Medical support for a company during a defensive battle
CONDUCTING A DEFENSIVE BATTLE
In defense, units must be in constant readiness to repel enemy attacks.
To check the readiness of the platoon, the commander periodically advances to the positions of the squads and checks the soldiers' knowledge of their tasks, the order of fire when repelling attacks by enemy infantry and tanks, warning signals and target designation. He also checks the progress of work on the engineering equipment of positions, their camouflage and readiness for combat use of weapons and night vision devices.
Before the enemy begins an offensive, observers constantly conduct reconnaissance at the positions of the squads and at the command and observation post of the platoon commander.
To destroy individual enemy groups trying to conduct reconnaissance, make passages in obstacles or penetrate into the depths of the defense, duty fire weapons (duty infantry fighting vehicle) are assigned to the platoon, the personnel of which are in constant readiness to open fire from a reserve or temporary firing position.
The rest of the platoon personnel continue to work on improving the defense and maintenance of infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers),
Before an attack, the enemy usually conducts fire training. Therefore, it is very important to promptly shelter platoon personnel in dugouts, shelters, and trenches to reduce losses from enemy fire.
When the enemy launches a nuclear strike, the personnel of a motorized rifle platoon, noticing the flash, quickly lie down at the bottom of the trench (trench) or occupy the nearest shelters. Personnel in infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) close hatches and blinds. After the shock wave passes, the platoon prepares for battle, taking measures to protect against radioactive contamination. When radioactive contamination is detected, platoon personnel, at the command of the commander, carry out partial special treatment, during which surveillance of the enemy does not weaken and the combat readiness of the platoon does not decrease.
With the start of the enemy's fire preparation, the platoon commander and observers conduct observation in order to timely determine the moment of his transition to the attack. The platoon personnel, at the command of the commander, take cover in readiness to immediately take their places in position to repel the attack.
The defending platoon must always strive to repel an attack by the advancing enemy in front of the forward edge. It must be remembered that repelling an attack in front of the front line largely determines the success of the defense, since an enemy who has suffered certain losses in manpower and equipment and has used up a significant part of the ammunition will find it difficult to create the necessary densities in manpower and fire for a second attack.
When the enemy goes on the attack, the platoon, at the commander’s signal, takes its positions and prepares for battle. The platoon commander, having assessed the situation, selects the most important targets for destruction and, as the enemy approaches the actual fire range, gives commands to open fire in order to primarily destroy tanks and other armored vehicles of the enemy. As the enemy approaches the front line, fire from all types of weapons is brought to the highest intensity. A platoon uses anti-tank fire to destroy enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers, and uses machine gun and machine gun fire to cut off enemy infantry from the tanks and destroy them. If necessary, the platoon, at the command (signal) of the platoon commander, concentrates fire on the most important targets. The platoon conducts the most intense fire on the enemy while he is overcoming mine-explosive barriers along the aisles, since at this time his battle formations become denser and become most vulnerable. As the enemy infantry approaches the strong point at a distance of 30-40 m, the platoon pelts it with grenades and destroys it with point-blank fire. Enemy tanks that have broken through to squad positions are destroyed by fire from hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers and hand-held anti-tank grenades.
If enemy infantry and tanks penetrate into the platoon's strong point, the personnel destroy the infantry with point-blank fire and grenades, and the tanks are destroyed with the fire of hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers, anti-tank grenades and the fire of anti-tank weapons of senior commanders. In difficult moments of battle, the platoon commander must, by personal example, instill confidence in his subordinates in achieving victory over the enemy.
The enemy, wedged into the gaps with neighbors, is destroyed by flanking fire from the platoon and the neighboring unit, for which the platoon commander quickly assigns tasks to fire weapons or carries out the necessary maneuver.
If the enemy bypasses a strong point, the platoon moves to a perimeter defense, using reserve positions and communications. Firm and continuous control of the platoon when fighting in an encirclement is critical to achieving success; the platoon personnel, acting decisively and boldly, firmly hold their positions, destroying the enemy with fire from all types of weapons, or act on the instructions of the company commander.
The platoon conducts the fight against aviation and fire support helicopters in combat with concentrated fire from machine guns and machine guns as part of a squad or the entire platoon at the command of the platoon commander.
Fire at airplanes and helicopters is carried out at a range: from machine guns and light machine guns - up to 500 m; from a PK (PKM) machine gun - up to 1000 m; from a sniper rifle - up to 800 m.
At air targets flying at speeds of up to 150 m/s, shooting is carried out with accompanying fire. To combat fire support helicopters, ATGMs, infantry fighting vehicle fire, and other fire weapons can be used.
When the air target's flight speed is over 150 m/s, small arms fire is conducted in a barrage manner.
After repelling the attack, the fire system and destroyed defensive structures are restored, if necessary, with the permission of the company commander, the firing positions of infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) and other fire weapons are changed, ammunition is replenished and assistance is provided to the wounded.
The platoon commander reports the results of the battle to the company commander.
PROCEDURE AND CONTENT OF THE WORK OF THE COMMANDER OF A MOTORIZED PLATOON IN ORGANIZING DEFENSE OUT OF CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY (option)
Tactical situation (diagram 4)
The 1st MSR as part of the battalion, having completed a 150-km march, concentrated in the forest 1 km south by 9.00 on 25.10. Sokolovo, where it replenishes material resources and conducts Maintenance military equipment.
By 12.00 on 25.10, the commander of the 1st MSR conducted reconnaissance with the platoon commanders on the high ground. “Ploskaya” gave a combat order, from which the commander of the 1st MSV learned:
The enemy, after delivering a nuclear strike and carrying out fire training, broke through the defenses of our troops 50 km north on the morning of 25.10. Popovo and develops an offensive in a southern direction. The approach of its advanced units to the line of defense is possible by the morning of 26.10, and the actions of reconnaissance, tactical airborne assault forces, sabotage and reconnaissance groups and aviation - at any time.
1st MSR with TV goes to the defense of the strong point high. "Round", height. “Floating”, height. “Ploskaya” with the task of preventing enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of the “Redkaya” grove, Sokolov, concentrating the main efforts on holding the BYS area. “Flat”, high. “Floating”, height. from elevation 155.5.
The company is supported by 2 battalions adn regiment.
1 MSV with a pullo to defend a strong point on the high ground. “Flat” with the task, in cooperation with tank 321, to defeat the enemy in front of the front edge of the strong point and prevent the enemy’s tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of the barn, vye. “Flat”, Sokolov.
Platoon fire line: on the right - stone, right corner of the “Malaya” grove; on the left - dept. tree, left corner of the Sosnovaya grove. Additional sector of fire - - to the right in the direction of the high. "Round." Platoon concentrated fire areas: for SO-1 infantry fighting vehicles - op. 4, road; for small arms CO2 - op. 2, Sosnovaya grove; SO-3 - op. 1, “Low” bushes. The gap from 2 MSV should be provided with fire from an infantry fighting vehicle, and from 3 MSV by light machine gun fire.
In the platoon's stronghold, tank 321 occupies a firing position with the main sector of fire being the "Redkaya" grove, op. 5, with additional - in the direction of op. 3.
On the right, 2 MSV goes on the defensive and defends the strong point on the high ground. “Round” with the task of preventing enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of the “Malaya” grove and mill. The left border of his line of fire is west. slopes are high. "Round", grove "Rare".
On the left, 3 MSV goes on the defensive and defends the strong point on the high ground. “Flat” with the task of preventing enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of the “Sosnovaya” grove, vye. from elevation 155.0. The right border of his line of fire is east. slopes are high. "Golden", grove "Rare".
Take up defense at 13.00 on 10/25. Fire system readiness - 13.30. The readiness of engineering work of the first stage is 19.00, the second - 24.00 10.25.
KNP 1 MSV is equipped to the southeast. slopes "Flat." Deputy - commander of the 1st MSV.
From the instructions of the commander of the 1st msr on interaction, the commander of the 1st msr learned:
1. As soon as the personnel enter the positions, immediately begin the engineering equipment of the strong point. The trenches, the communication route to the rear, the pit for the dugout, the firing positions for the infantry fighting vehicles and the tank are torn off with the help of a regimental earthmoving machine and a bulldozer, which will arrive at the platoon stronghold at 12.40. By this time, trace the trench, the course of communication, determine the locations of firing positions for the infantry fighting vehicles and the pit for the dugout. Mark the work areas of the machines with milestones.
2. Individual enemy groups and their reconnaissance are destroyed by fire from duty fire weapons from reserve firing positions. After repelling the attack (reconnaissance), change firing positions.
With the start of enemy fire preparation, personnel take cover in blocked crevices and in dugouts. Observers monitor the enemy in order to timely detect his transition to attack.
3. When the enemy is deployed into a battle formation, he is defeated by concentrated fire from infantry fighting vehicles in the SO-1 sector. The signal for opening fire is “Wind”.
With the enemy reaching the line of op. 3, Sosnovaya grove, machine guns open fire, and when it reaches the line, op. 1, road bend - all fire weapons. Fire on areas of concentrated fire is opened according to the following signals: “Storm” - on area SO-2; "Hurricane" - for section CO-3. As the enemy approaches the barriers in front of the front line of defense, the platoon brings its fire to the highest intensity.
The passages made by the enemy in our barriers are closed by means of the senior commander.
In the event of an enemy penetration on the flanks or into a platoon stronghold, infantry fighting vehicles should take reserve firing positions and prevent it from spreading into the depths of the defense.
To destroy air targets, open fire on the command of the platoon commanders with all fire weapons.
4. Signals:
- alerts: about the immediate threat of the enemy using weapons of mass destruction - “Zarya”; about radioactive contamination - “Radiation hazard”; about chemical and biological contamination - “Chemical Alert”; about air attack - “Air”;
- control and interaction: combat alarm - signal cartridge of red smoke, voice - “For battle”, on the radio - “222”; open fire on the section SO-1 - “Wind”, SO-2 - “Storm”, SO-3 - “Hurricane”; cease fire - “Calm”;
- target designation - by voice from landmarks (local objects) and tracer bullets in the direction of the target.
