Creation of an army under Peter 1. Formation of a regular army under Peter I. Moscow army before the reform

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History of the Red Army

Armed Forces of the USSR Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

Army of Peter I- a regular army created by the first Russian Emperor Peter I on the basis of the so-called troops that began to appear in Russia during the reign of his father. foreign regiments, taking into account the latest European achievements in this area. Replaced the irregular local troops, which were a feudal relic, and the Streltsy units, which opposed Peter I during the struggle for power and were then repressed by him. The army was staffed on the basis of conscription (compulsory service for nobles also remained until the mid-18th century). and so, Peter was the first

Russian army before Peter

The introduction of troops of a foreign system changed the composition of the army: it ceased to be based on class. It was impossible to recruit only service people - landowners - into the soldier regiments. The soldiers were required to have constant service and constant exercise in military affairs; they could not be sent home in peacetime and convened only in wartime. Therefore, they began to recruit soldiers into foreign regiments in the same way as later recruits.

Peter's transformations in military affairs

Thus, Peter inherited an army from his predecessors, even if it did not satisfy all the requirements of the then military science, then already adapted for further reconstruction due to new requirements.

In his “amusing” villages, Peter organized two regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky - completely according to the foreign model. By 1692, these regiments were finally formed and trained. Preobrazhensky was headed by Colonel Yuri von Mengden, and Ivan Chambers was appointed colonel of Semyonovsky, “originally a Muscovite of the Shkot breed”.

Other regiments began to be formed based on the model of these regiments, and already in the first Azov campaign four regular regiments took part - Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky, Lefortovo and the transformed Butyrsky regiment.

The regiment was led by a colonel; According to the regulations, he must “as a captain in his company, have the same and even greater first respect for his regiment.” The lieutenant colonel assisted the regiment commander, the prime major commanded one battalion, the second major commanded another; Moreover, the first major was considered older than the second major and, in addition to command, had the responsibility to take care “whether the regiment is in good condition, both in the number of soldiers and in their weapons, ammunition and uniform.”

Artillery

The cavalry under Peter consisted of dragoon regiments; the artillery of Peter the Great's time consisted of 12-, 8-, 6- and 3-pound guns (a pound is equal to a cast iron cannonball with a diameter of 2 English inches (5.08 cm); the weight of a pound is exceeded by 20 spools (85.32 kg) , one-pound and half-pound howitzers, one-pound and 6-pound mortars (a pound is equal to 16.38 kg). This was inconvenient artillery for transportation: a 12-pound gun, for example, weighed 150 pounds with a carriage and limber; it was carried by 15 horses. Three-pound guns. made up the regimental artillery; at first there were two such guns per battalion, and from 1723 they were limited to two per regiment. These regimental guns weighed about 28 pounds (459 kg) The range of the guns of those times was very small - about 150 fathoms (320 m) on average. - and depended on the caliber of the gun.

From the gunners and grenades of former times, Peter ordered the formation of a special artillery regiment in 1700, and schools were established for the training of artillerymen: engineering and navigation in Moscow and engineering in St. Petersburg. Weapons factories on Okhta and Tula, organized by Peter, produced artillery and guns for the army.

Garrison troops

Garrison troops in Russian imperial army intended to carry garrison service in cities and fortresses in wartime. Created by Peter I in 1702 from city archers, soldiers, reiters and others. In 1720, the garrison troops consisted of 80 infantry and 4 dragoon regiments. In the 2nd half of the 19th century, they were transformed into local troops (garrison artillery - into fortress artillery).

Weapons and uniforms

Officer of the Life Guards Semenovsky Regiment from 1700 to 1720.

Grenadier of an infantry regiment from 1700 to 1732.

Fuseliers of infantry regiments from 1700 to 1720.

Historical description of clothing and weapons of Russian troops, with drawings, compiled by the highest order: in 30 volumes, in 60 books. / Ed. A. V. Viskovatova.- Part (T.) 2.- Ill. 166. Chief officer and staff officer of the Life Guards Preobrazhensky Regiment from 1700 to 1732.

