2. Further rise of industry and agriculture in the USSR. Early implementation of the second five-year plan. Reconstruction of agriculture and completion of collectivization. The meaning of frames. Stakhanov movement. Rising people's well-being. The rise of folk culture.

The highest and most characteristic of our people is a sense of justice and a thirst for it.

F. M. Dostoevsky

In December 1927, the collectivization of agriculture began in the USSR. This policy was aimed at forming collective farms throughout the country, which were to include individual private land owners. The implementation of collectivization plans was entrusted to activists of the revolutionary movement, as well as the so-called twenty-five thousanders. All this led to the strengthening of the role of the state in the agricultural and labor sectors in the Soviet Union. The country managed to overcome the “devastation” and industrialize industry. On the other hand, this led to mass repressions and the famous famine of 32-33.

Reasons for the transition to a policy of mass collectivization

The collectivization of agriculture was conceived by Stalin as an extreme measure with which to solve the vast majority of problems that at that time became obvious to the leadership of the Union. Highlighting the main reasons for the transition to a policy of mass collectivization, we can highlight the following:

• Crisis of 1927. The revolution, civil war and confusion in the leadership led to a record low harvest in the agricultural sector in 1927. This was a strong blow for the new Soviet government, as well as for its foreign economic activity.
• Elimination of the kulaks. The young Soviet government still saw counter-revolution and supporters of the imperial regime at every step. That is why the policy of dispossession was continued en masse.
• Centralized agricultural management. The legacy of the Soviet regime was a country where the vast majority of people were engaged in individual agriculture. The new government was not happy with this situation, since the state sought to control everything in the country. But it is very difficult to control millions of independent farmers.

Speaking about collectivization, it is necessary to understand that this process was directly related to industrialization. Industrialization means the creation of light and heavy industry, which could provide the Soviet government with everything necessary. These are the so-called five-year plans, where the whole country built factories, hydroelectric power stations, dams, and so on. This was all extremely important, since during the years of the revolution and civil war almost the entire industry Russian Empire was destroyed.

The problem was that industrialization required a large number of workers, as well as a large amount of money. Money was needed not so much to pay workers, but to purchase equipment. After all, all the equipment was produced abroad, and no equipment was produced within the country.

On initial stage Soviet leaders often said that Western countries managed to develop their own economy only thanks to their colonies, from which they squeezed all the juices. There were no such colonies in Russia, much less the Soviet Union. But according to the plan of the country’s new leadership, collective farms were to become such internal colonies. In fact, this is what happened. Collectivization created collective farms, which provided the country with food, free or very cheap labor, as well as workers with the help of which industrialization took place. It was for these purposes that a course was taken towards the collectivization of agriculture. This course was officially reversed on November 7, 1929, when an article by Stalin entitled “The Year of the Great Turning Point” appeared in the newspaper Pravda. In this article, the Soviet leader said that within a year the country should make a breakthrough from a backward individual imperialist economy to an advanced collective economy. It was in this article that Stalin openly declared that the kulaks as a class should be eliminated in the country.

On January 5, 1930, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks issued a decree on the pace of collectivization. This resolution spoke about the creation of special regions where agricultural reform was to take place first of all and in the shortest possible time. Among the main regions that were identified for reform were the following:

• North Caucasus, Volga region. Here the deadline for the creation of collective farms was set for the spring of 1931. In fact, two regions were supposed to move to collectivization in one year.
• Other grain regions. Any other regions where grain was grown on a large scale were also subject to collectivization, but until the spring of 1932.
• Other regions of the country. The remaining regions, which were less attractive in terms of agriculture, were planned to be integrated into collective farms within 5 years.

The problem was that this document clearly regulated which regions to work with and in what time frame the action should be carried out. But this same document said nothing about how collectivization of agriculture should be carried out. Actually local authorities independently began to take measures in order to solve the tasks assigned to them. And almost everyone reduced the solution to this problem to violence. The state said “We must” and turned a blind eye to how this “We must” was implemented...

Why was collectivization accompanied by dispossession?

Solving the tasks set by the country's leadership assumed the presence of two interrelated processes: the formation of collective farms and dispossession. Moreover, the first process was very dependent on the second. After all, in order to form a collective farm, it is necessary to give this economic instrument the necessary equipment for work, so that the collective farm is economically profitable and can feed itself. The state did not allocate money for this. Therefore, the path that Sharikov liked so much was adopted - to take everything away and divide it. And so they did. All “kulaks” had their property confiscated and transferred to collective farms.

But this is not the only reason why collectivization was accompanied by the dispossession of the working class. In fact, the leadership of the USSR simultaneously solved several problems:

• Collection of free tools, animals and premises for the needs of collective farms.
• Destruction of everyone who dared to express dissatisfaction with the new government.

The practical implementation of dispossession came down to the fact that the state established a standard for each collective farm. It was necessary to dispossess 5 - 7 percent of all “private” people. In practice, ideological adherents of the new regime in many regions of the country significantly exceeded this figure. As a result, it was not the established norm that was dispossessed, but up to 20% of the population!

Surprisingly, there were absolutely no criteria for defining a “fist”. And even today, historians who actively defend collectivization and the Soviet regime cannot clearly say by what principles the definition of kulak and peasant worker took place. At best, we are told that fists were meant by people who had 2 cows or 2 horses on their farm. In practice, almost no one adhered to such criteria, and even a peasant who had nothing in his soul could be declared a fist. For example, my close friend's great-grandfather was called a "kulak" because he owned a cow. For this, everything was taken away from him and he was exiled to Sakhalin. And there are thousands of such cases...

We have already talked above about the resolution of January 5, 1930. This decree is usually cited by many, but most historians forget about the appendix to this document, which gave recommendations on how to deal with fists. It is there that we can find 3 classes of fists:

• Counter-revolutionaries. The paranoid fear of the Soviet government of counter-revolution made this category of kulaks one of the most dangerous. If a peasant was recognized as a counter-revolutionary, then all his property was confiscated and transferred to collective farms, and the person himself was sent to concentration camps. Collectivization received all his property.
• Rich peasants. They also did not stand on ceremony with rich peasants. According to Stalin's plan, the property of such people was also subject to complete confiscation, and the peasants themselves, along with all members of their family, were resettled to remote regions of the country.
• Peasants with average income. The property of such people was also confiscated, and people were sent not to distant regions of the country, but to neighboring regions.

Even here it is clear that the authorities clearly divided the people and the penalties for these people. But the authorities absolutely did not indicate how to define a counter-revolutionary, how to define a rich peasant or a peasant with an average income. That is why dispossession came down to the fact that those peasants who were often called kulaks objectionable to people with weapon. This is exactly how collectivization and dispossession took place. Activists of the Soviet movement were given weapons, and they enthusiastically carried the banner of Soviet power. Often, under the banner of this power, and under the guise of collectivization, they simply settled personal scores. For this purpose, a special term “subkulak” was even coined. And even poor peasants who had nothing belonged to this category.

As a result, we see that those people who were capable of running a profitable individual economy were subjected to massive repression. In fact, these were people who for many years built their farm in such a way that it could make money. These were people who actively cared about the results of their activities. These were people who wanted and knew how to work. And all these people were removed from the village.

It was thanks to dispossession that the Soviet government organized its concentration camps, into which a huge number of people ended up. These people were used, as a rule, as free labor. Moreover, this labor was used in the most difficult jobs, which ordinary citizens did not want to work on. These were logging, oil mining, gold mining, coal mining and so on. In fact, political prisoners forged the success of those Five-Year Plans that the Soviet government so proudly reported on. But this is a topic for another article. Now it should be noted that dispossession on collective farms amounted to extreme cruelty, which caused active discontent among the local population. As a result, in many regions where collectivization was proceeding at the most active pace, mass uprisings began to be observed. They even used the army to suppress them. It became obvious that the forced collectivization of agriculture did not give the necessary success. Moreover, the discontent of the local population began to spread to the army. After all, when an army, instead of fighting the enemy, fights its own population, this greatly undermines its spirit and discipline. It became obvious that in short time It is simply impossible to drive people into collective farms.

The reasons for the appearance of Stalin’s article “Dizziness from Success”

The most active regions where mass unrest was observed were the Caucasus, middle Asia and Ukraine. People used both active and passive forms of protest. Active forms expressed themselves in demonstrations, passively in that people destroyed all their property so that it would not go to the collective farms. And such unrest and discontent among people was “achieved” in just a few months.

Already in March 1930, Stalin realized that his plan had failed. That is why on March 2, 1930, Stalin’s article “Dizziness from Success” appeared. The essence of this article was very simple. In it, Joseph Vissarionovich openly shifted all the blame for terror and violence during collectivization and dispossession onto local authorities. As a result, an ideal image of a Soviet leader who wishes the people well began to emerge. To strengthen this image, Stalin allowed everyone to voluntarily leave the collective farms; we note that these organizations cannot be violent.