Call signs: commander of the 1st unit - "Dnepr-10", platoon commanders: 1st msv - "Dnepr-11", 2nd msv - "Dnepr-12", 3rd msv - "Dnepr-13". Circular call sign - “Hoop”.
Reference. 1 MSV is 90% staffed. The platoon has 0.5 bq of ammunition for each type of weapon. The grenade launcher in the first compartment is faulty. The personnel have a radiation dose of 30 rad. 2 MSV is 80% staffed, ZMSV is 90% staffed.
Understanding the problem
1st MSR from TV goes to the defense of the strong point higher. “Round”, high “Flat”, high. “Ploskaya” with the task of destroying enemy tanks and infantry in front of the front line and preventing their breakthrough in the direction of the “Redkaya” grove, Sokolov. The main efforts are concentrated on retention. “Flat”, high. “Descent”, high. from elevation 155.5.
1 MSV with a pullo defends a strong point on the high ground, “Ploskaya” with the goal of, in cooperation with tank 321, to defeat the enemy in front of the front edge of the strong point and prevent enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of the barn, high ground. “Flat”, Sokolov.
The platoon's line of fire: on the right - a stone, the right corner of the "Malaya" grove; on the left - dept. tree, left corner of the Sosnovaya grove. Additional sector of fire - to the right in the direction of the high. "Round." Platoon concentrated fire areas: for SO-1 infantry fighting vehicles - op. 4, road; for small arms SO-2 - op. 2, road; SO-3 - op. 1, “Low” bushes. The gap from 2 MSV should be provided with fire from an infantry fighting vehicle, and from 3 MSV by light machine gun fire.
During the advance and deployment, the enemy is suppressed by concentrated artillery fire to the south. outskirts of Popovo, target 207 and stationary barrage fire "Akatsiya" at the line of op. 4, Sosnovaya grove.
On the right he goes to the defense of the strong point on the high ground. “Round” 2 MSV with the task of preventing the breakthrough of enemy tanks and infantry in the direction of the “Malaya” grove, the mill. The left border of the fire strip is west. slopes are high. "Round", grove "Rare".
On the left, 3 MSV goes on the defensive and defends a strong point on high. “Flat” with the task of preventing enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of the “Sosnovaya” grove, vye. from elevation 155.5. The right border of the fire strip is east. slopes are high. "Golden", grove "Rare".
The enemy, who has penetrated the defense on the flanks of the platoon, is destroyed by fire from infantry fighting vehicles from reserve firing positions and small arms fire in cooperation with neighboring platoons, while its spread into the depths of the defense is not allowed.
Fire system readiness time - 13.30 25.10.
Conclusions:
1. The company defends in the main tank-dangerous direction. The stability of the battalion's defense largely depends on its retention of the stronghold.
2. 1st MSV goes to the defense of a strong point in the center of the company’s battle formation, in the direction of concentration of the company’s main efforts, having a defense front of up to 400 m and a depth of up to 300 m.
3. Based on the position of the platoon in the company’s battle formation, the size of the strong point and the terrain, it is necessary to pay special attention to securing the flanks of the platoon, focusing the main efforts on the left flank, for which purpose on the left flank
have 3 mso, in the center - 1 mso, on the right flank - 2 mso.
4. There is 1 hour 30 minutes to organize the defense and fire system.
Timing:
- task received at 12.00 10.25;
- take up defense at 13.00 25.10;
- readiness of the fire system at 13.30 25.10. The total time to organize defense is 1 hour 30 minutes.
Time to distribute:
- assessing the situation and making a decision - 15 minutes (12.00-12.15);
- setting tasks for departments - 10 min; (12.15-12.25);
- organization of observation, interaction and fire system - 10 min (12.25-12.35);
- drawing up a diagram of a strong point - 20 minutes (12.40-13.00);
- control and assistance to subordinates in preparation for battle - 30 minutes (13.00-13.30);
- report to the company commander about readiness for battle - 13.30.
Engineering equipment of the support point: readiness of the first stage of work - 19.00, the second - 24.00 10.25.
Assessing the situation
Study of the composition, position and possible nature of the enemy’s actions. The enemy, after delivering a nuclear strike and carrying out fire training, broke through the defenses of our troops 50 km north on the morning of 25.10. Popovo and develops an offensive in a southern direction. The approach of its advanced units to the line of defense is possible by the morning of 26.10, and the actions of reconnaissance, tactical airborne assault forces, sabotage and reconnaissance groups and aviation - at any time.
Based on the tactics of action and tactical standards of the enemy, up to two motorized infantry platoons with 5-6 tanks can advance in front of the platoon’s defense front, taking into account the gaps with neighbors. Their line for going on the attack, apparently, will be at the line of the “Malaya” grove and the “Sosnovaya” grove.
As the enemy goes on the attack, one should expect the concentration of his main efforts along the Popovo road, vye. "Sloping."
Conclusions:
1. The most likely direction of attack of enemy tanks and infantry should be considered op. 2, high from elevation 155.5.
2. Based on the composition of the enemy, it is advisable to have a battle formation: in the center - 1 mso with a machine gun crew; on the right - 2 mso; on the left - 3 mso with a machine gun crew.
3. It is necessary to provide for the organization of all-round defense, as well as maneuver by fire and squads; require personnel to strictly adhere to masking measures.
Study of the condition, security and capabilities of the platoon and attached units.
1 MSV with Pulo goes on the defensive, suffering 10% personnel losses. In I MSO the grenade launcher is faulty.
The platoon has 0.5 bq of ammunition for each type of weapon. To complete the task, by 19.00 on October 25, you must have: ammunition for small arms - 1 bq; ATGM - 2 bk; BMP guns - 1 bq.
Despite the losses, the platoon can create a density of 7-8 bullets per linear meter per minute in front of the front of the strong point and solve the problem of destroying attacking motorized infantry on foot, destroying up to 7 armored targets with BMP and RPG fire.
The presence of a tank in a platoon's strong point increases the platoon's ability to combat armored targets.
Conclusions:
1. Based on staffing and combat experience It is advisable to have squad commanders: in the center - 1 mso; on the right - 2 mso; on the left - 3 mso.
2. Increase the density of fire by concentrating the fire.
3. Designate fire weapons on duty to fire at air targets.
4. By 19.00 25.10, replenish ammunition and fuel to normal levels.
5. The platoon, due to its combat and moral-political qualities, is able to fulfill the assigned combat mission in cooperation with the tank
com defending in a platoon stronghold.
Studying the composition, position, nature of the actions of neighbors and the conditions of interaction with them.
On the right, 2 MSV goes to the defense of a strong point intercepting the road, with the task of preventing enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through the strong point. Platoon strength is 80%.
On the left, 3 MSV goes on the defensive with the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through in the direction of the Sosnovaya grove, high. from elevation 155.5. Platoon strength is 90%.
Tank 321 occupies a firing position at the platoon strong point.
When repelling an enemy attack in front of the front line, have the closest cooperation with 3 MSV. When the enemy bypasses a strong point, provide for maneuver with fire and squads.
Conclusions:
1. To cover the gaps, it is necessary to allocate an infantry fighting vehicle from 2 mso, and a machine gun from 3 mso. With the enemy reaching the line of op. 2, Sosnovaya grove, provide for the concentration of fire by a platoon.
2. Coordinate issues of interaction with neighbors and the commander of tank 321.
Studying the area.
In front of the platoon's defense front and on the flanks, the terrain is flat with the presence of small heights, groves and bushes. This allows you to fire from all means within the range of actual fire.
The terrain at the platoon's stronghold is semi-enclosed. The height defended by the platoon is covered with small bushes, which makes it possible to camouflage infantry fighting vehicles, squad positions, fire weapons and conduct observation of the enemy. Bushes that interfere with observation and firing must be cut down. The height allows you to organize flanking and crossfire, and, if necessary, all-round defense.
On the flanks, the terrain allows for visual and fire contact with the 2nd and 3rd MSV.
Conclusions:
Based on the terrain, it is advisable to assign positions to the squads and the firing line:
1 mso - bush, yellow hillock. Line of fire: on the right - bush, op. 3; on the left is a yellow hillock, the Sosnovaya grove. Additional sector of fire - to the right in the direction of op. 1.
2 mso - stone, bushes. Line of fire: on the right - stone, “Malaya” grove; on the left - bush, op. 2. Additional sector of fire - to the right in the direction of height. "Round."
3 mso - (claim) yellow hillock, pine. Line of fire: on the right - a notch, op. 2; on the left is a pine tree, the Sosnovaya grove. An additional sector of fire is to the right in the direction of the “Low” bushes.
BMP firing positions should be located 50 m behind the squad positions. Have spare firing positions on the flanks of 2 and 3 mso and in the rear 1 mso.
Study of the most likely directions of action of aircraft, helicopters and other air targets.
Aviation actions should be expected at any time, and the most intense - during the period of fire preparation and attack of the front line of defense.
Considering the nature of the terrain, the probable directions of action of airplanes and helicopters should be considered: No. 1 - Zhilino, barn, vye. "Sloping"; No. 2 - high. "Melon", bushes "Low", high. "Round"; No. 3 - “Rare” grove, Sokolov. Combat helicopters can strike from behind the Malaya, Redkaya, and Sosnovaya groves.
Conclusions:
1. For reconnaissance of enemy air, have an observer in each squad.
2. Repelling attacks by airplanes and helicopters operating at low and extremely low altitudes should be carried out: before the start of the battle - with duty fire weapons, during the battle - with concentrated platoon fire.
The time of day and weather conditions will not have a significant impact on the performance of the combat mission.
Platoon commander's decision to defend
I. Using the results of artillery fire and other fire weapons, as well as favorable terrain conditions, use the fire of all platoon weapons in cooperation with neighbors and tank 321 to defeat the enemy on the approaches to the front line and prevent his breakthrough in the direction of the Redkaya Grove, Sokolovo.
The enemy, wedged into gaps with neighbors, should be destroyed by fire from squads from reserve positions, preventing it from spreading towards the flanks and in depth.