The armament of each soldier consisted of a sword with a sword belt and a fusée. Fusee - a gun that weighed about 14 pounds; his bullet weighed 8 spools; the fusee castle was made of flint; In the necessary cases, a baguette - a five- or eight-inch triangular bayonet - was mounted on the fusee. The cartridges were placed in leather bags attached to a sling, to which a horny powder with gunpowder was also tied. Captains and sergeants, instead of fusees, were armed with halberds - axes on a three-arch shaft.

One of the companies in each regiment was called a grenadier, and a feature of its weapons were matchlock bombs, which the grenadier kept in a special bag; The grenadier's fuses were a little lighter and the soldiers could put their fuses on a belt behind their backs when throwing a bomb. Lower ranks The artillery units were armed with swords, pistols, and some with a special “mortar.” These "mortars" were something between a fusée and a small cannon attached to a fusée stock with a fusée lock; when firing from mortars, they had to be supported by a special halberd; The length of the mortar was 13 inches, and it fired a bomb the size of a pound cannonball. Each soldier was given a satchel for carrying things. Dragoons for foot combat were armed with a fusée, and for mounted combat - with a broadsword and a pistol.

Since 1700, a soldier's uniform consisted of a small flattened cocked hat, caftan, epancha, camisole and trousers. The hat was black, the brim was trimmed with braid, and a brass button was attached to the left side. When listening to orders from the elders, the younger ones took off their hat and held it under their left armpit. Soldiers and officers wore their hair long to the shoulder and powdered it with flour on ceremonial occasions.

The caftans of the infantrymen were made of green cloth, and those of the dragoons were made of blue, single-breasted, without a collar, with red cuffs. The caftan was knee-length and equipped with copper buttons; The cape for cavalry and infantry was made of red cloth and had two collars: it was a narrow cape that reached to the knees and provided poor protection from rain and snow; boots - long, with light bells - were worn only on guard duty and when marching, and ordinary shoes were stockings and blunt-toed greased heads with a copper buckle; Army soldiers had stockings Green colour, and among the Preobrazhentsy and Semyonovtsy after the Narva defeat - red, according to legend, in memory of the day when the former “amusing” regiments did not flinch, despite the general “embarrassment” under the onslaught of Charles XII.

The grenadiers of the guard differed from the fuseliers only in their headdress: instead of a triangular hat, they wore leather helmets with an ostrich feather. The cut of the officer's uniform was the same as that of the soldiers, only trimmed along the edges and sides with gold braid, the buttons were also gilded, and the tie, instead of black cloth, like the soldiers', was white linen. A plume of white and red feathers was attached to the hat. In full dress uniform, officers were required to wear powdered wigs on their heads. What distinguished an officer from a private was a white-blue-red scarf with silver tassels, and for a staff officer - with gold tassels, which was worn high on the chest, near the collar. The officers were armed with a sword and also had a protazan in the ranks, or, in those days, a “partazan” - a type of spear on a three-arch shaft. Grenadier officers had a light fusee on a gold belt instead of a protazan.

By the end of Peter's reign, the regular army numbered in its ranks more than 200 thousand soldiers of all branches of the military and over 100 thousand irregular Cossack cavalry and Kalmyk cavalry. For the 13 million population of Peter's Russia, it was a heavy burden to support and feed such a large army. According to the estimate drawn up in 1710, a little more than three million rubles were spent on the maintenance of the field army, garrisons and fleet, on artillery and other military expenses, while the treasury spent only a little over 800 thousand on other needs: the army absorbed 78% of the total expenditure budget .

To resolve the issue of financing the army, Peter ordered, by decree of November 26, 1718, to count the number of tax-paying population of Russia; all landowners, secular and church, were ordered to provide accurate information on how many male souls lived in their villages, including old people and infants. The information was then checked by special auditors. Then they accurately determined the number of soldiers in the army and calculated how many souls were counted in the census for each soldier. Then they calculated how much the full maintenance of a soldier costs per year. Then it became clear what tax should be imposed on every tax-paying soul in order to cover all the costs of maintaining the army. According to this calculation, for each tax-paying soul there were: 74 kopecks for the owning (serf) peasants, 1 ruble 14 kopecks for state peasants and single-lords; 1 ruble 20 kopecks per tradesman.