As a result, a large number of people who were forcibly driven into collective farms voluntarily left them. But this was only one step back to make a powerful leap forward. Already in September 1930, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks condemned local authorities for passive actions in carrying out collectivization of the agricultural sector. The party called for active action in order to achieve a powerful entry of people into collective farms. As a result, in 1931 already 60% of peasants were on collective farms. In 1934 - 75%.

In fact, “Dizziness with Success” was necessary for the Soviet government as a means of influencing its own people. It was necessary to somehow justify the atrocities and violence that occurred within the country. The country's leadership could not take the blame, since this would instantly undermine their authority. That is why local authorities were chosen as a target for peasant hatred. And this goal was achieved. The peasants sincerely believed in Stalin’s spiritual impulses, as a result of which just a few months later they stopped resisting forced entry into the collective farm.

Results of the policy of complete collectivization of agriculture

The first results of the policy of complete collectivization were not long in coming. Grain production throughout the country decreased by 10%, the number of cattle decreased by a third, and the number of sheep by 2.5 times. Such figures are observed in all aspects of agricultural activity. Subsequently, these negative trends were overcome, but at the initial stage the negative effect was extremely strong. This negativity resulted in the famous famine of 1932-33. Today this famine is known largely due to the constant complaints of Ukraine, but in fact many regions of the Soviet Republic suffered greatly from that famine (the Caucasus and especially the Volga region). In total, the events of those years were felt by about 30 million people. According to various sources, from 3 to 5 million people died from famine. These events were caused both by the actions of the Soviet government on collectivization and by a lean year. Despite the weak harvest, almost the entire grain supply was sold abroad. This sale was necessary in order to continue industrialization. Industrialization continued, but this continuation cost millions of lives.

The collectivization of agriculture led to the fact that the rich population, the average wealthy population, and activists who simply cared for the result completely disappeared from the village. There remained people who were forcibly driven into collective farms, and who were absolutely in no way worried about the final result of their activities. This was due to the fact that the state took for itself most of what the collective farms produced. As a result, a simple peasant understood that no matter how much he grows, the state will take almost everything. People understood that even if they grew not a bucket of potatoes, but 10 bags, the state would still give them 2 kilograms of grain for it and that’s all. And this was the case with all products.

Peasants received payment for their labor for so-called workdays. The problem was that there was practically no money on collective farms. Therefore, the peasants received not money, but products. This trend changed only in the 60s. Then they began to give out money, but the money was very small. Collectivization was accompanied by the fact that the peasants were given what simply allowed them to feed themselves. The fact that during the years of collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union, passports were issued deserves special mention. A fact that is not widely discussed today is that peasants were not entitled to a passport. As a result, the peasant could not go to live in the city because he did not have documents. In fact, people remained tied to the place where they were born.

Final results

And if we leave Soviet propaganda and if we look at the events of those days independently, we will see clear signs that make collectivization and serfdom similar. How did serfdom develop in imperial Russia? The peasants lived in communities in the village, they did not receive money, they obeyed the owner, and were limited in freedom of movement. The situation with collective farms was the same. The peasants lived in communities on collective farms, for their work they received not money, but food, they were subordinate to the head of the collective farm, and due to the lack of passports they could not leave the collective. In fact, the Soviet government, under the slogans of socialization, returned serfdom. Yes, this serfdom was ideologically consistent, but the essence does not change. Subsequently, these negative elements were largely eliminated, but at the initial stage everything happened exactly like that.

Collectivization, on the one hand, was based on absolutely anti-human principles, on the other hand, it allowed the young Soviet government to industrialize and stand firmly on its feet. Which of these is more important? Everyone must answer this question for themselves. The only thing that can be said with absolute certainty is that the success of the first Five-Year Plans is based not on the genius of Stalin, but solely on terror, violence and blood.

Results and consequences of collectivization

The main results of the complete collectivization of agriculture can be expressed in the following theses:

• A terrible famine that killed millions of people.
• Complete destruction of all individual peasants who wanted and knew how to work.
• The growth rate of agriculture was very low because people were not interested in the end result of their work.
• Agriculture became completely collective, eliminating everything private.

COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

Plan

1. Introduction.

Collectivization- the process of uniting individual peasant farms into collective farms (collective farms in the USSR). The decision on collectivization was made at the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1927. It was carried out in the USSR in the late 1920s - early 1930s (1928-1933); in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, collectivization was completed in 1949-1950.

Goal of collectivization :

1) establishment of socialist production relations in the countryside,

2) transformation of small-scale individual farms into large, highly productive public cooperative industries.

Reasons for collectivization:

1) The implementation of grandiose industrialization required a radical restructuring of the agricultural sector.

2) In Western countries, the agricultural revolution, i.e. a system of improving agricultural production that preceded the industrial revolution. In the USSR, both of these processes had to be carried out simultaneously.

3) The village was considered not only as a source of food, but also as the most important channel for replenishing financial resources for the needs of industrialization.

In December, Stalin announced the end of the NEP and the transition to a policy of “liquidation of the kulaks as a class.” On January 5, 1930, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks issued a resolution “On the pace of collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction.” It set strict deadlines for completing collectivization: for the North Caucasus, Lower and Middle Volga - autumn 1930, in extreme cases - spring 1931, for other grain regions - autumn 1931 or no later than spring 1932. All other regions had to “solve the problem of collectivization within five years.” This formulation aimed to complete collectivization by the end of the first five-year plan. 2. Main part.

Dispossession. Two interrelated violent processes took place in the village: the creation of collective farms and dispossession. The “liquidation of the kulaks” was aimed primarily at providing collective farms with a material base. From the end of 1929 to the middle of 1930, over 320 thousand peasant farms were dispossessed. Their property is worth more than 175 million rubles. transferred to collective farms.

In the generally accepted sense, a fist- this is someone who used hired labor, but this category could also include a middle peasant who had two cows, or two horses, or a good house. Each district received a dispossession norm, which equaled on average 5-7% of the number of peasant households, but local authorities, following the example of the first five-year plan, tried to exceed it. Often, not only the middle peasants, but also, for some reason, the unwanted poor people were registered as kulaks. To justify these actions, the ominous word “podkulaknik” was coined. In some areas the number of dispossessed people reached 15-20%. The liquidation of the kulaks as a class, depriving the village of the most enterprising, most independent peasants, undermined the spirit of resistance. In addition, the fate of the dispossessed should have served as an example to others, to those who did not want to voluntarily go to the collective farm. Kulaks were evicted with their families, infants, and old people. In cold, unheated carriages, with a minimum amount of household belongings, thousands of people traveled to remote areas of the Urals, Siberia, and Kazakhstan. The most active “anti-Soviet” activists were sent to concentration camps. To assist local authorities, 25 thousand urban communists (“twenty-five thousanders”) were sent to the village. "Dizziness from success." By the spring of 1930, it became clear to Stalin that the insane collectivization launched at his call was threatening disaster. Discontent began to permeate the army. Stalin made a well-calculated tactical move. On March 2, Pravda published his article “Dizziness from Success.” He placed all the blame for the current situation on the executors, local workers, declaring that “collective farms cannot be established by force.” After this article, most peasants began to perceive Stalin as a people's protector. A mass exodus of peasants from collective farms began. But a step back was taken only to immediately take a dozen steps forward. In September 1930, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) sent a letter to local party organizations, in which it condemned their passive behavior, fear of “excesses” and demanded “to achieve a powerful rise in the collective farm movement.” In September 1931, collective farms united already 60% of peasant households, in 1934 - 75%. 3.Results of collectivization.

The policy of complete collectivization led to catastrophic results: in 1929-1934. gross grain production decreased by 10%, the number of cattle and horses for 1929-1932. decreased by one third, pigs - 2 times, sheep - 2.5 times. Extermination of livestock, ruin of the village by continuous dispossession, complete disorganization of the work of collective farms in 1932-1933. led to an unprecedented famine that affected approximately 25-30 million people. To a large extent, it was provoked by the policies of the authorities. The country's leadership, trying to hide the scale of the tragedy, banned mention of the famine in the media. Despite its scale, 18 million centners of grain were exported abroad to obtain foreign currency for the needs of industrialization. However, Stalin celebrated his victory: despite the reduction in grain production, its supplies to the state doubled. But most importantly, collectivization created the necessary conditions for the implementation of plans for an industrial leap. It placed at the disposal of the city a huge number of workers, simultaneously eliminating agrarian overpopulation, made it possible, with a significant decrease in the number of employees, to maintain agricultural production at a level that prevented prolonged famine, and provided industry with the necessary raw materials. Collectivization not only created the conditions for pumping funds from villages to cities for the needs of industrialization, but also fulfilled an important political and ideological task by destroying the last island of a market economy - privately owned peasant farming.

