That in which the deity is represented can only be an independent being; for what limits our ideas, if not the fact that we see something dependent? God contemplates things in themselves. In itself, being is only eternal, resting on itself, will, freedom. The concept of derived absoluteness or divinity is so consistent that it serves as the central concept of all philosophy. Such divinity is inherent in nature. Immanence in God and freedom do not contradict each other so much that it is only the free, and insofar as it is free, that exists in God; what is not free, and since it is not free, is necessary outside of God.
Although such a general deduction in itself cannot, of course, satisfy those who strive for a deeper understanding, it shows in any case that the denial of formal freedom is not necessarily associated with pantheism. We do not expect that we will be objected to by pointing to Spinozism. Considerable decisiveness is needed in order to assert that any system that has developed in the human mind is a system of reason k a t e z o k h n Let us express once and for all our definite opinion about Spinozism! This system is fatalism not because it believes that things exist in God, for, as we have shown, pantheism does not exclude the possibility of at least formal freedom. Consequently, Spinoza's fatalism must have a completely different, independent basis. The error of his system lies not in the fact that he posits things in God, but in the fact that these are things in the abstract concept of world entities, moreover, of the infinite substance itself, which for him is also a thing. Therefore, his arguments against freedom are completely deterministic, and not at all pantheistic. He considers the will as a thing and quite naturally comes to the conclusion that in any of its actions it must be determined by another thing, which in turn is determined by another, etc. ad infinitum. Hence the lifelessness of his system, the soullessness of the form, the poverty of concepts and expressions, the unyielding rigidity of definitions, which is fully consistent with the abstract nature of the consideration; hence - and quite consistently - his mechanistic view of nature. Can there be any doubt that even a dynamic idea of nature would have to significantly change the basic views of Spinozism? If the doctrine of the existence of things in God is the basis of the whole system, then before it can become a principle of a system of reason, there must at least be brought into it vitality and freedom from abstraction. How general are the statements that finite beings are modifications or consequences of God; what a chasm remains to be filled here and how many questions remain to be answered! Spinozism could be likened in its ossification to the statue of Pygmalion, which had to be spiritualized with the warm breath of love; however, this comparison is not entirely correct, for Spinozism is rather like a creation sketched only in general terms, in which, if it were spiritualized, many missing and incomplete features could be discovered. It can rather be compared with the most ancient images of deities, which seemed the more mysterious the less individual living features were given to them. In a word, this is a one-sided realistic system, and such a definition, which is not the first time, sounds less defamatory than pantheism, and much more correctly reflects the originality of Spinozism.
It would be a shame to repeat here the many explanations of this problem that can be found in the author's first works. The goal of his tireless endeavor was to show the interpenetration of realism and idealism. Spinoza's basic concept, inspired by the principle of idealism (and modified in one essential point), also found a living basis in a higher consideration of nature and the known dynamic unity of the mental and spiritual, from which natural philosophy emerged; as pure physics it could exist for itself, but within the framework of philosophy as a whole it was always considered only as one, namely its real part, capable of rising to a genuine system of reason only when complemented by the ideal part in which freedom reigns. In it (in freedom), the author claims, there is the last potentiating act, through which all nature is transformed into sensation, into intelligence, and finally into will. In the final, highest instance, there is no other existence other than volition. Volition is primordial existence, and only to volition are all the predicates of this existence applicable: groundlessness, eternity, independence from time, self-affirmation. All philosophy strives only to find this highest expression.
Prior to this, philosophy has been raised in our time by idealism: only starting from it can we begin to study our subject, for it is by no means our intention to dwell on all the difficulties that can be and have been associated with the concept of freedom, if we proceed from a one-sided realistic or dogmatic system. However, no matter what peaks we have achieved in this area thanks to idealism and no matter how certain it is that we owe it the first perfect concept of formal freedom, idealism for itself is by no means a complete system, and as soon as we want to come to the doctrine of freedom a more precise and definite understanding, it leaves us completely at a loss. Let us note first of all that for idealism developed into a system, it is completely insufficient to assert that “the truly real is only activity, life and freedom”; this statement is also compatible with Fichte’s subjective (misunderstanding itself) idealism; here it is necessary to show the opposite, namely, that the basis of everything real (nature, the world of things) is activity, life and freedom, or, using Fichte’s terminology, that not only I (Ichheit) is everything, but, conversely, everything is I (Ichheit ). The idea of making freedom the basis of all philosophy liberated the human spirit in general, not only in relation to itself - and produced a more decisive revolution in all branches of science than any of the previous revolutions. The idealistic concept is the true triumph of the highest philosophy of our time and especially its highest realism. Let those who judge it or attribute it to themselves reflect on the fact that its deepest premise is freedom; In what a different light would they then view and comprehend this teaching! Only those who have tasted freedom can feel the need to liken everything to it, to extend it to the entire universe. Anyone who does not come to philosophy in this way only follows others and imitates them in their actions, without feeling what caused these actions. It will always be puzzling that Kant, who at first distinguished things in themselves from phenomena only negatively in independence of time, then considered in the metaphysical explanations of the Critique of Practical Reason independence of time and freedom really as correlative concepts, did not come to the idea of extending this only a possible positive concept of being in itself and on things, which would allow him to directly rise in his research to a higher point of view and overcome the negativity that characterizes his theoretical philosophy. However, on the other hand, if freedom is generally a positive concept of being in itself, then the study of human freedom is again thrown into the realm of the universal, since the intelligible, which alone constitutes its basis, is also the essence of things in themselves. Consequently, idealism alone is not enough to reveal the specific difference of human freedom, that is, exactly what determines it. It would also be a mistake to assume that pantheism is eliminated and destroyed by idealism - an opinion that could only be formed by mixing pantheism with one-sided realism. For from the point of view of pantheism as such, it is completely indifferent whether things are contained in absolute substance or individual wills in the same quantity - in the primordial will. In the first case, pantheism is realistic, in the second it is idealistic, but the basic concept remains unchanged. It is from this that it already becomes obvious that the most significant difficulties contained in the concept of freedom cannot be resolved by idealism itself, just like by any other one-sided system. The fact is that idealism gives, on the one hand, only the most general, and on the other, only a formal concept of freedom. The real and living concept of freedom is that it is the capacity for good and evil.