By decrees of January 10 and February 5, 1722, Peter outlined to the Senate the very method of feeding and maintaining the army, and proposed to “lay out the troops on the ground.” Military and foot regiments had to support them. In the newly conquered regions - Ingria, Karelia, Livonia and Estland - no census was carried out, and regiments were to be assigned to billet here, the feeding of which was entrusted to individual provinces that did not need constant military protection.

The Military Collegium compiled a list of regiments by locality, and for the cantonment itself, 5 generals, 1 brigadier and 4 colonels were sent - one to each province. Having received from the Senate for layout, and from the Military College - a list of regiments that were to be deployed in a given area, the sent headquarters officer, arriving in his district, had to convene the local nobility, announcing to them the rules of layout and inviting the layoutrs to assist. The regiments were distributed as follows: each company was assigned a rural district with such a population that there were 35 souls for each infantryman, and 50 souls of the male population for each horseman. The instructions ordered the dispatcher to insist on dispersing the regiments in special settlements, so as not to place them in peasant households and thus not cause quarrels between peasants in peasant households and thus not cause quarrels between peasants and inns. To this end, the planners had to persuade the nobles to build huts, one for each non-commissioned officer and one for every two soldiers. Each settlement had to accommodate at least a corporal and be located at such a distance from the other that a cavalry company would be deployed no further than 10 versts, a foot regiment no further than 5 versts, a cavalry regiment no further than 5 versts, a cavalry regiment no further than 100 versts, and a foot regiment no further than 50 versts. . In the middle of the company district, the nobility was ordered to build a company courtyard with two huts for the chief officers of the company and one for lower servants; In the center of the regiment's location, the nobles were obliged to build a courtyard for the regimental headquarters with 8 huts, a hospital and a barn.

Having positioned the company, the dispatcher handed over to the company commander a list of villages in which the company was located, indicating the number of households and the number of souls listed in each; The spreader handed another similar list to the landowners of those villages. In the same way, he compiled a list of villages in which the entire regiment was stationed, and handed it over to the regimental commander. The nobles of each province had to jointly take care of the maintenance of the regiments stationed in their area and for this purpose elect from among themselves a special commissar, who was entrusted with taking care of the timely collection of money for the maintenance of the regiments settled in a given area, and in general being responsible to the nobility as a clerk and intermediary of the class in relations with the military authorities. Since 1723, these elected zemstvo commissars have been given the exclusive right to collect poll taxes and arrears.

The regiment settled in this area not only lived at the expense of the population that supported it, but also, according to Peter’s plan, was supposed to become an instrument of local government: in addition to drill exercises, the regiment was assigned many purely police duties. The colonel and his officers were required to pursue thieves and robbers in their district, that is, the location of the regiment, keep the peasants of their district from escaping, catch those who fled, monitor fugitives coming to the district from the outside, eradicate tavern and smuggling, help forest wardens in pursuing illegal forest felling, send their people with the officials who are sent to the provinces from the governors, so that these people do not allow the officials to ruin the district inhabitants, and help the officials cope with the willfulness of the inhabitants.

According to the instructions, the regimental command was to rural population the district “to protect from all taxes and insults.” V. O. Klyuchevsky writes about this:

In fact, these authorities, even against their will, themselves laid a heavy tax and resentment on the local population and not only on the peasants, but also on the landowners. Officers and soldiers were forbidden to interfere in the economic orders of landowners and in peasant work, in the grazing of regimental horses and domestic officers' and soldiers' livestock on common pastures where both landowners and peasants grazed their livestock, the right of the military authorities to demand in known cases people for regimental work and carts for regimental parcels and, finally, the right of general supervision of order and security in the regimental district - all this was supposed to create constant misunderstandings between the military authorities and the inhabitants.