An enemy who breaks into a platoon's stronghold must be destroyed with point-blank fire, grenades and hand-to-hand combat. To prevent the enemy from spreading into the depths of the strong point and towards the flanks, install portable barriers (hedgehogs, slingshots, etc.) in trenches and communication passages.
If the enemy bypasses the strong point, move to a perimeter defense and continue to firmly hold the positions occupied, destroying the enemy with fire of all means from the main and reserve positions.
Have opening fire lines: for infantry fighting vehicles - Zhilino, op. 5; for light machine guns - op. 3, Sosnovaya grove; for grenade launchers and machine guns - op. 1, road bend
2. Defined combat missions for squads and attached units:
1 MSO with a machine gun crew to defend the bush position, yellow hillock with the task of preventing enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of the barn, yellow hillock. Line of fire: on the right - bush, op. 3; on the left is a yellow hillock, the Sosnovaya grove.
Additional sector of fire - - to the right in the direction of op. 1. The main firing position of the infantry fighting vehicle should be 50 m south. bush. Firing sector - op. 3, op. 2; additional - to the right in the direction of op. 1. Have a spare OP at the hillock. Firing sector - tower, corner of the building; additional - to the right in the direction of the stones.
2 mso defend the position of stone, bushes with the task of preventing the breakthrough of enemy tanks and infantry in the direction of the op. 1, mill. The line of fire on the right is a stone, the “Malaya” grove; on the left - bush, op. 2. Additional firing sector - to the right
in the direction higher. "Round." The main firing position for the infantry fighting vehicle should be 50 m southeast. bushes Firing sector - op. 1, bushes “Low”; additional - to the right in the direction of the Malaya grove. Have a spare OP at a bend in the road. Firing sector - "Malye" bushes, mill; additional - to the right in the direction of the right corner of the building.
3 mso with the crew of a machine gun pulo to defend the position (claim) yellow hillock, department. pine with the task of preventing enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of op. 2, high. from elevation 155.5. Line of fire: on the right - notch, op. 2; on the left - dept. pine, grove "Pine". An additional sector of fire is to the right in the direction of the “Low” bushes. The main firing position for infantry fighting vehicles is 50 m south. notches. Firing sector - op. 2, Sosnovaya grove; additional - to the right in the direction of the “Low” bushes. The department has a spare OP. pine trees. Firing sector - - high. from elevation 155.5, stones; additional - to the right in the direction of the department. birch trees
Prepare areas of concentrated fire:
- for infantry fighting vehicles: SO-1 - op. 4, road;
- for small arms: SO-2 - op. 2, road; SO-3 - op. 1, “Low” bushes.
The gap on the right should be secured with fire from an infantry fighting vehicle, and on the left - with fire from a light machine gun and a tank.
The sniper should have his main firing position near the bush, and a backup position on the left flank of the first mso. Observe the battlefield, at my command, and independently destroy officers, snipers, and fire crews.
The gunner-medic is located at the platoon command and observation post with the task of conducting observation and being ready to provide first aid to the wounded and their evacuation.
3. To observe the enemy, have one observer in each section and at the platoon control post. To destroy reconnaissance and small groups of the enemy, assign duty equipment: in 1 mso - a machine gunner, in 2 mso - a grenade launcher, in 3 mso - a machine gunner, in a platoon - an infantry fighting vehicle 1 mso.
Repel enemy infantry and tank attacks with fire from all platoon weapons. With the entry of enemy infantry and armored personnel carriers to the southern line. edge of the grove “Rare”, op. 5 open fire combat vehicles infantry; when the infantry approaches line 3, Sosnovaya grove, fire from light machine guns, and from line line 3. 1, op. 2 All fire weapons of the platoon open fire and bring it to the highest tension, grenade launchers destroy tanks, machine gunners and submachine gunners destroy infantry. As enemy infantry approaches the front line of defense at a distance of 40-30 m, platoon personnel throw grenades at it and destroy it with point-blank fire. Enemy tanks that have broken through to the front line must be destroyed with hand anti-tank grenades.
When the enemy penetrates into the gap from 2 MSV, part of the forces of 2 MSF and an infantry fighting vehicle occupy reserve firing positions, destroy the wedged enemy and prevent its further spread into the depths of the company’s strong point. The remaining forces and means of the platoon destroy the enemy in front of the front line.
When the enemy is penetrated on the left flank, a machine gunner and two submachine gunners of the 3rd mso take up positions during the communication and, in cooperation with the 1st mso, prevent the enemy from spreading through the bushes to the rear of the platoon's strong point.
To destroy low-flying enemy aircraft and helicopters, open concentrated fire on my command to all fire weapons of the platoon. When fire support helicopters are detected over the Redkaya and Sosnovaya groves, open fire on infantry fighting vehicles with ATGMs.
Organization of surveillance and direct security
Private Ivanov - observer.
1. Landmarks: the first is a stone, the second is a barn, the third is a tower, the fourth is a mound, the fifth is ruins.
2. The enemy, having broken through the defenses of our troops 50 km north. Popovo, develops an offensive in a southern direction. The approach of his advanced units to the line of defense is possible by the morning of 26.10, and reconnaissance actions - at any time.
3. The platoon goes to the defense of a strong point on high. "Flat."
4. Place for observation - near the bush, observation sector: on the right - op. 3, left - op. 5. Conduct observation with the task of timely establishing the advance of the enemy and his transition to the offensive. Pay special attention to the “Rare” grove and the road leading from Popovo in a southern direction.
5. Report everything noticed to me by voice.
6. Signals:
7. about radioactive contamination - in the voice “Radiation Hazard”;
- about chemical and biological contamination - in the voice “Chemical Alert”;
- about an air enemy - in the voice “Air”.
In order to prevent a surprise attack by the enemy and the penetration of his ground reconnaissance, squad commanders should assign observers and fire weapons on duty in the squads. Positions of duty fire weapons should be equipped by 14.00 on 10/25.
Report the appearance of the enemy to me immediately.
Conducting reconnaissance
When conducting reconnaissance, the platoon commander indicates:
1. Landmarks: the first is a stone, the second is a barn, the third is a tower, the fourth is a mound, which is also the main one, the fifth is ruins.
2. The enemy, after delivering a nuclear strike and conducting fire training, broke through the defenses of our troops 50 km north. Popovo and develops an offensive in a southern direction. The approach of its advanced units to the line of defense is possible from the morning of 26.10, and the actions of reconnaissance, tactical airborne assault forces, sabotage and reconnaissance groups and aviation - at any time.
In front of the platoon's defensive front, an attack by up to two MPVs with tanks should be expected. The most likely direction of their actions is Popovo, op. 2, Sokolovo. The actions of his combat helicopters should be expected from behind the “Malaya”, “Rare” and “Sosnovaya” groves.
3. 1st measure from TV goes to the defense of the strong point higher. "Round", height. “Floating”, height. “Ploskaya” with the task of destroying enemy tanks and infantry in front of the front line of defense and preventing them from breaking through in the direction of the “Rare” grove,
Sokolov.
1 MSV with a pullo to defend a strong point on high. “Flat” with the task of inflicting fire from all platoon weapons in cooperation with tank 321
the enemy in front of the front line of defense and prevent his tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of Sarai and Sokolovo.
Platoon fire line: on the right - stone, right corner of the “Malaya” grove; on the left - dept. tree, left corner of the Sosnovaya grove. Additional sector of fire - to the right in the direction of the high. "Round." Platoon concentrated fire areas: for CO-1 infantry fighting vehicles - op. 4, road; for small arms SO-2 - op. 2, Sosnovaya grove, SO-3 - op. I, “Low” bushes.
On the right, 2 MSV goes on the defensive and defends the strong point on the high ground. "Round." Its left border of the fire lane is west. slopes are high. "Round", grove "Rare".
On the left, 3 MSV goes on the defensive and defends the strong point on the high ground. "Sloping." His right boundary of the fire line is east. slopes are high. "Golden", grove "Rare".
4. 1 MSO defend the position of the bush, yellow hillock and prevent enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of the barn, yellow hillock. Line of fire: on the right - bush, op. 3; on the left is a yellow hillock, the Sosnovaya grove. Additional sector of fire - to the right in the direction of op. 1. The main firing position of the infantry fighting vehicle should be 50 m south. bush. Firing sector - op. 3, op. 2; additional - to the right in the direction of op. 1. Have a spare OP at the hillock. Firing sector - tower, corner of the building; add
telny - to the right in the direction of the stones.
2 mso defend the position of stone, bushes with the task of preventing the breakthrough of enemy tanks and infantry in the direction of the op. 1, mill. Line of fire: on the right - stone, “Malaya” grove; on the left - bush, op. 2. Additional sector of fire - to the right in the direction of the high. "Round." The main firing position for the infantry fighting vehicle should be 50 m southeast. bushes Firing sector - op. 1, bushes “Low”; additional - to the right in the direction of the Malaya grove. Have a spare OP at a bend in the road. Firing sector - "Malye" bushes, mill; additional - to the right in the direction of the corner of the building.
Z.mso with pullo defend position (claim) yellow hillock, dept. pine and prevent enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of op. 2, high. from elevation 155.5. Line of fire: on the right - notch, op. 2; on the left - dept. pine, grove "Pine". An additional sector of fire is in the direction of the “Low” bushes. The main firing position for the infantry fighting vehicle is 50 m south of the excavation. Firing sector - op. 2, Sosnovaya grove; additional - to the right in the direction of the “Low” bushes. The department has a spare OP. pine trees. The firing sector is high. from elevation 155.5, stones; additional - to the right in the direction of the department. birch trees
5. Start the engineering equipment of the positions and strong point at 12.40 and carry out it secretly, in constant readiness to repel enemy attacks.
At the strong point, first of all, dig single trenches for machine gunners, machine gunners, grenade launchers, trenches at the main firing positions of infantry fighting vehicles, equip a command and observation post and clear the line of sight and fire, secondly, connect single trenches into a trench, dig trenches in spare ones firing positions for infantry fighting vehicles and other fire weapons, as well as communication passages to the firing positions of infantry fighting vehicles, open a dugout and communication passages to the rear. Finish the work: the first stage - at 19.00, the second - at 24.00 10.25.