All-Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks of the USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Reason 3 - But it is much easier to siphon funds from several hundred large farms than to deal with millions of small ones. That is why, with the beginning of industrialization, a course was taken towards the collectivization of agriculture - “the implementation of socialist transformations in the countryside.” NEP - New Economic Policy

Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks - Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks

"Dizziness from success"

In many areas, especially in Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia, the peasantry resisted mass dispossession. Regular units of the Red Army were brought in to suppress peasant unrest. But most often, peasants used passive forms of protest: they refused to join collective farms, they destroyed livestock and equipment as a sign of protest. Terrorist acts were also committed against the “twenty-five thousanders” and local collective farm activists. Collective farm holiday. Artist S. Gerasimov.

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Subtitles

Agriculture in Russia before collectivization

The country's agriculture was undermined by the First World War and the Civil War. According to the All-Russian Agricultural Census of 1917, the working-age male population in the village decreased by 47.4% compared to 1914; the number of horses - the main draft force - from 17.9 million to 12.8 million. The number of livestock and sown areas decreased, and agricultural yields decreased. A food crisis has begun in the country. Even two years after the end of the civil war, grain crops amounted to only 63.9 million hectares (1923).

IN Last year In his life, V.I. Lenin called, in particular, for the development of the cooperative movement. It is known that before dictating the article “On Cooperation,” V.I. Lenin ordered literature on cooperation from the library, among others there was a book by A. V. Chayanov “Basic ideas and forms of organization of peasant cooperation” (Moscow, 1919). And in the Lenin library in the Kremlin there were seven works by A.V. Chayanov. A. V. Chayanov highly appreciated V. I. Lenin’s article “On Cooperation.” He believed that after this Leninist work, “cooperation is becoming one of the foundations of our economic policy. During the NEP years, cooperation began to be actively restored. According to the memoirs of the former Chairman of the USSR Government A.N. Kosygin (he worked in the leadership until the early 1930s cooperative organizations in Siberia), “the main thing that forced him to “leave the ranks of cooperators” was that collectivization, which unfolded in Siberia in the early 30s, meant, paradoxical as it may be at first glance, disorganization and largely powerful , covering all corners of Siberia cooperative network".

The restoration of pre-war grain sown areas - 94.7 million hectares - was achieved only by 1927 (the total sown area in 1927 was 112.4 million hectares against 105 million hectares in 1913). It was also possible to slightly exceed the pre-war level (1913) of productivity: the average yield of grain crops for 1924-1928 reached 7.5 c/ha. It was practically possible to restore the livestock population (with the exception of horses). Gross grain production by the end of the recovery period (1928) reached 733.2 million quintals. The marketability of grain farming remained extremely low - in 1926/27, the average marketability of grain farming was 13.3% (47.2% - collective and state farms, 20.0% - kulaks, 11.2% - poor and middle peasants). In the gross grain production, collective and state farms accounted for 1.7%, kulaks - 13%, middle peasants and poor peasants - 85.3%. The number of private peasant farms by 1926 reached 24.6 million, the average crop area was less than 4.5 hectares (1928), more than 30% of farms did not have the means (tools, draft animals) to cultivate the land. The low level of agricultural technology of small individual farms had no further prospects for growth. In 1928, 9.8% of the sown areas were plowed with a plow, three-quarters of the sowing was done by hand, 44% of grain harvesting was done with a sickle and scythe, and 40.7% of threshing was done by non-mechanical (manual) methods (flail, etc.).

As a result of the transfer of landowners' lands to the peasants, peasant farms were fragmented into small plots. By 1928, their number increased one and a half times compared to 1913 - from 16 to 25 million

By 1928-29 share of poor people in rural population The USSR accounted for 35%, middle peasants - 60%, kulaks - 5%. At the same time, it was the kulak farms that had a significant part (15-20%) of the means of production, including about a third of agricultural machines.

"Bread Strike"

The course towards collectivization of agriculture was proclaimed at the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (December 1927). As of July 1, 1927, there were 14.88 thousand collective farms in the country; for the same period 1928 - 33.2 thousand, 1929 - St. 57 thousand. They united 194.7 thousand, 416.7 thousand and 1,007.7 thousand individual farms, respectively. Among the organizational forms of collective farms, partnerships for joint cultivation of land (TOZs) predominated; There were also agricultural cooperatives and communes. To support collective farms, the state provided various incentive measures - interest-free loans, the supply of agricultural machinery and implements, and the provision of tax benefits.

Already by November 1927, a problem arose with providing food to some industrial centers. The simultaneous increase in prices in cooperative and private shops for food products with a decrease in planned supplies led to an increase in discontent in the working environment.

To ensure grain procurements, the authorities in many regions of the USSR returned to procurement on the principles of surplus appropriation. Such actions, however, were condemned in the Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 10, 1928, “The Policy of Grain Procurement in Connection with the General Economic Situation.”

At the same time, the practice of collective farming in 1928 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus showed that collective and state farms have more opportunities to overcome crises (natural, wars, etc.). According to Stalin's plan, it was large industrial grain farms - state farms created on state lands - that could “solve grain difficulties” and avoid difficulties in providing the country with the necessary amount of marketable grain. On July 11, 1928, the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the organization of new (grain) state farms,” which stated: “to approve the task for 1928 with a total plowed area sufficient to obtain 5-7 million poods in 1929 commercial bread."

The result of this resolution was the adoption of the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated August 1, 1928 “On the organization of large grain farms”, paragraph 1 of which read: “It is recognized as necessary to organize new large grain Soviet farms (grain factories) on free land funds, taking this into account in order to ensure the receipt of marketable grain from these farms in an amount of at least 100,000,000 poods (1,638,000 tons) by the harvest of 1933.” It was planned to unite the new Soviet farms being created into a trust of all-Union significance “Zernotrest”, directly subordinate to the Council of Labor and Defense.

A repeated grain crop failure in Ukraine in 1928 brought the country to the brink of famine, which, despite the measures taken (food aid, reduction in the level of supply to cities, the introduction of a rationing supply system), occurred in certain regions (in particular, in Ukraine).

Considering the lack of state reserves of grain, a number of Soviet leaders (N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, M.P. Tomsky) proposed slowing down the pace of industrialization, abandoning the development of collective farm construction and the “attack on the kulaks, returning to the free sale of grain, raising prices by 2-3 times, and buying the missing bread abroad.”

This proposal was rejected by Stalin, and the practice of “pressure” was continued (mainly at the expense of the grain-producing regions of Siberia, which were less affected by crop failures).

This crisis became the starting point for a “radical solution to the grain problem,” expressed in “the development of socialist construction in the countryside, planting state and collective farms capable of using tractors and other modern machines” (from I. Stalin’s speech at the XVI Congress of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) ( 1930)).

Goals and objectives of collectivization

The party leadership saw a way out of the “grain difficulties” in the reorganization of agriculture, providing for the creation of state farms and the collectivization of poor and middle peasant farms while simultaneously resolutely fighting the kulaks. According to the initiators of collectivization, the main problem of agriculture was its fragmentation: most farms were in small private ownership with a high share of manual labor, which did not allow satisfying the growing demand of the urban population for food products, and industry for agricultural raw materials. Collectivization was supposed to solve the problem of the limited distribution of industrial crops in small-scale individual farming and create the necessary raw material base for the processing industry. It was also intended to reduce the cost of agricultural products for the end consumer by eliminating the chain of intermediaries, as well as through mechanization to increase the productivity and efficiency of labor in agriculture, which was supposed to free up additional labor resources for industry. The result of collectivization was supposed to be the availability of a marketable mass of agricultural products in quantities sufficient to form food reserves and supply the rapidly growing urban population with food. [ ]

Unlike previous major agrarian reforms in Russia, such as the abolition of serfdom in 1861 or the Stolypin agrarian reform of 1906, collectivization was not accompanied by any clearly formulated program and detailed instructions for its implementation, while attempts by local leaders to obtain clarification were stopped by disciplinary means. The signal for a radical change in policy towards the village was given in the speech of I.V. 

Stalin at the Communist Academy in December 1929, although no specific instructions were given for collectivization, except for the call to “liquidate the kulaks as a class.”

Complete collectivization

The transition to complete collectivization was carried out against the backdrop of an armed conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway and the outbreak of the global economic crisis, which caused serious concerns among the party leadership about the possibility of a new military intervention against the USSR. At the same time, some positive examples of collective farming, as well as successes in the development of consumer and agricultural cooperation, led to not entirely the current situation in agriculture.