Obliged to monitor the payers of the poll tax that fed the regiment, the regimental authorities carried out this supervision in the most inconvenient way for the average person: if a peasant wanted to go to work in another district, he had to receive a letter of leave from the landowner or parish priest. With this letter, he went to the regimental yard, where the zemstvo commissar registered this letter of leave in the book. Instead of a letter, the peasant was given a special ticket signed and sealed by the colonel.

The supposed separate soldiers' settlements were not built anywhere, and those that were started were not completed, and the soldiers were housed in philistine courtyards. In one decree of 1727, introducing some changes in the collection of the poll tax, the government itself admitted all the harm from such placement of soldiers, it admitted that “The poor Russian peasants are going bankrupt and fleeing not only from the shortage of grain and the poll tax, but also from the disagreement of the officers with the zemstvo rulers, and the soldiers with the peasants”. Fights between soldiers and men were constant.

The burden of military billeting became heaviest during periods of collecting the poll tax, which was collected by zemstvo commissars with military teams assigned to them “for anstaltu,” that is, for order, with an officer at their head. The tax was usually paid in thirds, and three times a year zemstvo commissars with military men traveled around villages and hamlets, making collections, collecting fines from defaulters, selling goods to the poor, feeding at the expense of the local population. “Each detour lasted two months: for six months of the year, villages and hamlets lived in panic, under oppression or in anticipation of armed collectors. Poor men are afraid of the mere entry and passage of officers and soldiers, commissars and other commanders; There are not enough peasant belongings to pay taxes, and the peasants not only sell livestock and belongings, but also pawn their children, while others flee separately; commanders, often replaced, do not feel such ruin; none of them thinks about anything else other than taking the last tax from the peasant and currying favor with this,” says the opinion of Menshikov and other high officials, presented to the Supreme Privy Council in 1726. The Senate in 1725 pointed out that “the zemstvo commissars and officers are so oppressed by the payment of per capita money that the peasants are not only forced to sell off their belongings and livestock, but many also give away the grain sown in the ground for next to nothing and therefore are necessarily forced to flee beyond other people’s borders.”.

The flight of peasants reached enormous proportions: in the Kazan province, in the area where one infantry regiment was settled, after less than two years of such military-financial management, the regiment was missing 13 thousand souls in its district, which was more than half of the revision souls obliged to support them.

Production to ranks and training

Promotion to ranks in Peter's army took place in strict gradual order. Each new vacancy was filled by the choice of officers of the regiment; the rank up to captain was approved by the commander of the “generalship”, that is, the corps - general-in-chief, and up to colonel - field marshal. Until 1724, patents for all ranks were issued under the signature of the sovereign himself. Promotion to the ranks of colonel and general depended on the sovereign. To prevent family ties, patronage, affection and friendship from leading people unfamiliar with military affairs into the officer ranks, Peter, by decree of 1714, decreed: “Since many are promoting their relatives and friends as officers from young people who do not know the basics of soldiering, for they did not serve in low ranks, and some served only for appearances for several weeks or months, so such people need a statement of how many such ranks there are since 1709, and henceforth a decree must be issued so that both noble breeds and others from outside should not be written down, which did not serve as soldiers in the guard." Peter often looked through the lists of persons promoted to rank himself.

In 1717, Peter demoted Lieutenant Colonel Myakishev “to the Preobrazhensky Regiment as a soldier in the bombardment company because he got that rank through intrigue and not through service.”

The Tsar made sure that the nobles who entered the guards regiments as soldiers went through a well-known military education, “befitting an officer.”

In special regimental schools, young nobles (up to the age of 15) studied arithmetic, geometry, artillery, fortification, foreign languages. The officer's training did not stop after entering the service.

In the Preobrazhensky Regiment, Peter demanded that officers know “engineering.” For this purpose, in 1721, a special school was established at the regiment.

Having made the guards regiments like schools for studying everything that “a good officer should know,” the practice of studying abroad continued.

In 1716, the Military Regulations were published, which strictly defined the rights and obligations of the military during their service.