In front of the front edge of the strong point and on the left flank, anti-tank minefields are installed in areas of the road bend and hillock; bush, dept. tree.
The gap with the neighbor on the right is covered with an inconspicuous obstacle placed in front of a hole or a bush.
In front of the front of the squads, the squad commanders should cover minefields and subtle obstacles with BMP and machine gun fire.
6. Platoon command and observation post - 50 m south. yellow lump.
Combat order from the commander of the 1st MSV for defense
1. The enemy, after delivering a nuclear strike and carrying out fire training, broke through our defenses in the morning of 25.10, searching 50 km north. Popovo and develops an offensive in a southern direction. The approach of its advanced units to the line of defense is possible by the morning of 26.10, and the actions of reconnaissance, tactical airborne assault forces, sabotage and reconnaissance groups and aviation - at any time.
2. 1st measure from TV goes to the defense of the strong point on the high, “Round”, high. “Descent”, high. “Flat”, concentrating the main efforts on keeping the area high. “Flat”, high. “Descent”, high. from elevation 155.5, with the task of preventing enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of the Redkaya Grove, Sokolov.
1 MSV with a pullo in cooperation with tank 321 defends a strong point on the high ground. “Ploskaya” with the task of defeating the enemy in front of the front edge of the strong point and preventing his tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of Sarai, vye, “Ploskaya”, Sokolov.
The platoon's line of fire: on the right - a stone, the right corner is the "Malaya" grove; on the left - dept. tree, left corner of the Sosnovaya grove. Additional sector of fire - to the right in the direction of the high. "Round." Platoon concentrated fire areas: for SO-1 infantry fighting vehicles - op. 4, road; for small arms SO-2 -or. 2, Sosnovaya grove; SO-3 - op. I, “Low” bushes.
3. During the advance and deployment, the enemy is suppressed by concentrated artillery fire in the south. the outskirts of Popovo, target 207 and the stationary barrage fire of "Acacia" at the line of op. 4, Sosnovaya grove.
On the right, 2 MSV goes on the defensive and defends the strong point on the high ground. “Round” with the task of preventing enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of the “Malaya” grove and mill. The left border of the fire lane is west. slopes are high. "Round", grove "Rare".
On the left, 3 MSV goes on the defensive and defends a strong point on high. “Pologaya” with the task of preventing the breakthrough of enemy tanks and infantry in the direction of the “Sosnovaya” grove, height. with oti. 155.5. The right border of the fire strip is east. slopes are high. "Golden", grove "Rare".
Tank 321 takes up a firing position in a platoon stronghold near a fallen tree. Sectors of fire: main - "Rare" grove, op. 5; additional - in the direction of op. 3.
4. I mso defend the bush position, yellow hillock with the task of preventing enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of the barn, yellow hillock. Line of fire: on the right - bushes, op. 3; on the left is a yellow hillock, the Sosnovaya grove. Additional sector of fire - to the right in the direction of op. 1. The main firing position of the infantry fighting vehicle should be 50 m south. bush. Firing sector-op. 3, op. 2; additional - to the right in the direction of op. 1. Have a spare OP at the hillock. Firing sector - tower, corner of the building; additional - to the right in the direction of the stones.
2 mso defend the position of stone, bushes with the task of preventing the breakthrough of enemy tanks and infantry in the direction of the op. 1, mill. Line of fire: on the right - stone, “Malaya” grove; left-bush, op. 2. Additional sector of fire - to the right in the direction of the high. "Round." The main firing position for infantry fighting vehicles
have 50 m southeast. bushes Firing sector - op. 1, bushes “Low”; additional - to the right in the direction of the Malaya grove. Have a spare OP at a bend in the road. Firing sector - "Malye" bushes, mill; additional - to the right towards the corner of the building.
3 mso with pullo defend position (claim) yellow hillock, dept. pine with the task of preventing enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through in the direction of op. 2, high. from elevation 155.5. Line of fire: on the right - notch, op. 2; on the left - dept. pine, grove "Pine". Additional sector of fire - to the right in the direction of the bushes
"Low." The main firing position for infantry fighting vehicles is 50 m south. notches. Firing sector-op. 2, Sosnovaya grove; additional - to the right in the direction of the “Low” bushes. The department has a spare OP. pine trees. The firing sector is high. from elevation 155.5, stones; additional - to the right in the direction of the department. birch trees
Areas of concentrated fire: for BMP SO-1 - op. 4, road; for small arms SO-2 - op. 2, Sosnovaya grove; SO-3 - op. 1, “Low” bushes.
Provide the gap on the right with 2 MSO BMP fire, and on the left with 3 MSO light machine gun fire.
The sniper should have his main firing position near the bush, and a backup position on the left flank of the first mso. Observation should be carried out in the sector op. 2. “Pine” grove. Destroy detected targets at my command and independently.
The gunner-medic is located at the platoon command and observation post with the task of monitoring the personnel and being ready to provide first aid to the wounded at the positions of the squads, evacuate the seriously wounded and evacuate the ravine to the company medical center.
5. Readiness of the fire system - 13.30 25.10, engineering work of the first stage - 19.00, second - 24.00 25.10.
. Platoon command and observation post - 50 m south. yellow lump. Deputy - full-time and commander of 1 mso.
Interaction Guidelines
Separate enemy groups trying to conduct reconnaissance, making passages in barriers or penetrating into the depths of the defense, destroy with fire from on-duty fire weapons from reserve or temporary firing positions, and improve the equipment of firing positions for platoon personnel. Have duty fire weapons: in 1 MSO - a submachine gunner; in 2 mso - grenade launcher; in 3 mso - machine gunner; in the platoon - BMP 1 MSO.
With the enemy reaching the southern line. edge of the grove “Rare”, op. 5 infantry fighting vehicles and machine guns open fire; when motorized infantry approaches the line of the op. 3, Sosnovaya grove - light machine guns. From the line of op. 1, “Low” bushes, fire with all fire weapons of the platoon. First of all, destroy enemy tanks and other armored vehicles with infantry fighting vehicles, RPGs and hand-held cumulative grenades, and cut off infantry from tanks with machine gun and machine gun fire and destroy it. As enemy infantry approaches the squad positions at a distance of 40-30 m, personnel should throw grenades at them and destroy them with point-blank fire.
When the enemy is wedged in the center of a strong point, his destruction is carried out by point-blank fire with grenades and in hand-to-hand combat. To prevent the enemy from spreading into the depths of the strong point and towards the flanks of the squads, install hedgehogs and slingshots in the trenches and communication passages.
When the enemy penetrates into the gap with 2 MSV, part of the forces take reserve positions and destroy him in cooperation with 2 MSV, preventing spread into the depths and towards the flanks. The rest of the personnel should destroy the enemy in front of the front line.
If the enemy bypasses the strong point, take positions: 1 MSO - crater, bush; 2 mso - stone, tall grass; 3 mso - pine, pit, then move to all-round defense, firmly holding positions and destroying the enemy with fire of all means.
After repelling the attack, restore the fire system, destroyed fortifications and replenish ammunition.
On the command “Wind”, open fire on the CO-1 section; “Storm” - for section CO-2; "Hurricane" - for section CO-3.
Fire at airplanes, helicopters and other air targets: before the start of the battle - with duty fire weapons; during the battle - by concentrated fire from squads and platoons.
Signals:
- warnings about an immediate threat and the beginning of the enemy’s use of weapons of mass destruction - in the voice of “Zarya”, on the radio - “999”. Based on these signals, the platoon personnel continue to perform the assigned task and transfer their protective equipment to the “ready” position;
- notifications: about radioactive contamination - in the voice “Radiation danger”, on the radio - “666”; about chemical and biological contamination - in the voice “Chemical Alert”, on the radio - “777” (according to these signals, personnel engaged in engineering equipment, without stopping the task at hand, put on personal protective equipment, and those in the infantry fighting vehicles - only gas masks); about an air enemy - in the voice “Air”, on the radio - “555”;
- control and interaction: to take a position - by radio and voice “For battle”, red fire signal flare, open fire on the SO-1 section - by radio and voice “Wind”, one burst of tracer bullets in the direction of the site; at the SO-2 site - on the radio and in the voice “Storm”, two bursts of tracer bullets in the direction of the site.
Instructions for combat support
1. Reconnaissance before the start of an enemy attack is carried out by observation, for which purpose there is an observer in each squad. With the start of enemy fire preparation, observation is carried out by BMP gunners-operators. During a defensive battle, observation is carried out by the entire platoon personnel. The squad commanders should report to me immediately about the locations of artillery fire weapons, anti-tank weapons and flamethrowers, about the enemy's penetration into the company strong point and attempts to bypass the platoon strong point, as well as about the approach of enemy reserves.
2. To protect personnel from weapons of mass destruction and incendiary weapons, use trenches, covered sections of trenches, crevices, dugouts and personal protective equipment. Until 18.00 check availability and serviceability
personal protective equipment, individual dose rate meters, dressing and anti-chemical bags. Radioactive control
irradiation of personnel is carried out using individual dose rate meters.
3. Proceed with the engineering equipment of positions after organizing the fire system. Engineering work of the first stage will be completed at 19.00, the second - at 24.00 on 10/25. Trenches, communication passages and trenches for infantry fighting vehicles are torn off by PZM. By 12.40 25.10
squad commanders to trace their sections of trenches and communication passages. All work must be carried out in compliance with camouflage measures, and the prepared structures must be camouflaged.
4. Conceal infantry fighting vehicles, trenches, trenches and control points with local materials. During a defensive battle, the maneuver must be carried out covertly, using a trench, communication passage, or crater.
5. By 19.00 25.10, refuel the infantry fighting vehicle to the required level, carry out technical maintenance to the extent of ETO, replenish ammunition to the required level. To combat enemy tanks, each squad should have three hand-held anti-tank cumulative grenades.