Since the spring of 1929, events aimed at increasing the number of collective farms were carried out in the countryside - in particular, Komsomol campaigns “for collectivization.” In the RSFSR, the institute of agricultural commissioners was created; in Ukraine, much attention was paid to those preserved from the civil war to the komnesams(analogous to the Russian commander). Mainly through the use of administrative measures, it was possible to achieve a significant increase in collective farms (mainly in the form of TOZs).

In the countryside, forced grain procurements, accompanied by mass arrests and destruction of farms, led to riots, the number of which by the end of 1929 numbered in the hundreds. Not wanting to give property and livestock to collective farms and fearing the repression that wealthy peasants were subjected to, people slaughtered livestock and reduced crops.

Meanwhile, the November (1929) plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the results and further tasks of collective farm construction,” in which it noted that the country had begun a large-scale socialist reorganization of the countryside and the construction of large-scale socialist agriculture. The resolution indicated the need for a transition to complete collectivization in certain regions. At the plenum it was decided to send to collective farms permanent job 25 thousand urban workers (twenty-five thousand people) for “the management of the created collective and state farms” (in fact, their number subsequently almost tripled, amounting to over 73 thousand).

This caused sharp resistance from the peasantry. According to data from various sources cited by O. V. Khlevnyuk, in January 1930, 346 mass protests were registered, in which 125 thousand people took part, in February - 736 (220 thousand), in the first two weeks of March - 595 ( about 230 thousand), not counting Ukraine, where 500 were engulfed in unrest settlements. In March 1930, in general, in Belarus, the Central Black Earth region, in the Lower and Middle Volga region, in the North Caucasus, in Siberia, in the Urals, in the Leningrad, Moscow, Western, Ivanovo-Voznesensk regions, in the Crimea and Central Asia, 1642 mass peasant uprisings, in which at least 750-800 thousand people took part. In Ukraine at this time, more than a thousand settlements were already engulfed in unrest. IN post-war period in Western Ukraine, the collectivization process was opposed by the OUN underground.

XVI Congress of the CPSU(b)

Collectivization was carried out primarily through forced administrative methods. Excessively centralized management and at the same time the predominantly low qualification level of local managers, equalization, and the race to “exceed plans” had a negative impact on the collective farm system as a whole. Despite the excellent harvest of 1930, a number of collective farms were left without seed by the spring of the following year, while in the fall some of the grain was not fully harvested. Low wage standards on Kolkhoz Commodity Farms (KTF), against the backdrop of the general unpreparedness of collective farms for large-scale commercial livestock farming (lack of necessary premises for farms, stock of feed, regulatory documents and qualified personnel (veterinarians, livestock breeders, etc.)) led to mass death of livestock.

An attempt to improve the situation by adopting on July 30, 1931 the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR “On the development of socialist livestock farming” in practice led locally to the forced socialization of cows and small livestock. This practice was condemned by the Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of March 26, 1932.

The severe drought that struck the country in 1931 and mismanagement of the harvest led to a significant decrease in the gross grain harvest (694.8 million quintals in 1931 versus 835.4 million quintals in 1930).

Famine in the USSR (1932-1933)

Despite the failure of the harvest, local efforts were made to meet and exceed the planned norms for the collection of agricultural products - the same applied to the plan for grain exports, despite a significant drop in prices on the world market. This, like a number of other factors, ultimately led to a difficult food situation and famine in villages and small towns in the east of the country in the winter of 1931-1932. The freezing of winter crops in 1932 and the fact that a significant number of collective farms approached the sowing campaign of 1932 without seed material and draft animals (which died or were unsuitable for work due to poor care and lack of feed, which were paid towards the general grain procurement plan ), led to a significant deterioration in the prospects for the 1932 harvest. Across the country, plans for export supplies (about three times), planned grain procurements (by 22%) and delivery of livestock (by 2 times) were reduced, but general situation this no longer helped - repeated crop failure (death of winter crops, lack of sowing, partial drought, decreased yields caused by violation of basic agronomic principles, large losses during harvesting and a number of other reasons) led to severe famine in the winter of 1932 - spring of 1933.

Elimination of the kulaks as a class

By the beginning of complete collectivization, the view prevailed in the party leadership that the main obstacle to the unification of poor and middle peasants was the more prosperous stratum in the countryside that had formed during the years of the NEP - the kulaks, as well as those who supported them or were dependent on them social group - "subkulak".

As part of the implementation of complete collectivization, this obstacle had to be “removed.”

On January 30, 1930, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On measures to eliminate kulak farms in areas of complete collectivization.” At the same time, it was noted that the starting point for the “liquidation of the kulak as a class” was the publication in newspapers of all levels of Stalin’s speech at the congress of Marxist agrarians in late December 1929. A number of historians note that planning for “liquidation” took place in early December 1929 - in the so-called. “Yakovlev Commission” since the number and “areas” of eviction of “1st category kulaks” had already been approved by January 1, 1930.

"Fists" were divided into three categories:

• 1st - counter-revolutionary activists: kulaks who actively oppose the organization of collective farms, fleeing from their permanent place of residence and going into hiding;

The heads of kulak families of the first category were arrested, and cases about their actions were transferred to the “troikas” consisting of representatives of the OGPU, regional committees (territorial committees) of the CPSU (b) and the prosecutor’s office.

• 2nd - the richest local kulak authorities, who are the stronghold of the anti-Soviet activists;

Dispossessed peasants of the second category, as well as families of kulaks of the first category, were evicted to remote areas of the country in a special settlement, or labor settlement (otherwise it was called “kulak exile” or “labor exile”). The certificate from the Department of Special Resettlers of the Gulag OGPU indicated that in 1930-1931. 381,026 families with a total number of 1,803,392 people were evicted (and sent to a special settlement), including 63,720 families from Ukraine, of which: to the Northern Territory - 19,658, to the Urals - 32,127, to Western Siberia- 6556, to Eastern Siberia - 5056, to Yakutia - 97, Far Eastern Territory - 323.

• 3rd - the remaining fists.

Kulaks classified in the third category, as a rule, were resettled within the region or region, that is, they were not sent to a special settlement.

In practice, not only kulaks were subjected to eviction with confiscation of property, but also the so-called sub-kulaks, that is, middle peasants, poor peasants and even farm laborers convicted of pro-kulak and anti-collective farm actions (there were also many cases of settling scores with neighbors and déjà vu “rob the loot”). - which clearly contradicted the point clearly stated in the resolution about the inadmissibility of “infringement” of the middle peasant.

To oust the kulaks as a class, the policy of limiting and ousting its individual detachments is not enough. In order to oust the kulaks as a class, it is necessary to break the resistance of this class in open battle and deprive it of production sources of existence and development (free use of land, tools of production, rent, the right to hire labor, etc.).

Collective farm construction in the vast majority of German villages in the Siberian region was carried out as a result of administrative pressure, without sufficient consideration of the degree of organizational and political preparation for it. Dispossession measures were used in many cases as a measure of influence against middle peasants who did not want to join collective farms. Thus, measures aimed exclusively against kulaks affected a significant number of middle peasants in German villages. These methods not only did not contribute, but repelled the German peasantry from collective farms. It is enough to point out that of the total number of kulaks expelled administratively in the Omsk District, half were returned by the OGPU authorities from assembly points and from the road.

Management of the resettlement (timing, number and selection of resettlement sites) was carried out by the Sector of Land Funds and Resettlement of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR (1930-1933), the Resettlement Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR (1930-1931), the Sector of Land Funds and Resettlement of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR (Reorganized) (1931-1933) , ensured the resettlement of the OGPU.

The deportees, in violation of existing instructions, were provided with little or no necessary food and equipment in the new places of resettlement (especially in the first years of mass expulsion), which often had no prospects for agricultural use.

Collectivization of agriculture in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which became part of the USSR in pre-war years, was completed in 1949-1950.

Export of grain and import of agricultural equipment during collectivization

Since the late 80s, the history of collectivization has included the opinion of some Western historians that “Stalin organized collectivization to obtain money for industrialization through the extensive export of agricultural products (mainly grain)” [ ] .

• Import of agricultural machinery and tractors (thousands of red rubles): 1926/27 - 25,971, 1927/28 - 23,033, 1928/29 - 45,595, 1929/30 - 113,443, 1931 - 97,534, 1932-420.
• Export of bakery products (million rubles): 1926/27 - 202.6, 1927/28 - 32.8, 1928/29 - 15.9, 1930-207.1, 1931-157.6, 1932 - 56.8.

Total, for the period 1926 - 33. grain was exported for 672.8 million rubles, and equipment was imported for 306 million rubles.