The results of Peter's reforms in the army

As a result of Peter's reforms, Russia received a constant, regular, centrally supplied modern army, which subsequently for more than a century (before the Crimean War) successfully fought, including with the armies of the leading European powers (Seven Years' War, Patriotic War of 1812). Also, the new army served as a means that allowed Russia to turn the tide of the fight against the Ottoman Empire, gain access to the Black Sea and spread its influence in the Balkans and Transcaucasia. However, the transformation of the army was part general course to the absoluteization of the power of the monarch and the infringement of the rights of the most diverse social strata Russian society. In particular, despite the abolition of the local system, the duty of service was not removed from the nobles, and the functioning of the industry necessary for the technical equipment of the army was ensured through the use of serf labor along with civilian labor.

The need to create a regular army

The Russian army, created during the reform in the conditions of the grueling Northern War, won numerous victories over a strong enemy. The old armed forces, which Peter inherited from the Moscow state at the beginning of his reign, were unable to cope with such tasks, which was clearly demonstrated during the Crimean campaigns, and then by the failure near Narva at the beginning of the war.

The armed forces of the Russian state in the 17th century had a structure that was characteristic of earlier times: noble cavalry, urban (city army) and rural (staff) militia, as well as the Streltsy army, which appeared under Ivan the Terrible. The local and settled system of maintaining troops, when after the end of hostilities the nobles returned to their estates, and the archers and staves returned to their crafts and agriculture, did not contribute to increasing the combat effectiveness of the armed forces.

It was traditional to invite foreigners to Russian service, and since the end of the 16th century this process has been significantly intensified. This made it possible to become more familiar with Western military systems and gradually learn their positive experience. From the second half XVII century, following the model of Western formations, so-called regiments of a foreign system were created from Russians - foot and horse, whose commanders and officers were foreigners invited to Russian service. The greatest preference in hiring was given to the British and Dutch, because Russia had long-standing trade relations with these countries. But still, the majority of the army was made up of local cavalry, armed variably and mostly unsatisfactorily.

Time increasingly urgently demanded the creation of a new type of professional armed forces. It was necessary to tear the warrior away from the land or craft, to make military service the only source of his existence.

Beginning of the formation of the regular army

The formation of a new type of regular army began with four regiments: Lefortov and Gordon, Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky, which together numbered just over 20 thousand people. Created and trained in accordance with Western standards, they became the backbone and source of personnel for the new Russian army. After the defeat of the Streltsy uprising, these formations became almost the only fighting force on which the tsar could fully rely. Many people from them later became officers of other units of the regular Russian army.

In the fall of 1699, the Streltsy regiments in Moscow were reformed, and a number of Peter’s associates were instructed to form three divisions of nine regiments each, recruited from datochny people from all over the state, as well as from the “willing” people of Moscow. During the winter of 1699/1700, recruits were delivered to Preobrazhenskoye, where Peter personally, with a list in his hands, determined the suitability of each and himself distributed them into regiments, the command of which was assigned to foreigners who had previously commanded regiments of the “foreign system”. The officers were either mercenaries who were at the disposal of the Foreign Order, or Semyonovtsy and Preobrazhensky soldiers who had undergone good training in the amusing regiments. There was practically no time to train the newly recruited units (only about three months), which resulted in a crushing defeat near Narva. Peter drew the right conclusions from this defeat. It was decided to more actively begin to create a new regular army, especially since the situation was favorable since Charles XII, considering the Russian army completely defeated, turned his main forces against Augustus II.

Since 1699, the principle of recruitment has changed. A recruiting system is being gradually introduced. Militarily, it was progressive for its time, although it placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of the common people. The living conditions of the recruits were unbearably harsh, which led to high mortality and mass escapes.

By the end of the first decade of the 18th century, the active field army consisted of 54 infantry regiments (in their including the Guards - Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky) and 34 cavalry regiments. The borders and cities were guarded by the so-called garrison regiments - 2 dragoons and 40 infantry, which were formed partly from former regiments of the “foreign system”, and partly from archers.