This is the greatest difficulty of the entire doctrine of freedom, which has been felt for a long time and is inherent not only in one or another system, but to a greater or lesser extent in all; with the greatest obviousness it manifests itself in connection with the concept of immanence. For either real evil is allowed, then evil must inevitably be placed in infinite substance or in the primordial will, which completely destroys the concept of an all-perfect being; or it is necessary to deny in some way the reality of evil, as a result of which the real concept of freedom simultaneously disappears. No less difficulty arises if even the most distant connection is allowed between God and the creatures of the world; for even if this connection is limited only to the so-called concursus or the necessary participation of God in the actions of the creature, which, due to its essential dependence on God, has to be allowed, even affirming the presence of freedom, then God necessarily reveals himself to be the source of evil, since allowing the actions of a completely dependent creature to not many it is better to participate in them; or, finally, here too it is necessary to deny the reality of evil in one way or another. The position according to which everything positive in creation comes from God must be affirmed in this system. If, therefore, we accept that evil contains something positive, then this positive also comes from God. To this one can object: the positive in evil, to the extent that it is positive, is good. Thus, evil does not disappear, but it is true that it is not explained. For if the being in evil is good, then where does that in which this being exists, the basis, which, in fact, constitutes evil, come from? Quite different from this statement (although it was often, and in recent times, confused with it) is that there is nothing positive in evil at all or, in other words, that it does not exist at all (it does not exist together with or in other positive ), but that all actions are more or less positive and the difference between them lies only in a greater or lesser degree of perfection, and since such a difference does not lead to opposition, evil completely disappears. This is the second possible point of view associated with the position that everything positive is from God. Here the power that manifests itself in evil, it is true, is comparatively less perfect than the power that manifests itself in good, but in itself or without such comparison it is still perfection, which, therefore, like everything else, must be derived from God. What we call evil in it is only a lesser degree of perfection, which appears as a defect only in our comparison, but in the nature of things it is not such. It cannot be denied that this is Spinoza's true opinion. One could try to avoid this dilemma in the following way: the positive, which comes from God, is freedom, itself indifferent to evil and good. However, if we think of this indifference not simply negatively, but as a living positive capacity for good and evil, then it is impossible to understand how the capacity for evil can flow from God, considered as only goodness. From this, we note in passing, it is clear: if freedom really is what it should be according to this concept (and it certainly is), then the attempt made above to derive freedom from God also cannot be considered correct; for if freedom is the capacity for evil, then its root must be independent of God. In this regard, there may be a temptation to turn to dualism. The system of dualism, if it is really thought of as a doctrine of two absolutely different and independent principles, is only a system of fragmentation and despair of the mind. If we think of the basic essence of evil in any sense as dependent on the basic essence of good, then the whole difficulty of the origin of evil from good, concentrated, however, in one essence, will rather increase than decrease. Even if we assume that the evil essence was initially created by a good one and fell away from the original essence through its own fault, then the first manifestation of the ability to act against God still remains inexplicable in all previous systems. Therefore, even if we eliminate not only identity, but also any connection between the beings of the world and God, even if we consider their entire existence, and thereby the existence of the world, as a falling away from God, this would only somewhat distance the difficulty, but would not eliminate it. After all, in order to flow from God, the beings of the world would have to exist in some way before this, therefore, the doctrine of emanation cannot in any way be opposed to pantheism, for it presupposes the original existence of things in God and thereby clearly presupposes pantheism . The falling away of the world from God can only be explained in the following way: either it is involuntary on the part of things, but not on the part of God - then things are plunged into a state of misfortune and malice by God; therefore, God is the author of this condition;