In addition, during the period 1927-32, the state imported breeding cattle worth about 100 million rubles. Imports of fertilizers and equipment intended for the production of tools and mechanisms for agriculture were also very significant.

Consequences of collectivization

As a result of Stalin's collectivization policy: more than 2 million peasants were deported, of which 1,800,000 were deported in 1930-1931 alone; 6 million died of hunger, hundreds of thousands were in exile.

This policy caused a lot of uprisings among the population. In March 1930 alone, the OGPU counted 6,500 mass protests, of which 800 were suppressed using weapons. Overall, during 1930, some 2.5 million peasants took part in 14,000 uprisings against the Soviet collectivization policy.

In one interview, professor of political science at Moscow State University and Ph.D. Alexey Kara-Murza expressed the opinion that collectivization was a direct genocide of the Soviet people. But this issue remains debatable.

There is also an opinion that collectivization led to the disappearance of Russian civilization (in the terminology of A. Toynbee).

Theme of collectivization in art

Fiction:

• M.A.  Sholokhov. " Virgin soil raised
• "(1937) - shows the process of formation of collective farms, collectivization on the Don. IN AND. Belov. ".
• Eves", "The Year of the Great Turning Point" AND I.  Egorov. " Lush Herbs

"(1940) - about collectivization in Kuban.

• Music and cinema:
• Take us for a ride, Petrusha, on a tractor (song) - music: Vladimir Zakharov; words: Ivan Molchanov, 1929

Virgin Soil Upturned (film, 1959-1961) - a film adaptation of the novel of the same name by M.A. Sholokhov.

The first attempts at collectivization were made by the Soviet government immediately after the revolution. However, at that time there were many more serious problems. The decision to carry out collectivization in the USSR was made at the 15th Party Congress in 1927. The reasons for collectivization were, first of all:

• the need for large investments in industry to industrialize the country;
• and the “grain procurement crisis” that the authorities faced in the late 20s.

The collectivization of peasant farms began in 1929. During this period, taxes on individual farms were significantly increased. The process of dispossession began - deprivation of property and, often, deportation of wealthy peasants. There was a massive slaughter of livestock - the peasants did not want to give it to collective farms. Members of the Politburo who objected to harsh pressure on the peasantry (Rykov, Bukharin) were accused of right-wing deviation.

But, according to Stalin, the process was not going fast enough. In the winter of 1930, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decided to carry out complete collectivization of agriculture in the USSR as quickly as possible, within 1–2 years. Peasants were forced to join collective farms under the threat of dispossession. The seizure of bread from the village led to a terrible famine in 1932-33, which broke out in many regions of the USSR. During that period, according to minimal estimates, 2.5 million people died.

As a result, collectivization dealt a significant blow to agriculture. Grain production decreased, the number of cows and horses decreased by more than 2 times. From mass dispossession (at least 10 million were dispossessed during the period from 1929 to 1933) and entry into collective farms, only the poorest layers of peasants benefited. The situation in rural areas improved somewhat only during the 2nd Five-Year Plan period. Carrying out collectivization became one of the important stages in the approval of the new regime.

The year 1929 marked the beginning of the complete collectivization of agriculture in the USSR. In the famous article by J.V. Stalin “The Year of the Great Turning Point,” accelerated collective farm construction was recognized as the main task, the solution of which in three years would make the country “one of the most grain-producing, if not the most grain-producing country in the world.” The choice was made in favor of the liquidation of individual farms, dispossession, destruction of the grain market, and the actual nationalization of the village economy. What was behind this decision?

On the one hand, there was a growing conviction that economics always follows politics, and political expediency is higher than economic laws. These are the conclusions that the leadership of the CPSU(b) made from the experience of resolving the grain procurement crises of 1926-1929. The essence of the grain procurement crisis was that individual peasants were reducing grain supplies to the state and disrupting the planned indicators: fixed purchase prices were too low, and systematic attacks on the “village world-eaters” did not encourage an expansion of sown areas and an increase in yields. The party and the state assessed the problems, which were economic in nature, as political. The proposed solutions were appropriate: a ban on free trade in grain, confiscation of grain reserves, incitement of the poor against the wealthy part of the village. The results convinced of the effectiveness of violent measures.

On the other hand, the accelerated industrialization that began required colossal investments. Their main source was recognized as the village, which, according to the plans of the developers of the new general line, was supposed to uninterruptedly supply industry with raw materials, and cities with practically free food.

The collectivization policy was carried out in two main directions: the unification of individual farms into collective farms and dispossession.

Collective farms were recognized as the main form of association of individual farms. They socialized land, cattle, and equipment.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 5, 1930 established a truly rapid pace of collectivization: in key grain-producing regions (Volga region, North Caucasus) it was to be completed within one year; in Ukraine, in the black earth regions of Russia, in Kazakhstan - for two years; in other areas - for three years. To speed up collectivization, “ideologically literate” urban workers were sent to the villages (first 25 thousand, and then another 35 thousand people). The hesitations, doubts, mental tossing of individual peasants, for the most part tied to their own farm, to the land, to livestock (“... I am left in the past with one foot, I slide and fall with the other,” Sergei Yesenin wrote on another occasion), were simply overcome - by force. Punitive authorities deprived those who persisted of voting rights, confiscated property, intimidated them, and put them under arrest.

In parallel with collectivization, there was a campaign of dispossession, the elimination of the kulaks as a class.

A secret directive was adopted on this score, according to which all the kulaks (who was meant by a kulak was not clearly defined in it) were divided into three categories: participants in anti-Soviet movements; wealthy owners who had influence on their neighbors; everyone else. The first were subject to arrest and transfer into the hands of the OGPU; the second - eviction to remote regions of the Urals, Kazakhstan, Siberia along with their families; still others - resettlement to poorer lands in the same area. Land, property, and monetary savings of the kulaks were subject to confiscation. The tragedy of the situation was aggravated by the fact that for all categories, firm targets were set for each region, which exceeded the actual number of wealthy peasants. There were also so-called sub-kulak members, “accomplices of the world-eating enemies” (“... the most ragged farm laborer can quite be counted among the sub-kulak members,” testifies A.I. Solzhenitsyn). According to historians, on the eve of collectivization there were about 3% of wealthy households; In some areas, up to 10-15% of individual farms were subject to dispossession. Arrests, executions, relocation to remote areas - the entire range of repressive means was used during dispossession, which affected at least 1 million households (the average number of families is 7-8 people).

The response was mass unrest, livestock slaughter, hidden and overt resistance. The state had to temporarily retreat: Stalin’s article “Dizziness from Success” (spring 1930) placed responsibility for violence and coercion on local authorities. The reverse process began, millions of peasants left the collective farms. But already in the autumn of 1930 the pressure intensified again. In 1932-1933 famine came to the most grain-producing regions of the country, primarily to Ukraine, Stavropol, and the North Caucasus. According to the most conservative estimates, more than 3 million people died of starvation (according to other sources, up to 8 million). At the same time, both grain exports from the country and the volume of government supplies grew steadily. By 1933, more than 60% of peasants belonged to collective farms, by 1937 - about 93%. Collectivization was declared complete.

What are its results? Statistics show that it caused irreparable damage to the agricultural economy (reduction in grain production, livestock numbers, yields, sown areas, etc.). At the same time, state grain procurements increased by 2 times, taxes from collective farms - by 3.5 times. Behind this obvious contradiction lay the true tragedy of the Russian peasantry. Of course, large, technically equipped farms had certain advantages. But that was not the main thing. Collective farms, which formally remained voluntary cooperative associations, in fact turned into a type of state enterprise that had strict planned targets and were subject to directive management. During the passport reform, collective farmers did not receive passports: in fact, they were attached to the collective farm and deprived of freedom of movement. Industry grew at the expense of agriculture. Collectivization turned collective farms into reliable and uncomplaining suppliers of raw materials, food, capital, and labor. Moreover, it destroyed an entire social layer of individual peasants with their culture, moral values, and foundations. It was replaced by a new class - the collective farm peasantry.

39. Foreign policy of the USSR in the 20–30s. (Ticket 15)

Foreign policy of the USSR in the 20s. identified two contradictory principles. The first principle recognized the need to break out of foreign political isolation, strengthen the country’s position in the international arena, and establish mutually beneficial trade and economic relations with other states. The second principle followed the traditional doctrine of world communist revolutions for Bolshevism and demanded that the revolutionary movement in other countries be supported as actively as possible. The implementation of the first principle was carried out primarily by the bodies of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the second - by the structures of the Third International (Comintern, created in 1919).