6. First aid to the wounded and sick should be provided to the rifleman-medic at the site of injury or in the nearest shelter. Severely wounded
after providing assistance, evacuate along the route to the company medical post in the Rare forest.
Orders of the platoon commander during the transition to night operations
To conduct defense at night, I assign additional landmarks: sixth - the Sosnovaya grove; the seventh is the “Rare” grove. To conduct observation between neighbors, by 21.00 the commander of the 2nd mso will set up a listening post, and the 3rd mso will additionally post an observer at a separate pine tree.
BMP 1 MSO move to a temporary firing position and prepare fire in the barn sector, Sosnovaya grove.
The commander of the 1st MDF should allocate one machine gunner to illuminate the area and send it to me for instructions.
At night, have 2/3 of the personnel in positions in full combat readiness. All platoon personnel must have a white bandage on their left sleeve.
The deputy platoon commander receives flares and ammunition with tracer bullets from the company sergeant major and distributes them among the squads.
Destroy small enemy groups with fire from standby weapons from temporary firing positions. The transition from daytime to night activities is made at 17.00, from nighttime to daytime - at 6.00,
Report of the platoon commander on the results of the battle in defense
Don-40, I - Don-10, repelled the attack of enemy tanks and infantry. I have losses: one infantry fighting vehicle, five personnel killed, seven wounded, three of them seriously.
I decided to restore the fire system and fortifications, evacuate the seriously wounded to the company medical center, and provide first aid to the rest. 1 mso move to message progress.
I ask permission to change the firing position of the 1st MSO BMP, I am Don-10, over.
70 years ago - July 10, 1941, the defense of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) began during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.
The Battle of Leningrad lasted from July 10, 1941 to August 9, 1944 and became the longest during the Great Patriotic War. In it in different time troops of the Northern, Northwestern, Leningrad, Volkhov, Karelian and 2nd Baltic fronts, aviation formations participated long range and the country's Air Defense Forces, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (KBF), the Peipus, Ladoga and Onega military flotillas, partisan formations, as well as the working people of Leningrad and the region.
For the German leadership, the capture of Leningrad was of great military and political significance. Leningrad was one of the largest political, strategic and economic centers Soviet Union. The loss of the city meant the isolation of the northern regions of the USSR, depriving the Baltic Fleet of basing opportunities in the Baltic Sea.
The German command planned a strike by Army Group North (commanded by Field Marshal von Leeb) consisting of the 4th Panzer Group, the 18th and 16th armies from East Prussia in the northeast direction and two Finnish armies (Karelian and South Eastern) from the south-eastern part of Finland in the southern and south-eastern directions to destroy those located in the Baltic Soviet troops, capture Leningrad, acquire the most convenient sea and land communications for supplying their troops and an advantageous starting area for striking in the rear of the Red Army troops covering Moscow.
To organize the interaction of troops State Committee Defense of the USSR On July 10, 1941, it formed the Main Command of the North-Western Direction, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Voroshilov, subordinating to it the troops of the Northern and North-Western Fronts, the Northern and Red Banner Baltic Fleets. After the start of the war, the hasty construction of several belts of defensive lines began around Leningrad, and the internal defense of Leningrad was also created. The civilian population provided great assistance to the troops in the construction of defense lines (up to 500 thousand Leningraders worked).
By the beginning of the battle, the troops of the Northern and Northwestern Fronts and the Baltic Fleet numbered 540 thousand people, 5,000 guns and mortars, about 700 tanks (of which 646 were light), 235 combat aircraft and 19 warships of the main classes. The enemy had 810 thousand people, 5,300 guns and mortars, 440 tanks, 1,200 combat aircraft.
The Battle of Leningrad can be divided into several stages.
1st stage (July 10 - September 30, 1941)- defense on the distant and near approaches to Leningrad. Leningrad strategic defensive operation.
Having overcome the resistance of Soviet troops in the Baltic states, fascist German troops on July 10, 1941 launched an offensive on the southwestern approaches to Leningrad from the line of the Velikaya River. Finnish troops went on the offensive from the north.
On August 8-10, defensive battles began on the near approaches to Leningrad. Despite the heroic resistance of the Soviet troops, the enemy broke through on the left flank of the Luga defense line and occupied Novgorod on August 19, Chudovo on August 20, cut the Moscow-Leningrad highway and the railways connecting Leningrad with the country. At the end of August, Finnish troops reached the line of the old state border of the USSR in 1939.
On September 4, the enemy began barbaric artillery shelling of Leningrad and systematic air raids. Having captured Shlisselburg (Petrokrepost) on September 8, German troops cut off Leningrad from land. The situation in the city was extremely difficult. If in the north the front in some places passed 45-50 km from the city, then in the south the front line was only a few kilometers from the city limits. An almost 900-day blockade of the city began, communication with which was maintained only by Lake Ladoga and by air.
An important role in the defense of Leningrad from the sea was played by the heroic defense of the Moonsund Islands, the Hanko Peninsula and the naval base of Tallinn, the Oranienbaum bridgehead and Kronstadt. Their defenders showed exceptional courage and heroism.
As a result of stubborn resistance by the troops of the Leningrad Front, the enemy's offensive weakened, and by the end of September the front stabilized. The enemy's plan to capture Leningrad immediately failed, which was of great military and strategic importance. The German command, forced to give the order to go on the defensive near Leningrad, lost the opportunity to turn the forces of Army Group North to the Moscow direction to reinforce the troops of Army Group Center advancing there.
2nd stage (October 1941 - January 12, 1943)- defensive military operations of Soviet troops. Siege of the city of Leningrad.
On November 8, German troops captured Tikhvin and cut the last railway (Tikhvin - Volkhov), along which cargo was delivered to Lake Ladoga, which was then transported by water to the besieged city.
Soviet troops made repeated attempts to lift the blockade of the city. In November-December 1941, the Tikhvin defensive and offensive operations were carried out, in 1942 - in January-April - the Lyuban operation and in August-October - the Sinyavin operation. They were not successful, but these active actions of the Soviet troops disrupted the new assault on the city that was being prepared. Leningrad was covered from the sea by the Baltic Fleet.
The German troops besieging the city subjected it to regular bombing and shelling from siege weapons high power. Despite the most difficult conditions, the industry of Leningrad did not stop its work. In the difficult conditions of the blockade, the working people of the city provided the front with weapons, equipment, uniforms, and ammunition.
The partisans waged an active fight, diverting significant enemy forces from the front.
3rd stage (1943)- combat operations of Soviet troops, breaking the blockade of Leningrad.
In January 1943, the strategic offensive operation Iskra was carried out near Leningrad. January 12, 1943 formations of the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front, the 2nd Shock and part of the forces of the 8th Army of the Volkhov Front with the support of the 13th and 14th air armies, long-range aviation, artillery and aviation of the Baltic Fleet launched counter strikes on a narrow ledge between Shlisselburg and Sinyavin.
On January 18, the troops of the fronts united, Shlisselburg was liberated. A corridor 8-11 km wide has formed south of Lake Ladoga. A 36 km long railway was built along the southern shore of Ladoga in 18 days. Trains went along it to Leningrad. However, the city’s connection with the country was not completely restored. All the main railways going to Leningrad were cut by the enemy. Attempts to expand land communications (the offensive in February - March 1943 on Mgu and Sinyavino) did not achieve their goal.
In the summer and autumn battles of 1943, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts actively thwarted the enemy’s attempts to restore the complete blockade of Leningrad, cleared the Kirishi bridgehead on the Volkhov River from the enemy, captured the powerful defense center of Sinyavino and improved their operational position. The combat activity of our troops pinned down about 30 enemy divisions.
4th stage (January - February 1944)- offensive of Soviet troops in the northwestern direction, complete lifting of the blockade of Leningrad.
The final defeat of the Nazi troops near Leningrad and the complete lifting of the blockade of the city occurred at the beginning of 1944. In January - February 1944, Soviet troops carried out the strategic Leningrad-Novgorod operation. On January 14, troops of the Leningrad Front, interacting with Baltic Fleet, went on the offensive from the Oranienbaum bridgehead to Ropsha, and on January 15 - from Leningrad to Krasnoye Selo. On January 20, after stubborn fighting, the advancing troops united in the Ropsha area, eliminated the Peterhof-Strelny enemy group and continued to develop the offensive in the southwestern direction. The command of the Volkhov Front began to carry out the Novgorod-Luga operation. On January 20, Novgorod was liberated. By the end of January, the cities of Pushkin, Krasnogvardeysk, and Tosno were liberated. . On this day, fireworks were given in Leningrad.
On February 12, Soviet troops, in cooperation with partisans, captured the city of Luga. February, 15 Volkhov Front was disbanded, and the troops of the Leningrad and 2nd Baltic fronts, continuing to pursue the enemy, reached the border of the Latvian SSR by the end of March 1. As a result, Army Group North was severely defeated and almost all of Leningrad region and part of Kalininskaya (now Tverskaya), were created favorable conditions to defeat the enemy in the Baltic states.
By August 10, 1944, the battle for Leningrad, which was of great political and military-strategic significance, was over. It influenced the course of military operations in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, drawing large forces of German troops and the entire Finnish army to itself. The German command could not transfer troops from Leningrad to other directions when events were happening there decisive battles. The heroic defense of Leningrad became a symbol of courage Soviet people. At the cost of incredible hardships, heroism and self-sacrifice, the soldiers and residents of Leningrad defended the city. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers received government awards, 486 received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 8 of them twice.
On December 22, 1942, the medal “For the Defense of Leningrad” was established, which was awarded to about 1.5 million people.
On January 26, 1945, the city of Leningrad itself was awarded the order Lenin. Since May 1, 1945, Leningrad has been a hero city, and on May 8, 1965, the city was awarded the Golden Star medal.
(Military encyclopedia. Chairman of the Main Editorial Commission S.B. Ivanov. Military Publishing House. Moscow. in 8 volumes -2004 ISBN 5 - 203 01875 - 8)
The work of the medical service is organized taking into account the specific situation. In all cases, the main attention is paid to the fastest search for the wounded, providing them with first aid, collection and removal (removal) from the battlefield.