As for the number and distribution of personnel within each branch of the military, the situation here has changed over time. The infantry was divided into two types - grenadiers and fusiliers. By 1710, in addition to the two guards regiments, 5 grenadier and 47 fusilier regiments were formed. After the victory at Poltava, it was decided to have only 42 field infantry regiments: 2 guards, 5 grenadiers and 35 fusiliers. The remaining field regiments were to be disbanded. The staff of the regiments changed. Until 1704, the regiment had 10 fusilier companies and only a few - 9 fusiliers and 1 grenadier. Since 1704, all regiments had 8 fusiliers and 1 grenadier company. Since 1708, after the unification of all grenadier companies into special regiments, 8 companies remained in the field regiments, reduced to 2 battalions. Only the Semenovsky, Preobrazhensky and Ingermanland regiments had a three-battalion composition (12 companies). According to the states of 1711, the strength of the infantry regiment was 1,487 people. According to the states of 1720, the number remained almost the same (1,488 people), but the ratio of combatant and non-combatant ranks in the regiment changed somewhat. This situation is typical for the main structure of the Russian infantry, if you do not take into account some special formations.

A similar process was going on in the cavalry. In 1702, 10 dragoon regiments were formed, in 1705 - the Life Regiment (the first guards cavalry regiment). According to the states of 1711, it was determined to have 33 dragoon regiments, not counting the life regiment, whose staff consisted of 10 companies (a total of 1328 people in the regiment). According to the states of 1720, there were 33 dragoon regiments and a life regiment left in the cavalry. Among the 33 field regiments, 3 were grenadiers and 30 fuiliers. The strength of the regiment was 1253 people. In 1721, the life regiment was transformed into an ordinary dragoon regiment.

The first regular artillery unit was the bombardment company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment. In 1701, a special artillery regiment was formed, consisting of pushkar companies and four bombardment teams, which also had pontoon and engineer companies and assigned ranks. The regiment's stable staff was determined in 1712. Now it consisted of one bombardment and four gunner companies, pontoon and engineering teams and regimental ranks. According to the states of 1723, the structure remained the same, but the number of people increased. All artillery was divided into regimental, field and siege. The regimental was part of the field, but was attached directly to the regiments.

At the same time, the unification of weapons of all types of troops is being carried out, a unified military uniform. The transition to linear tactics, which in Russia had specific features, is being completed.

Thanks to such transformations, Peter short term managed to create a mobile, clearly organized and well-armed regular army. Such a system, despite minor changes, was extremely cumbersome and inconvenient, especially at the level of local territorial administration. All this required the most radical restructuring.

Peter I is without a doubt one of the brightest and most talented statesmen Russia. The time of his reign fell on the 18th century and it was under him that Russia finally turned into one of the strongest states in Europe, primarily in military terms.

The topic of the reign of Peter I is very extensive, so we will not touch on all of his many achievements, but will only talk about Peter’s reform of the Russian army. The reform envisaged the creation of a new type of army, more efficient and combat-ready. The further course of events showed that Peter’s plan was a brilliant success.

1. What is a regular army and how did it differ from the “old type” Russian army?

First of all, let us note the difference between the personnel (regular) army that Russia acquired during the reign of Peter, and the army that Russia had before the military reforms.

The Russian army of the old type was actually a militia that gathered in case of military necessity. Such an army was completely heterogeneous in composition - it was recruited from among service people, most of whom in peacetime lived on lands allocated to them by the state for service and were engaged in activities far from military affairs (boyars, stolniks, Duma clerks, etc. ) This unit, which formed the basis of the Russian army before the reforms of Peter the Great, was distinguished by the lack of constant military training, uniform weapons and supplies - each soldier was equipped at his own expense.

Another small part of the old type army, somewhat reminiscent of the future regular army, was recruited for permanent service and received a salary from the state (gunners, archers, etc.) This part of the army was more combat-ready and trained, but still its training left much to be desired the best.

The numerous difficulties that such an army encountered when faced with well-trained, prepared and armed troops like the Swedish ones put Russia at an extremely disadvantageous position in the event of a war with such a serious enemy.

What is the fundamental difference between a regular army and an old-type army? First of all, a regular army is a standing army.