In the first direction in the 20s. a lot has been achieved. In 1920, Russia signed peace treaties with Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland (countries that were part of the Russian Empire before the revolution). Since 1921, the conclusion of trade and economic agreements began (with England, Germany, Norway, Italy, etc.). In 1922, for the first time in the post-revolutionary years Soviet Russia took part in an international conference in Genoa. Main question, over which the struggle unfolded, was associated with the settlement of Russia's debts to European countries. The Genoa Conference did not bring any results, but during its days Russia and Germany signed the Treaty of Rapallo on the restoration of diplomatic relations and trade cooperation.

From that moment on, Soviet-German relations acquired a special character: Germany, which lost the First World War and, under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, was reduced to the position of a second-class European country, needed allies. Russia, in turn, received serious support in its struggle to overcome international isolation.

The years 1924-1925 were turning points in this sense. The USSR was recognized by Great Britain, France, Italy, Austria, Norway, Sweden, China, etc. Trade, economic and military-technical relations continued to develop most intensively until 1933 with Germany, as well as with the USA (although the USA officially recognized the USSR only in 1933).

The course towards peaceful coexistence (this term, it is believed, was first used by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin) coexisted with attempts to ignite the fire of the world revolution, to destabilize the situation in the very countries with which mutually beneficial relations were established with such difficulty. There are many examples. In 1923, the Comintern allocated significant funds to support revolutionary uprisings in Germany and Bulgaria. In 1921-1927 The USSR most directly participated in the creation of the Communist Party of China and in the development of the Chinese revolution (even to the point of sending military advisers to the country led by Marshal V.K. Blucher). In 1926, trade unions provided financial assistance to striking English miners, which provoked a crisis in Soviet-British relations and their rupture (1927). Significant adjustments to the activities of the Comintern were made in 1928. In the leadership of the CPSU (b), J.V. Stalin’s point of view on building socialism in a single country prevailed. She assigned a subordinate role to the world revolution. From now on, the activities of the Comintern were strictly subordinated to the main foreign policy line pursued by the USSR.

In 1933, the international situation changed. The National Socialists, led by A. Hitler, came to power in Germany. Germany set a course for scrapping the Versailles system, military construction, and preparing for war in Europe. The USSR was faced with a choice: either remain faithful to its traditionally friendly policy towards Germany, or look for ways to isolate Germany, which did not hide its aggressive aspirations. Until 1939, Soviet foreign policy was generally anti-German in nature and was aimed at creating a system of collective security in Europe (admission of the USSR to the League of Nations in 1934, the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935, support for anti-fascist forces in Spain in 1936-1939). The Comintern pursued a consistent anti-fascist policy during these years.

However military threat from Germany continued to grow. England, France, and the USA showed puzzling passivity. A policy of appeasement of the aggressor was carried out, the pinnacle of which was the agreement signed in October 1938 in Munich by England, France, Germany and Italy, which actually recognized Germany’s annexation of part of Czechoslovakia. In March 1939, Germany captured all of Czechoslovakia. The last attempt was made to organize an effective, effective anti-Hitler coalition: the USSR in April 1939 proposed that England and France conclude an agreement on a military alliance and mutual assistance in case of aggression. Negotiations began, but both Western countries and the USSR did not show much activity in them, secretly counting on the possibility of an alliance with Germany.

Meanwhile, an extremely difficult situation was developing on the eastern borders of the USSR. Japan captured Manchuria (1931), signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany (1936), and provoked serious border clashes at Lake Khasan (1938) and the Khalkhin Gol River (1939).

On August 23, 1939, the foreign ministers of the USSR and Germany V. M. Molotov and I. Ribbentrop signed a non-aggression pact and secret protocols to it in Moscow. On September 28, the Soviet-German Treaty “On Friendship and Border” was concluded. Secret protocols and treaties established zones of Soviet and German influence in Europe. The zone of influence of the USSR included Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, Bessarabia. The assessment of these documents causes controversy among historians. Many are inclined to believe that the signing of the non-aggression pact was a necessary measure aimed at delaying the involvement of the USSR, not prepared for war, in a military conflict with Germany, while pushing back the borders and overcoming the deadlock in relations with France and England. The secret protocols and the agreement of September 28, 1939 are assessed, as a rule, negatively, although they have many supporters.

On September 1, 1939, Hitler attacked Poland. The Second has begun World War. Two weeks later, the USSR sent troops into Western Ukraine and Belarus, in November demanded that Finland cede the territory of the Karelian Isthmus in exchange for other territories and, having received a refusal, began military operations (a peace treaty with Finland was concluded in March 1940, the USSR received the Karelian Isthmus isthmus with Vyborg, but suffered significant losses). In 1940, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Bessarabia became part of the USSR.

In 1940, Hitler gave the order to develop a plan for the invasion of the USSR (“Plan Barbarossa”). In December, Directive No. 21 was adopted, approving this plan. There were only a few months left before the start of the Great Patriotic War. Meanwhile, the USSR continued to strictly comply with all agreements with Germany, including on the supply of strategic materials, weapons and food.

40. The Great Patriotic War: main stages and battles. The role of the USSR in World War II. (Ticket 16)

The main stages and events of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War in 1939 – 1942

1) Initial period war before the attack on the USSR.1.09.1939 German attack on Poland. 62 German divisions against 32 Polish. 3.09.1939 - England and France declare war on Germany. End of September - surrender of Polish troops. 20.09.1939 - Warsaw fell. Reasons for the quick surrender: Germany's military-technical superiority, Poland's unpreparedness for war, failure of the allies to fulfill their duty. End of September - entry of Red Army troops into Polish territory. Soviet Union pushes the borders to the West and reclaims historical lands. 28.09.1939 - Treaty of friendship and border between the USSR and Germany.

September 1939 - April 1940 - “strange war” in Western Europe. Lack of active hostilities. November 1939 - March 1940 - war between the USSR and Finland. 9.04.1940 German attack on Denmark and Norway. The beginning of German aggression in the West. The “strange war” is over. Denmark capitulated within one day. 10.05.1940 -German attack on Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and France. The combat operations are led by: Rundstedt, Bock, Kleis. 14.05.1940 - Holland capitulated. 17.05.1940 Brussels fell. 28.05.1940 - Belgium capitulated. At the end of May, Allied troops found themselves pressed to the coast North Sea in the area of ​​the city of Dunkirk. “The Miracle of Dunkirk” is one of the mysteries of World War II. What happened? Either the Germans, by allowing the Allies to evacuate, were counting on England's favor, or they made a military miscalculation by overestimating the capabilities of Goering's operation. The Allies managed to evacuate. 10.06.1940 Italy declares war on the Anglo-French coalition. In June, the government in England changes. Churchill replaces Chamberlain. 14.06. -Paris fell. The French declared Paris an open city, not conceding it, but letting in everyone. 22.06.1940 France capitulated. France found itself occupied. In the southern part of France, a puppet regime emerged, called Vichy. Led by Marshal Pétain. One of the French generals did not accept the surrender (Charles de Gaulle), he called himself the head of all free French.

Summer-autumn 1940 - Battle of England.

19.07. Hitler offered Britain a peace treaty. England rejected him.

USSR in the 30s pre-war years. Collectivization.

Following this, air and sea wars began. The total number of aircraft is 2300. The firm position of Churchill and the entire English people, high mobilization capabilities made it possible to survive. The main role was played by the encryption machine.

Summer-autumn 1940 - The beginning of hostilities in Africa and the Mediterranean basin. Italy vs Kenya, Sudan and Somalia. Italy attempts an invasion from Libya and Egypt to take control of the Suez Canal.

27.09. Germany, Italy and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact (“Berlin Pact”). An aggressive bloc has finally taken shape. In November, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia joined, and in May 1941, Bulgaria joined. There was a military-political agreement with Finland.

11.03.1941 in the United States, the Lend-Lease law was passed (a system for the United States to loan or lease weapons, equipment, etc. to those countries that are waging war against Germany.)

April 1941 - Germany, together with Italy, occupy Yugoslavia and Greece. The state of Croatia, created on the occupied territory, joins the Tripartite Pact.

13.04.1941 The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed.

1940 — The beginning of a resistance movement. In response to the occupiers’ attempt to establish a “new order,” the liberation movement is growing. It includes the struggle in the occupied territories and in Germany itself.

Collectivization of agriculture in the USSR- this is the unification of small individual peasant farms into large collective ones through production cooperation.

Grain procurement crisis of 1927 - 1928 (peasants handed over 8 times less grain to the state than in the previous year) jeopardized industrialization plans.

The XV Congress of the CPSU (b) (1927) proclaimed collectivization as the main task of the party in the countryside. The implementation of the collectivization policy was reflected in the widespread creation of collective farms, which were provided with benefits in the field of credit, taxation, and the supply of agricultural machinery.