Company medical instructors and orderly riflemen, receiving information from company and platoon commanders about the appearance of wounded in units, using defensive structures, company and platoon shelters, and the protective properties of the terrain, covertly approach them, provide first aid and protect them from repeated defeats. Possible locations of the wounded are especially carefully examined: rubble, destroyed defensive structures, fire zones, etc. If necessary, unit personnel are involved in this work.
Porters, orderlies and personnel allocated by commanders carry the wounded from places of shelter to ambulance posts, and sometimes to the hospital. If the situation does not allow the wounded to be carried directly to the ambulance posts, then they are taken to the company medical post. Here they are located temporarily, until it becomes possible to carry them out to the parking areas of ambulance transport or to the hospital. From the ambulance post, the wounded are evacuated to the hospital, where they receive pre-medical (paramedic) care. After receiving assistance, they are evacuated to the MRBR using the latter’s transport (Diagram 21).
Scheme 21. Organization of evacuation of the wounded in defense.
Medical support for a brigade conducting a defensive battle in special conditions.
Defensive battle in mountains units and subunits lead, as a rule, in isolated directions and on a wide front, concentrating their main efforts on holding the most accessible directions for the enemy’s attack: passes, road junctions, dominant heights and other important areas of terrain and objects. Fighting Due to the nature of the terrain, they are carried out in small units. Therefore, when organizing medical support for combat operations, the medical service of these units must be strengthened by the forces and resources of the senior head of the medical service and prepare for autonomous work.
The peculiarities of conducting defensive battles in the mountains and climatic conditions will have a certain impact on the nature and structure of sanitary losses. Even when using conventional weapons, they will be of a focal nature. A significant place in the structure of losses
may include burns, frostbite, mountain sickness, ophthalmia, colds, pneumonia. If the enemy uses nuclear weapons, there may be an increase in casualties and injuries.
In the mountains, searching for and collecting the wounded is difficult. Therefore, unit personnel, combined arms transport, and combat vehicles are allocated to assist the medical service. Personnel involved in the search for the wounded are provided with various devices, special mountain medical equipment, light cable cars and other means of searching and extracting the wounded from hard-to-reach places. The search for the wounded is usually carried out by search groups.
After first aid is provided, the wounded and injured are removed from the rubble, defensive structures and other hard-to-reach places and taken to ambulance posts. The latter get as close to the troops as possible.
In the deserts the defense is being built on a wider front, to a greater depth than under normal conditions. Units and subunits conduct defensive combat in directions that are, as a rule, isolated from each other, while concentrating their main efforts on firmly holding road junctions, oases, water sources and other important objects. When organizing medical support for combat operations, the medical service of the defending units is strengthened by the forces and means of providing medical care to the wounded and sick, by road transport, and is prepared to work in autonomous conditions. At medical stations it is planned to provide a full range of medical care, and increased supplies of medical equipment and water are created.
Natural conditions and the characteristics of combat operations in the desert can have a significant impact on the nature and structure of sanitary losses, as well as the course of injuries and diseases. Sanitary losses will be mainly of a focal nature and will occur mainly in defense strongholds, as well as along roads; in the structure of sanitary losses, an increase in the proportion of those affected by light and ionizing radiation in the case of the use of nuclear weapons, as well as the number of patients with burns from exposure to direct sunlight and hot armored vehicles, heat injuries, skin and eye diseases, and colds. Due to the presence of natural foci in deserts infectious diseases(plague, malaria, Q fever, etc.) personnel may become infected with these infections. Poisonous snakes and insects also pose a serious danger.
In deserts, due to the characteristics of the terrain, it is not always possible to bring ambulance transport closer to the battle formations of troops and use it to remove the wounded and sick from the battlefield. Therefore, the wounded and sick have to be carried out manually on stretchers, often over long distances. The work of orderlies and orderlies-porters in this case is carried out using a relay race method, various devices are used to facilitate their work.
Terrain conditions and the nature of combat operations will have a significant impact on the choice of location for the deployment of medical evacuation stages, their security and defense. Medical posts are deployed in areas of the second echelons of defending units and subunits together with other rear units and units, near transport and evacuation routes, taking into account the availability of water sources.
When organizing the evacuation of the wounded and sick, it should be taken into account that due to the poor condition of the roads, the speed of road transport is reduced, and therefore the time spent by the wounded and sick on the road increases. Therefore, careful preparation of them for transportation, provision of medical care in pugas, as well as increased use of helicopters and airplanes for medical evacuation are required.
in winter the defense of units and subunits is organized as under normal conditions. However, due to the presence of snow cover, special attention is paid to the defense of road junctions and populated areas, as well as areas most accessible to enemy actions. Therefore, when organizing medical support for a brigade, provision should be made for units conducting a defensive battle in strongholds located at a considerable distance from each other. Medical units are being strengthened with the necessary forces and means.
In winter conditions, additional difficulties are created in the search for and removal (removal) of the wounded from the battlefield, and the performance of orderlies and orderly porters is significantly reduced. Therefore, for these purposes, additional forces and means must be allocated, and means used to support their work: drag boats, ski-stretchers, dog sleds, horse-drawn drags, as well as high-pass combined arms transport.
In winter, medical stations are deployed behind the second echelons, near transport and evacuation routes, and, if possible, indoors. In all cases, measures are taken to insulate them and create necessary conditions to provide medical care to the wounded and sick.
The significant distance of medical posts from the troops, as well as a decrease in the speed of road transport, lead to a longer stay for the wounded and sick on the road. Therefore, it is necessary to more carefully prepare the wounded and sick for evacuation, to use all-terrain vehicles, helicopters and airplanes. Automobile transport equipped with means to protect the wounded from the cold.
Transition to defense in conditions of direct contact with the enemy. Occupying a shooting position under enemy fire. Self-digging and camouflage of a trench (lying down). Conducting surveillance. Actions on commands and signals from the squad commander. Reflecting an enemy attack during a defensive battle. Firing at the command of the commander and independently. Assessment and selection of target, sight and aiming point. Repelling an attack by enemy personnel. Destruction of the enemy by fire, grenade and hand-to-hand combat
Occupying a shooting position under enemy fire
The firing position (place for shooting) must be convenient, provide a wide view and fire, cover the weapon (shooter) from enemy observation, exclude the presence of dead spaces in the firing sector and ensure maneuvering. After firing several shots (bursts) from one firing position (shooting location), in order to prevent the enemy from conducting aimed fire and deceiving him, it is changed.
To perform successfully on the battlefield, a soldier must be able to choose the right place to shoot. When choosing it, funnels, ditches, embankments and other local objects are widely used. If there are bushes, hummocks, tall grass, etc. in front of the selected place and they interfere with observation and shooting, then they should be removed or the location changed.
When choosing a place for shooting, it is necessary to take into account the protective and camouflage properties of the terrain. The location for the trench must be chosen so as to have good visibility and fire in a given sector and not be noticeable to the enemy. At the same time, the location of the trenches depends on the combat mission assigned to the unit and the terrain conditions.
The location of the trenches must satisfy the following basic conditions:
Allow good visibility and shelling of the terrain ahead at a distance of at least 400 m, overview and shelling of the approaches to neighboring trenches;
Contribute to camouflage of the trench, thereby significantly reducing the effectiveness of enemy fire;
Provide the most covert communication possible with the rear and with neighboring trenches;
Facilitate the construction and equipment of the trench.
Good shelling means the absence of dead (unfired) spaces within the shelling sector.
The best view and shelling of the approaches to the position is provided by the location of the trench on the slope of the hill, facing the enemy. When the trench is located at the base of the slope, flat fire is ensured, in which targets are hit throughout the entire flight of the bullet.
Positioning a trench near a topographic ridge usually allows long-range visibility, but shelling without blind spaces is usually only possible at the shortest ranges.
From the point of view of shelling, the combat ridge is considered the most convenient location for the trench. Combat crest called a line on the front (facing the enemy) slope of the hill, from which shelling is possible to the bottom of the slope without dead spaces.
It is prohibited to select and occupy a firing position (place for shooting) on the crests of heights (hillocks, hills), in front of local objects, against which the silhouette of the shooter will be clearly visible.
Self-digging and camouflage of a trench (lying down)
To conduct fire, observe and protect against weapons of destruction, the personnel in the occupied positions first arrange single trenches for shooting while lying down, then deepen them for shooting from the kneeling and standing.
Single trench for shooting from a machine gun while lying down
Excerpt from a single trench under enemy fire
Before opening a trench, each soldier approaches the terrain, positioning himself so as to have a good view and fire in a given sector and not be visible to the enemy. He then opens a single trench for prone shooting and clears his view and fire if local objects interfere with him.
Single trench for prone shooting
A single trench is a recess with an embankment in front and on the sides, providing convenient placement of weapons and soldiers when firing and protection from enemy weapons. In a single trench for prone shooting, a recess is made 60 cm wide, 170 cm long and 30 cm deep so that the soldier in it is completely hidden.
For ease of shooting, a threshold 25-30 cm wide is left in the front part of the recess, 10 cm above the bottom of the trench, providing support for the elbows. The earth removed during the lifting is thrown forward (towards the enemy) and forms an embankment called a parapet.
When firing from a trench towards one of the flanks, the height of the parapet of the trench on the enemy side (from the front) is 20 cm greater than in the firing sector. The volume of excavated soil is 0.3 m3. 0.5 people required per device. hour.
An excerpt from a single trench for prone shooting under enemy fire is performed as follows:
Lying in the chosen place, the soldier places the machine gun to his right at arm's length with the muzzle facing the enemy;
Turning on his left side, he pulls the shovel out of the case by the tray with his left hand, clasps the handle with both hands and, with blows toward himself, cuts the turf or the top compacted layer of earth, marking the boundaries of the excavation in front and on the sides;
After this, he intercepts the shovel and turns the turf away from himself with blows, puts it in front and begins to tear it out.