Such an army does not disband in the absence of military necessity, but exists and is in a state of combat readiness even in peacetime.

In the absence of hostilities, she is engaged military service, training soldiers and officers, maneuvers and tries in every possible way to strengthen its combat potential.

Such an army has a uniform uniform and weapons, as well as a system of organization. The regular army is maintained and supplied by the state.

It is more mobile, better armed and trained, and, accordingly, much better suited for solving foreign policy problems than the militia. Peter I understood all this very well. It was simply impossible to create one of the strongest states in Europe without a regular army - and Peter enthusiastically took on this task.

2. Why was a regular army necessary for Russia?

The main foreign policy task of Peter I was to establish control over the Baltic and access to the Baltic Sea, which provided Russia with a favorable economic and political position.

The main enemy standing in Russia's way in this matter was Sweden, which had a strong, well-equipped and trained regular army. In order to defeat the Swedes, gain a foothold in the Baltic and finally resolve the issue of control over Baltic Sea In its favor, Russia needed an army not inferior to the Swedish one.

Peter diligently, step by step, moved towards reforming the troops.

He drew conclusions from the severe defeat of the Russian army near Narva in 1700, after which he consistently strengthened the combat capability of the Russian army. Gradually, in terms of order, training and organization, the Russian military forces not only reached the level of the Swedish army, but also surpassed it.

The Battle of Poltava in 1709 marked the rebirth of the Russian army. Competent tactical actions of the new Russian regular army became one of the significant reasons for the victory over the Swedish troops.

3. How was the regular Russian army created?

First of all, Peter I changed the procedure for recruiting troops. Now the army was equipped with so-called recruitment kits. A census of all peasant households was carried out and the number of recruits - soldiers who were to be sent to the households to replenish the Russian army - was determined.

Depending on the army’s needs for soldiers, from a certain number of households in different time could take different numbers of recruits. During active hostilities, more recruits could be recruited from the yards, and accordingly, in the absence of an urgent need for people, fewer recruits. Recruitments were held annually. Peasants who thus became soldiers received liberation from serfdom.

However, it was not enough to recruit soldiers and form an army - it had to be trained.

To do this, Peter I began to hire military specialists from Europe for a lot of money, as well as train his own officers. Military schools were opened - artillery, engineering, and navigation. Commanders were trained on the basis of the best ground regiments Russian army- Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky. in 1716, a military charter was created that determined the procedure for military service.

A well-trained and prepared army required good logistics and supplies.

This problem was also brilliantly solved by Peter. As a result of the transformation of the control system, Provisions, Artillery, Naval orders, etc. appeared. We are not talking about orders - these “orders” were institutions that supplied the army and were responsible for a certain area.

All these measures made it possible to radically transform the Russian army, which literally in 15 years transformed from a “conciliar” army into a modern, well-organized and armed army, with trained soldiers and officers.

Now Russian troops were in no way inferior to European armies. Peter did a truly grandiose job - without the creation of a regular army, the transformation of Russia into a great power with weight in Europe would have been impossible.

18th century, History and politics

Creation of a regular army under Peter I

Recruit kits

Peter did not see the defeat of his army - he was no longer in the camp under the walls of Narva: literally on the eve of the battle, he left for Novgorod, taking with him his favorite Aleksashka Menshikov and the commander-in-chief of the army, Field Marshal F.

A. Golovina.

Of course, the fact that the king abandoned the army the day before decisive battle, does not adorn a great commander. But this act was not evidence of cowardice or weakness. It showed Peter's inherent rigid rationalism, a sober recognition of the impending inevitable defeat, a desire to survive in order to continue the fight with renewed energy.

Subsequently, many years after the Battle of Narva, Peter, filling out his famous “Journal, or Daily Note,” came to the idea not only of the inevitability then, in 1700, of defeat, the pattern of this shame, but even of the undoubted benefit that The ill-fated Narva brought everything that had begun.

Of course, the thought of the benefits of defeat initial stage war, far from life important centers country, came later, and in the first days after the “Narva embarrassment” he thought about something else: how to preserve what was left and not succumb to panic and despair, for indeed the victory of the Swedes was then “sadly sensual” for Peter.