Goals of collectivization:
— increasing grain exports to ensure financing of industrialization;
— implementation of socialist transformations in the countryside;
— ensuring supplies to rapidly growing cities.

The pace of collectivization:
- spring 1931 - main grain-growing regions (Middle and Lower Volga region, Northern Caucasus);
- spring 1932 - Central Chernozem region, Ukraine, Ural, Siberia, Kazakhstan;
- end of 1932 - other areas.

During mass collectivization, kulak farms were liquidated - dispossession. Lending was stopped and taxation of private households was increased, laws on land leasing and labor hiring were abolished. It was forbidden to admit kulaks to collective farms.

In the spring of 1930, anti-collective farm protests began (more than 2 thousand).

In March 1930, Stalin published the article “Dizziness from Success,” in which he blamed local authorities for forced collectivization. Most of the peasants left the collective farms. However, already in the fall of 1930, the authorities resumed forced collectivization.

Collectivization was completed by the mid-30s: 1935 on collective farms - 62% of farms, 1937 - 93%.

The consequences of collectivization were extremely severe:
— reduction in gross grain production and livestock numbers;
— growth in bread exports;
- mass famine of 1932 - 1933, from which over 5 million people died;
— weakening of economic incentives for the development of agricultural production;
- alienation of peasants from property and the results of their labor.

Collectivization of agriculture in the USSR

The highest and most characteristic feature of our people is a sense of justice and a thirst for it.

F. M. Dostoevsky

In December 1927, the collectivization of agriculture began in the USSR. This policy was aimed at forming collective farms throughout the country, which were to include individual private land owners. The implementation of collectivization plans was entrusted to activists of the revolutionary movement, as well as the so-called twenty-five thousanders. All this led to the strengthening of the role of the state in the agricultural and labor sectors in the Soviet Union. The country managed to overcome the “devastation” and industrialize industry. On the other hand, this led to mass repressions and the famous famine of 32-33.

Reasons for the transition to a policy of mass collectivization

The collectivization of agriculture was conceived by Stalin as an extreme measure with which to solve the vast majority of problems that at that time became obvious to the leadership of the Union. Highlighting the main reasons for the transition to a policy of mass collectivization, we can highlight the following:

• Crisis of 1927. The revolution, civil war and confusion in the leadership led to a record low harvest in the agricultural sector in 1927. This was a strong blow for the new Soviet government, as well as for its foreign economic activity.
• Elimination of the kulaks. The young Soviet government still saw counter-revolution and supporters of the imperial regime at every step. That is why the policy of dispossession was continued en masse.
• Centralized agricultural management. The legacy of the Soviet regime was a country where the vast majority of people were engaged in individual agriculture. The new government was not happy with this situation, since the state sought to control everything in the country. But it is very difficult to control millions of independent farmers.

Speaking about collectivization, it is necessary to understand that this process was directly related to industrialization. Industrialization means the creation of light and heavy industry, which could provide the Soviet government with everything necessary. These are the so-called five-year plans, where the whole country built factories, hydroelectric power stations, platinums, and so on. This was all extremely important, since during the years of the revolution and civil war almost the entire industry of the Russian empire was destroyed.

The problem was that industrialization required a large number of workers, as well as a large amount of money. Money was needed not so much to pay workers, but to purchase equipment. After all, all the equipment was produced abroad, and no equipment was produced within the country.

At the initial stage, the leaders of the Soviet government often said that Western countries were able to develop their own economies only thanks to their colonies, from which they squeezed all the juice. There were no such colonies in Russia, much less the Soviet Union.

Collectivization in the USSR: causes, goals, consequences

But according to the plan of the country’s new leadership, collective farms were to become such internal colonies. In fact, this is what happened. Collectivization created collective farms, which provided the country with food, free or very cheap labor, as well as workers with the help of which industrialization took place. It was for these purposes that a course was taken towards the collectivization of agriculture. This course was officially reversed on November 7, 1929, when an article by Stalin entitled “The Year of the Great Turning Point” appeared in the newspaper Pravda. In this article, the Soviet leader said that within a year the country should make a breakthrough from a backward individual imperialist economy to an advanced collective economy. It was in this article that Stalin openly declared that the kulaks as a class should be eliminated in the country.

On January 5, 1930, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks issued a decree on the pace of collectivization. This resolution spoke about the creation of special regions where agricultural reform was to take place first of all and in the shortest possible time. Among the main regions that were identified for reform were the following:

• Northern Caucasus, Volga region. Here the deadline for the creation of collective farms was set for the spring of 1931. In fact, two regions were supposed to move to collectivization in one year.
• Other grain regions. Any other regions where grain was grown on a large scale were also subject to collectivization, but until the spring of 1932.
• Other regions of the country. The remaining regions, which were less attractive in terms of agriculture, were planned to be integrated into collective farms within 5 years.

The problem was that this document clearly regulated which regions to work with and in what time frame the action should be carried out. But this same document said nothing about how collectivization of agriculture should be carried out. In fact, local authorities independently began to take measures in order to solve the tasks assigned to them. And almost everyone reduced the solution to this problem to violence. The state said “We must” and turned a blind eye to how this “We must” was implemented...

Why was collectivization accompanied by dispossession?

Solving the tasks set by the country's leadership assumed the presence of two interrelated processes: the formation of collective farms and dispossession. Moreover, the first process was very dependent on the second. After all, in order to form a collective farm, it is necessary to give this economic instrument the necessary equipment for work, so that the collective farm is economically profitable and can feed itself. The state did not allocate money for this. Therefore, the path that Sharikov liked so much was adopted - to take everything away and divide it. And so they did. All “kulaks” had their property confiscated and transferred to collective farms.

But this is not the only reason why collectivization was accompanied by the dispossession of the working class. In fact, the leadership of the USSR simultaneously solved several problems:

• Collection of free tools, animals and premises for the needs of collective farms.
• Destruction of everyone who dared to express dissatisfaction with the new government.

The practical implementation of dispossession came down to the fact that the state established a standard for each collective farm. It was necessary to dispossess 5–7 percent of all “private” people. In practice, ideological adherents of the new regime in many regions of the country significantly exceeded this figure. As a result, it was not the established norm that was dispossessed, but up to 20% of the population!

Surprisingly, there were absolutely no criteria for defining a “fist”. And even today, historians who actively defend collectivization and the Soviet regime cannot clearly say by what principles the definition of kulak and peasant worker took place. At best, we are told that fists were meant by people who had 2 cows or 2 horses on their farm. In practice, almost no one adhered to such criteria, and even a peasant who had nothing in his soul could be declared a fist. For example, my close friend's great-grandfather was called a "kulak" because he owned a cow. For this, everything was taken away from him and he was exiled to Sakhalin. And there are thousands of such cases...

Who are the kulaks?

We have already talked above about the resolution of January 5, 1930. This decree is usually cited by many, but most historians forget about the appendix to this document, which gave recommendations on how to deal with fists. It is there that we can find 3 classes of fists:

• Counter-revolutionaries. The paranoid fear of the Soviet government of counter-revolution made this category of kulaks one of the most dangerous. If a peasant was recognized as a counter-revolutionary, then all his property was confiscated and transferred to collective farms, and the person himself was sent to concentration camps. Collectivization received all his property.
• Rich peasants. They also did not stand on ceremony with rich peasants. According to Stalin's plan, the property of such people was also subject to complete confiscation, and the peasants themselves, along with all members of their family, were resettled to remote regions of the country.
• Peasants with average income. The property of such people was also confiscated, and people were sent not to distant regions of the country, but to neighboring regions.

Even here it is clear that the authorities clearly divided the people and the penalties for these people. But the authorities absolutely did not indicate how to define a counter-revolutionary, how to define a rich peasant or a peasant with an average income. That is why dispossession came down to the fact that those peasants who were disliked by people with weapons were often called kulaks. This is exactly how collectivization and dispossession took place.

Activists of the Soviet movement were given weapons, and they enthusiastically carried the banner of Soviet power. Often, under the banner of this power, and under the guise of collectivization, they simply settled personal scores. For this purpose, a special term “subkulak” was even coined. And even poor peasants who had nothing belonged to this category.

As a result, we see that those people who were capable of running a profitable individual economy were subjected to massive repression. In fact, these were people who for many years built their farm in such a way that it could make money. These were people who actively cared about the results of their activities. These were people who wanted and knew how to work. And all these people were removed from the village.