During work you should:
Drive the shovel into the ground with the corner of the tray, not vertically, but obliquely;
Chop thin roots with the sharp edge of a shovel;
To form a parapet, throw the turf and earth forward towards the enemy, leaving between the edge of the excavation and the parapet a small area called a berm, 20-40 cm wide;
Keep your head close to the ground, without ceasing to observe the enemy.
When the required depth is reached in the front part of the trench excavation, the soldier, moving back, continues to cut the excavation to the required length to cover the torso and legs.
At the end of the passage, the parapet is leveled with a shovel and disguised to match the appearance and color of the area with available material: grass, branches, arable soil, etc.
Masking trenches
Camouflage of trenches is usually achieved by skillfully placing them on the ground. The trench is well and easily camouflaged when located in bushes, in tall grass, in places that are poorly visible to the enemy and not visible from his ground observation posts. An engineered trench is much easier to hide if it is located taking into account the relief and pattern of the terrain, following the bends and unevenness of the terrain, as well as along boundaries, ditches and roads.
However, when trying to improve the camouflage of a trench, one must strive to ensure that the conditions for carrying out the assigned fire mission are not complicated and that the shelling of the area in a given zone does not deteriorate.
One of the main ways to camouflage trenches is sodding. If there is not enough turf to camouflage the parapets, additional turf is harvested to the side or in the rear of the trench and carried on a stretcher to the work site. It is better to prepare turf in those places where the construction of false trenches is planned. The area from which the turf is removed should be similar in shape and size to a regular trench.
It should be especially noted that attempts to hide the parapet of a trench by throwing cut vegetation over it are ineffective, since in these conditions only material that well imitates grass can give the necessary results. And this does not correspond to either the grass cut and thrown over the parapet, or the cut branches of bushes and trees, which are sharply different in brightness from the grass cover.
In addition to turf, the surfaces of parapets are well hidden only by artificial masks, the color and texture of which correspond to the background of the grass cover.
Against the background of arable land, the parapet is masked by sprinkling it top layer earth and imitation of furrows on it, inscribed in the general pattern of the arable land background. Required condition this involves restoring, in the area where the trench is hidden, the background of the arable land that was disturbed during the performance of engineering work.
On monotonous backgrounds of sand or snow, the parapet is sprinkled with sand or snow.
As coverings for artificial masks against the background of grass, it is most advisable to use nets with artificial camouflage material attached or woven into them (bundles of bast, pieces of polyvinyl chloride film, strips of fabric or special camouflage paper, etc.). In this case, preference should be given to mesh fabric, which provides better ventilation and penetration of daylight into the trench.
Conducting surveillance
Observation- one of the main methods of reconnaissance, by which the majority of intelligence data about the enemy and the area is obtained. Observation is organized in all types of combat, on the march, when a unit is located on the spot, and is carried out continuously day and night. In conditions of limited visibility, as well as at night, surveillance is carried out using technical means observation and supplemented by eavesdropping.
Each soldier is obliged to continuously monitor the battlefield, obtain important information about the nature of the enemy’s actions and report the results of observation to the squad commander.
Observers are appointed to conduct surveillance reconnaissance in the department. Observation is organized in such a way as to ensure viewing of the enemy's location and terrain throughout the entire zone of the squad's combat operations, as well as on the flanks to the greatest possible depth.
However, this does not mean that observation should be carried out only by observation soldiers; on the contrary, surveillance reconnaissance is carried out by all military personnel of the department.
In defense, when preparing an offensive and when a squad is positioned on the spot (rest), the observer is usually located near the squad commander in order to be able to report the results of the observation by voice.
The observer is usually appointed from among specially trained soldiers. He must be able to navigate the terrain well day and night, have good training in observational reconnaissance, visual memory, enormous endurance and patience, be hardy, quick-witted, and cold-blooded.
The observer is obliged:
Be able to select, equip and camouflage a place for observation, navigate the terrain at any time of the year and day; determine the distance to targets (objects), use surveillance devices and communications;
Know the reconnaissance signs of the main types of weapons and military equipment of the enemy, analyze the information, keep notes in the observation log and clearly report the results of the observation to the commander (senior observation post).
An observer is assigned a sector (band), and sometimes an area or observation object, to conduct reconnaissance of the enemy. An observation sector is assigned when observation of the enemy is carried out on rough terrain, if the terrain allows observation forward and to the sides and the task is set to observe friendly units, an observation strip is assigned. In cases where it is necessary to identify the enemy or monitor his actions in any area of the terrain, an area (object) is assigned for observation.
To perform the task, the observer is provided with standard observation devices.
The observer's task is usually assigned to the area from which the observation will be conducted.
When setting a task, the observer is instructed to:
Landmarks and coded (conventional) names of local objects;
Information about the enemy and friendly units;
Observation place;
Sector (band), area (object) of observation, what to watch and what to pay special attention to;
Directions of probable approach of enemy aircraft (helicopters);
The procedure for reporting observation results, warning signals.
The effectiveness of surveillance depends on the ability to select and equip an observation site in such a way that it provides good visibility, a covert approach, camouflage and protection from fire.
When choosing a place for observation, it is necessary to show maximum resourcefulness and ingenuity. The chosen location is camouflaged so as not to arouse suspicion among the enemy. It should be remembered that when camouflaging observation sites, enemy observers keep a record of every noticeable local object, so the appearance of a new “bump” or “stump” may arouse their suspicion, which will lead to increased surveillance.
The main requirement for an observation site is that it must be chosen so that the observer sees and hears everything, while remaining unnoticed. To do this, you cannot choose places for observation near clearly visible local objects; you cannot move to the tops of heights, hills, dunes, mounds, so as not to loom on the horizon.
Observation place
In an open place, the observer chooses a place for observation so that the color of his clothing and weapons blends with the natural color of the area. In a hole, crater, ditch, one must position himself so that there is a mound (hill, bush) behind him, against which the observer’s head would not be noticeable.
When positioned near local objects, one must be positioned on their shadow side, not allowing the observer’s figure to be projected against the sky when viewed from the enemy’s side.
When choosing a place for observation in a populated area, observers are located in the walls of destroyed houses, in attics, upper floors and in ruins.
While observing through cracks and holes, the observer must also remain in the shadows. It should be remembered that the enemy will try to destroy high-rise objects with artillery fire, so the most prominent of them are not practical for equipping an observation post.
In winter, the observation site is chosen so that it is protected from the wind. At temperatures below -10°C, the observer must be changed after 1 hour. If possible, observers are warmed in dugouts and other shelters.
The observation report should be specific, concise and include:
Landmark or conventional name of a local item;
The position of the target relative to the landmark;
Characteristic features of the target.
In this case, the soldier first indicates the position of the target to the right or left of the landmark in thousandths, and the distance of the target further or closer than the landmark - in meters.
Surveillance at night and in low visibility conditions. At night and in conditions of limited visibility, surveillance does not stop; it is carried out using night vision devices, as well as artificial lighting of the area. Enemy actions at night can be detected by their light revealing signs.
At night, local objects that are clearly distinguishable by silhouettes are used as landmarks: buildings, forest, etc.
When observing at night when the area is illuminated, the soldier must be informed about the order of illumination of the area, he must not look at the light source and must remember that many things will seem different to him than during the day: in the spotlight, yellow objects appear white, and light green objects appear yellow ; objects located in illuminated areas of the area seem closer than in reality; dark objects and darkened areas of the terrain appear smaller in size and more spaced out; in areas illuminated by a spotlight, flashes of shots are not visible.
When observing in an illuminated area, the soldier should be positioned in front and slightly to the side of the light source.
It should be remembered that the eye gets used to the darkness after a certain time. The longer a soldier is in the dark, the better he orients himself. An hour after a soldier is in complete darkness, his eyes reach the limit of their ability to see weak light sources, faint silhouettes of targets and soldiers, the enemy, projected against the sky.
Adaptation to darkness is a slow process, so it is necessary to especially protect your vision at night from bright light. One has only to look at bright light, and adaptation to night lighting will be lost for long time, and practically, the soldier will not see anything at first.
Actions on commands and signals from the squad commander
When fighting on foot, the commander controls his subordinates by issuing commands by voice, signals and through messengers. He uses the radio station to control the actions of infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers). He issues commands and sets combat missions to open fire from infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) through his deputy and gunner-operators remaining in infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers). When controlling single military personnel operating on foot, the command usually indicates: rank and surname, what action to perform and the executive part of the command.
For example: “Private Petrov - TO FIGHT.” “Private Ivanov should run to a separate tree - FORWARD.” “Corporal Sidorov should crawl to a separate bush - FORWARD.”
Reflecting an enemy attack during a defensive battle. Destruction of the enemy by fire, grenade and hand-to-hand combat
In an effort to restore their superiority, the enemy will attack the front line of the squad's defense. The squad soldiers repulse an enemy attack with fire from their main or reserve positions, independently changing them during the battle. By order of the commander, on their own or in cooperation with other squads, with a swift and bold counterattack, soldiers complete the destruction of the enemy with grenades and in hand-to-hand combat.
If the enemy attacks with tanks, then the infantry is cut off from the tanks first. The fight against tanks is carried out with all anti-tank weapons of the squad and platoon.
Firing at the command of the commander and independently. Assessment and selection of target, sight and aiming point
When the enemy's transition to attack is detected at the command of the commander: “Squad - TO FIGHT,” the soldiers quickly take their place at the squad position.
Soldiers open fire on the attacking enemy infantry at the command of the squad commander, and as the enemy approaches the actual fire range of their weapons, they open fire on their own. As the enemy approaches the front line of the defense, the fire is brought to its highest intensity.
Assessing and selecting a target. When assessing the importance and determining the priority of hitting a target, a soldier must proceed from the damage this target is capable of inflicting in terms of its fire capabilities. Important targets are those whose defeat in the given situational conditions can facilitate and speed up the execution of the combat mission.
Important the targets are usually enemy fire weapons: tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled guns, ATGMs, machine guns, grenade launchers, observation posts, radar stations, etc.