It was thanks to dispossession that the Soviet government organized its concentration camps, into which a huge number of people ended up. These people were used, as a rule, as free labor. Moreover, this labor was used in the most difficult jobs, which ordinary citizens did not want to work on. These were logging, oil mining, gold mining, coal mining and so on. In fact, political prisoners forged the success of those Five-Year Plans that the Soviet government so proudly reported on. But this is a topic for another article. Now it should be noted that dispossession on collective farms amounted to extreme cruelty, which caused active discontent among the local population. As a result, in many regions where collectivization was proceeding at the most active pace, mass uprisings began to be observed. They even used the army to suppress them. It became obvious that the forced collectivization of agriculture did not give the necessary success. Moreover, the discontent of the local population began to spread to the army. After all, when an army, instead of fighting the enemy, fights its own population, this greatly undermines its spirit and discipline. It became obvious that it was simply impossible to drive people into collective farms in a short time.

The reasons for the appearance of Stalin’s article “Dizziness from Success”

The most active regions where mass unrest was observed were the Caucasus, Central Asia and Ukraine. People used both active and passive forms of protest. Active forms were expressed in demonstrations, passive in that people destroyed all their property so that it would not go to collective farms. And such unrest and discontent among people was “achieved” in just a few months.

Already in March 1930, Stalin realized that his plan had failed. That is why on March 2, 1930, Stalin’s article “Dizziness from Success” appeared. The essence of this article was very simple. In it, Joseph Vissarionovich openly shifted all the blame for terror and violence during collectivization and dispossession onto local authorities. As a result, an ideal image of a Soviet leader who wishes the people well began to emerge. To strengthen this image, Stalin allowed everyone to voluntarily leave the collective farms; we note that these organizations cannot be violent.

As a result, a large number of people who were forcibly driven into collective farms voluntarily left them. But this was only one step back to make a powerful leap forward. Already in September 1930, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks condemned local authorities for passive actions in carrying out collectivization of the agricultural sector. The party called for active action in order to achieve a powerful entry of people into collective farms. As a result, in 1931 already 60% of peasants were on collective farms. In 1934 - 75%.

In fact, “Dizziness with Success” was necessary for the Soviet government as a means of influencing its own people. It was necessary to somehow justify the atrocities and violence that occurred within the country. The country's leadership could not take the blame, since this would instantly undermine their authority. That is why local authorities were chosen as a target for peasant hatred. And this goal was achieved. The peasants sincerely believed in Stalin’s spiritual impulses, as a result of which just a few months later they stopped resisting forced entry into the collective farm.

Results of the policy of complete collectivization of agriculture

The first results of the policy of complete collectivization were not long in coming. Grain production throughout the country decreased by 10%, the number of cattle decreased by a third, and the number of sheep by 2.5 times. Such figures are observed in all aspects of agricultural activity. Subsequently, these negative trends were overcome, but at the initial stage the negative effect was extremely strong. This negativity resulted in the famous famine of 1932-33. Today this famine is known largely due to the constant complaints of Ukraine, but in fact many regions of the Soviet Republic suffered greatly from that famine (the Caucasus and especially the Volga region). In total, the events of those years were felt by about 30 million people. According to various sources, from 3 to 5 million people died from famine. These events were caused both by the actions of the Soviet government on collectivization and by a lean year. Despite the weak harvest, almost the entire grain supply was sold abroad. This sale was necessary in order to continue industrialization. Industrialization continued, but this continuation cost millions of lives.

The collectivization of agriculture led to the fact that the rich population, the average wealthy population, and activists who simply cared for the result completely disappeared from the village. There remained people who were forcibly driven into collective farms, and who were absolutely in no way worried about the final result of their activities.

This was due to the fact that the state took for itself most of what the collective farms produced. As a result, a simple peasant understood that no matter how much he grows, the state will take almost everything. People understood that even if they grew not a bucket of potatoes, but 10 bags, the state would still give them 2 kilograms of grain for it and that’s all. And this was the case with all products.

Peasants received payment for their labor for so-called workdays. The problem was that there was practically no money on collective farms. Therefore, the peasants received not money, but products. This trend changed only in the 60s. Then they began to give out money, but the money was very small. Collectivization was accompanied by the fact that the peasants were given what simply allowed them to feed themselves. The fact that during the years of collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union, passports were issued deserves special mention. A fact that is not widely discussed today is that peasants were not entitled to a passport. As a result, the peasant could not go to live in the city because he did not have documents. In fact, people remained tied to the place where they were born.

Final results

And if we move away from Soviet propaganda and look at the events of those days independently, we will see clear signs that make collectivization and serfdom similar. How did serfdom develop in imperial Russia? The peasants lived in communities in the village, they did not receive money, they obeyed the owner, and were limited in freedom of movement. The situation with collective farms was the same. The peasants lived in communities on collective farms, for their work they received not money, but food, they were subordinate to the head of the collective farm, and due to the lack of passports they could not leave the collective. In fact, the Soviet government, under the slogans of socialization, returned serfdom to the villages. Yes, this serfdom was ideologically consistent, but the essence does not change. Subsequently, these negative elements were largely eliminated, but at the initial stage everything happened exactly like that.

Collectivization, on the one hand, was based on absolutely anti-human principles, on the other hand, it allowed the young Soviet government to industrialize and stand firmly on its feet. Which of these is more important? Everyone must answer this question for themselves. The only thing that can be said with absolute certainty is that the success of the first Five-Year Plans is based not on the genius of Stalin, but solely on terror, violence and blood.

Results and consequences of collectivization

The main results of the complete collectivization of agriculture can be expressed in the following theses:

• A terrible famine that killed millions of people.
• Complete destruction of all individual peasants who wanted and knew how to work.
• The growth rate of agriculture was very low because people were not interested in the end result of their work.
• Agriculture became completely collective, eliminating everything private.

Approaches to solving it in the country's party leadership

Implementation of agricultural cooperation

Lenin's principles of agricultural cooperation:

· voluntariness

· gradualism

· from simple shapes cooperation to complex

· provision of benefits

· the power of example (creation of large collective and state farms as advanced farms)

Collectivization of agriculture - the policy of the Soviet state and party leadership aimed at creating large collective farms.

Goals of collectivization:

· Ensuring industrialization with labor

· Providing financing for industrialization

· Independence of the state in grain procurements from individual farms

· Elimination of the kulaks as a class

Collectivization began with the grain procurement crisis of 1927-1928.

December 1927 - The XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks made decisions on the development of agriculture.

The course towards collectivization, as traditionally believed in Russian historiography, was proclaimed at the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) in December 1927. However, the decisions of the congress spoke about the development of all forms of cooperation, and not one (which became dominant later), production, i.e. collective farms. The question of an “offensive” against the kulaks was also raised, but there was no talk of their liquidation as a class. It was assumed that the kulaks would be ousted by economic methods (using taxes, changing the terms of land lease and hiring of workers, etc.) and a gradual transition to collective forms of work on the land.

· winter 1927 – autumn 1929

Collectivization in the USSR

– grain procurement crisis→ application of “war communism” measures

· autumn 1929 – early 1930s. – the first phase of complete collectivization, article by I.V. Stalin’s “Year of the Great Turning Point” (11/7/1929) → accelerated creation of collective farms, resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) “On the pace of collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction” (01/5/1930), slogan “Liquidation of the kulaks as a class! → dispossession, violation of the principle of voluntariness → mass peasant uprisings

· spring 1930 – summer 1930 – article by I.V. Stalin “Dizziness from success” (03/2/1930) → temporary “retreat”, weakening of violent measures against the peasantry → self-liquidation of many collective farms

· autumn 1930 – 1933 – the second phase of collectivization, “de-peasantization of the peasants”, resolution of the Central Executive Committee and Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR “On the protection of the property of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperation and the strengthening of public (socialist) property” (“the law on spikelets”) → mass famine in a number of regions of the country (5 to 7 million people died) → actual suspension of collectivization

· 1934 - 1937 – some liberalization of policy towards the peasantry, completion of collectivization (93% of peasant farms are united into collective farms).

Results and consequencescollectivization

· providing the army and industrial centers with food and raw materials

· the problem of export supplies of grain and raw materials has been resolved

· a layer of wealthy peasants who knew how to successfully work on the land was destroyed

(up to 15% of farms recognized as kulak were liquidated, although, according to the 1929 census, there were only 3%)

· alienation of peasants from property and the results of their labor on the land

· reduction in crop yields, livestock numbers, per capita food consumption

· loss of economic incentives to work in agriculture

· collective farms are deprived of independence in production activities

· transfer of material and labor resources from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector (mandatory supplies of agricultural products to the state, state purchases of products at prices 10-12 times lower than market prices, numerous agricultural taxes; in 1930-1932, 9.5 million people left the village)

· passport system introduced (December 1932)

· directive intervention of the party-state apparatus in the activities of collective farms

· getting rid of imports of cotton and some industrial crops

slowdown in agricultural production growth

· constant worsening of the food problem in the country

(1928 - 1935 - card system for food distribution was in effect

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