In the case where these targets are from the squad within their effective range of fire, they are called dangerous.
Particularly dangerous targets in all cases are the enemy's nuclear attack weapons - launchers and weapons that use nuclear weapons.
Those important targets that are located from the squad at distances exceeding their effective range of fire are considered not dangerous in this moment battle.
Dividing targets into important and less important, dangerous and non-dangerous, allows the soldier to quickly and correctly make a decision on the order of their destruction. Dangerous targets must be destroyed first, important targets second, and then all others.
Selecting the type of weapon that can most effectively hit a target (with the least amount of ammunition and in as soon as possible), depends primarily on the importance of the target, its nature, remoteness and vulnerability.
Small arms of the squad: machine guns and light machine guns are used to destroy enemy personnel with concentrated fire at ranges of up to 800 m.
Individual machine guns - up to 400 m, light machine guns - up to 800 m. PK and PKT machine guns are used to destroy manpower and destroy enemy fire weapons at distances of up to 1000 m. Large-caliber KPVT machine guns mounted on armored personnel carriers can hit manpower and enemy fire weapons at ranges of up to 2000 m. For air targets, small arms fire from the squad is used against helicopters and low-flying aircraft at a distance of up to 500 m.
Selecting the initial sight setting and aiming point height
To select a sight and aiming point, it is necessary to determine the range to the target and take into account external conditions that may affect the range and direction of the bullet. The sight and aiming point are selected in such a way that when shooting the average trajectory passed in the middle of the target.
When shooting at a distance of up to 400 m, fire should be carried out, as a rule, with a 4 or “P” sight, aiming at the lower edge of the target or the middle if the target is high (running figures, etc.).
When shooting at ranges exceeding 400 m, the sight is set according to the range to the target, rounded to the nearest hundred meters. The aiming point is usually taken to be the middle of the target. If the conditions of the situation do not allow changing the sight setting depending on the distance to the target, then within the direct shot range, fire should be carried out with a sight corresponding to the direct shot range, aiming at the lower edge of the target.
The range to targets far from the landmark is determined by the eye. In this case, the range to targets and local objects is determined by sections of the terrain that are well imprinted in visual memory, by the degree of visibility and apparent size of targets (objects), as well as by a combination of both methods.
When determining ranges from terrain segments it is necessary to mentally set aside some familiar range that is firmly entrenched in visual memory (for example, a segment of 100, 200 or 300 m) from oneself to the object (target).
When determining range by the degree of visibility and apparent size of objects (targets) need to compare visible size targets with the visible dimensions of a given target imprinted in memory at certain distances.
If a target is detected near a landmark or local object, the range to which is known, then when determining the range to the target, it is necessary to take into account its distance from the landmark by eye.
At night, the range to illuminated targets is determined in the same way as during the day.
When determining the range with an eye, the following must be taken into account:
The apparent size of the same section of terrain gradually decreases as it moves away from the machine gunner or machine gunner (in the future);
Ravines, hollows, rivers that cross the direction of a local object or target conceal (reduce) the range;
Small objects (bushes, stones, individual figures) seem further away than large objects located at the same distance (forest, mountain, column of troops);
A one-color, monotonous background of the area (meadow, snow, arable land) highlights and, as it were, brings closer the objects located on it if they are colored differently, and a motley, varied background of the area, on the contrary, masks and, as it were, removes the objects located on it;
On a cloudy day, in rain, at twilight, in fog, the distances seem increased, and on a bright, sunny day, on the contrary, they appear decreased;
In the mountains visible objects as if they were approaching.
The rate of advance of the German mobile groups operating against our right wing of the front was low and reached 4–5 km per day (in 20 days the Germans covered about 90 km).
During the offensive, the Germans suffered increasingly heavy losses in manpower and equipment and encountered increasing difficulties along the way, as a result of which their offensive spirit gradually fell. Our troops had growing confidence in the ultimate success of the battle.
6. In organizing the defense of the Red Army troops on the right wing of the front, the following deserves attention: the defense was mainly built not as a continuous defensive position from the times of the First World War, but as a system of strongholds and resistance nodes (created per platoon-battalion) using bunkers, bunkers and the use of settlements, where buildings were adapted for defense. An example is: a) strengthening the defensive line of the 16th Army at the line Kharlanikha, Chentsy, Nelidovo (excl.), Skirmanovo, Lake Trostenskoye (the second line of defense was also strengthened and occupied by units of the second echelon of defense at the line Teryaeva Sloboda, Denkovo, Novo -Petrovskoe); b) creation of a defensive line on the Istra River. In addition, the defense of the 16th Army at the line of Kharlanikha, Lake Trostenskoye was reinforced by fairly large reserves - a group of cavalry divisions located at the junction with the 30th Army in the Klin area.
During the defensive battle, a positively influencing factor was the presence of reserves in the armies, which had great importance during the battles on the near approaches to Moscow on the front of the 16th Army in the period December 2–5, when the 354th Infantry Division, 36th, 40th and 49th were promoted from the Headquarters reserve rifle brigades. This made it possible for the troops of the 16th Army not only to actively defend the occupied line, but from December 3 with the forces of the center (and from December 4 and the left flank) to launch a private counteroffensive.
7. During the defensive battle, the Germans surrounded one or another of our units several times. But this did not lead to the cessation of resistance. Our troops fought their way out of encirclement, created defenses on new lines and at the same time inflicted losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment.
Examples of such situations are:
a) encirclement and recovery from encirclement in the Klin area of the 107th motorized rifle, 58th tank, 24th cavalry divisions and 21st tank brigade in the period November 22–24;
b) environment of the 126th rifle division On November 22, southeast of Klin (in the area of Akulovo, Misirevo, Frolovskoye) - by the end of November 22, the division managed to fight out of the encirclement in the area of Borozda, Karavaevo, Kononovo;
c) encirclement of the 17th Cavalry Division in the area of Khlynikha, Zhestoki by enemy infantry and tanks on November 23 - the division managed to fight out of the encirclement in the area of Olisovo, Polushkino.
There were several reasons for this. Firstly, in a number of cases the Germans did not have enough time, strength and means to complete the operational encirclement with a completely tactical encirclement and destruction. Secondly, the terrain conditions (forests) were conducive to fighting while surrounded for a more or less long period of time. Thirdly, a significant role was played by the measures of the high command of the Red Army, which consisted in providing assistance to the encircled troops with counterattacks from other units. Fourthly, the activity, stability, perseverance and flexibility in the actions of our troops in the encirclement contributed to a favorable outcome. Fifthly, the high morale of the troops was reflected, as they sought not only to get out of encirclement, but also to inflict as many losses on the enemy as possible.
8. Experience of defensive battles on the right wing Western Front confirmed the enormous role of artillery of all types and calibers in modern combat (especially in the fight against enemy tanks and automatic weapons). The artillery of the troops of the right wing of the front (as well as mortars) with their fire ensured that our infantry and tanks completed the assigned tasks. It prevented the approach of enemy reserves from the depths. It should be emphasized the importance of the guards mortar divisions, whose combat work is to destroy the enemy’s manpower and materiel (as when they accumulate in populated areas, and during the attack on our defense) gave good results.
9. The course of the battle on the right wing of the front confirms the importance of the correct organization of the battle and the establishment of interaction between all units. Positive examples of good organization of defensive combat are the actions of General Dovator’s cavalry group, which from November 15 to 21, with relatively small forces, repelled attempts by large enemy infantry and tank forces to break through to the Volokolamsk Highway, as well as similar actions of other military formations. Cavalry group of General Dovator (50th and 53rd cavalry divisions) as a result of a series of successful battles against the German invaders, it was renamed the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps.
10. In the fight against German tank units, anti-tank defense of the troops, described above, was of great importance.
IN special cases By order of the high command, anti-tank areas and barriers were created in advance at points or at the junctions of formations and the army. An example is the order of the commander of the Western Front on December 5 to organize an anti-tank defense area at the junction of the 1st and 20th armies in view of the appearance in the Nikolskoye area, White Rast a new large enemy tank group.
During the defensive battles in the Klin and Istra directions against large tank groupings of the fascists, in addition to field and anti-tank artillery, bomber aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery of the air defense of the city of Moscow (as anti-tank artillery) were used. In the period from November 23 to December 5, anti-aircraft artillery took part in joint combat operations with the troops of the right wing in tank-hazardous directions (in the areas of battles for Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Istra Reservoir).
Anti-aircraft anti-tank air defense groups of Moscow were used in the 30th and especially in the 16th armies and with their fire they delayed the German advance, while simultaneously covering our units from the air. 76- and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns from the tactical and technical side showed themselves to be quite effective weapon to destroy enemy tanks.
11. The control of the armies during the defensive battle was carried out by issuing episodic general orders covering the combat work of all the armies of the right wing of the front and individual orders for the armies, depending on the situation that developed at the front of a given army; direct negotiations via HF and telephone with coding; code; on the radio; sending liaison officers on planes, cars and personal visits by the command.
During the defensive battle, these control methods yielded positive results.
Chapter Four
The course of events in the center. Defense on the Nara River
The Nara River as a defensive line
The Nara River is one of the small rivers of the Moscow region, no different from the other rivers of the Moscow region - Istra, Ruza and Protva. The river width is on average 20–25 m, depth 0.5–2 m; the bottom is hard, sandy, the shores are low along almost the entire length, and in some places swampy. The river flows in a direction from northwest to southeast; The current is slow and calm.
The Nara River has long served as a serious water boundary, preventing the troops of opponents of the Russian state from freely approaching Moscow. Nara played the same role in Patriotic War 1812. Kutuzov's strongly fortified Tarutino position was located on the Nara.
The defense on Nara in 1941 took place in late autumn and early winter conditions. Although there was ice on the river by this time, the struggle on the Nara nevertheless took on the character of battles for crossings. Nara is crossed by a number of routes leading to Moscow; the enemy sought to take possession of these routes, since crossing the river off-road did not allow him to widely use his motorized vehicles. The defense organized at the turn of the Nara River was a serious obstacle in the way of the Germans, which they could not overcome.