Internal affairs were more serious: after Narva, Peter clearly realized that the Russian army was not ready to fight its enemy - Swedish army Charles XII.

Naturally, the question arises: why was army reform necessary after Narva?

The fact is that the defeat at Narva was on a par with the defeats that plagued the Russian army in the second half of the 17th century. And Peter understood this clearly.

Peter understood the reason for the chronic defeats of the army; he saw that it was necessary to change the very basis on which the military organization was based.

At its core, the regiments of the “new order” were a type of local army, a new shoot on an old tree. The officers and soldiers of the “new manner” regiments served “from the ground”, enjoyed estate rights, that is, they were landowners.

Peter had no doubt which way to go.

It was in the absence of “order” - a clear organization, “regularity” (a concept that embraces and expresses the meaning and purpose of army reform) - that Peter saw as the reason for the failures of the Russian army in the 17th century, as well as near Narva.

It should be noted that he took the path of “regularity” long before the war with the Swedes. As you know, in 1687, 15-year-old Peter created two “amusing” regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky (named after the palace villages where they were stationed), in which noble children and royal servants served.

Without a doubt, for Peter and his associates, service in the "amusing" became that invaluable military school, which gave the young king an initial military education and developed those natural abilities that made him outstanding commander, military reformer.

In terms of methods and techniques of training, the “amusing” regiments, based on the “regular”, that is, not on the local 6az, became the prototype of the army that Peter began to create on the eve and especially in the initial period of the war with Sweden.

The signal for the creation of regular regiments as the main ones was the dissolution of the Streltsy regiments in 1699 after the suppression of their rebellion in 1698.

In Peter's decrees and other government decrees for 1699, a whole program for creating new army on principles significantly different from those on which the army of the 17th century was built.

To form new regiments, two methods were chosen: the admission of those who wished - volunteers - as they said then, into the “freedom”, as well as the recruitment of “dachas”.

Everyone was accepted into the “freedom”, with the exception of peasants who were tax-paying, that is, paying state taxes. Among the free ones could be, according to the tsar’s decrees, “children of boyars, and from the undergrowth, and Cossack, and Streltsy children, and brothers, and nephews, and backbenchers, and from all other ranks, and from hired working people who sail on ships , except for retired Moscow regiments of archers, and by no means to take tax-paying peasants from the arable land.”

“Datochnye” are basically those armed serfs who previously, together with their landowner masters, went out to a review or war in accordance with established proportions, for example, the landowner had to present at least one armed soldier from every twenty households of his estate.

Now the recruitment of freemen and “dachas” (this practice, which was generally common in the 17th century), acquired a different character, having been changed radically: volunteers were not assigned to soldier regiments of the old, local type, and the “dachas” no longer served, as before, in auxiliary troops - they all became “correct” soldiers of regular regiments.

They were trained according to new regulations and supported by state funds, and they became lifelong military personnel who were not sent home after the war.

Since 1705, the government has taken the next step - it stops accepting the “freemen” and moves on to recruiting so-called recruits directly from the peasant population, which was not the case before.

This was caused by an acute shortage of people in the army, the needs of which could no longer be met by volunteers and “dachas”.

The recruiting system was introduced in 1699. It was based on the system of recruiting soldier and dragoon regiments, established in the second half of the 17th century. The merit of Peter I was that, having rejected all other methods of recruitment, he used domestic experience, which was justified in practice.

With this method of recruitment, the class principle of army organization was firmly established. The soldiers were recruited from peasants and other tax-paying classes, and the officers from the nobles.

All those who signed up were given a salary of 11 rubles a year and food money on a par with the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments. The registration of freemen was entrusted to a special commission. After checking all the data with the census books, the commission decided to recruit data from among the landowner peasants and courtyard servants. It was proposed to recruit into the service only from boyar children, underage Cossacks and Streltsy and free people.

Later, it was allowed to recruit from the Danish people, except “from the arable lands of fugitive peasants.”

The end of recruitment was envisaged in Moscow by December 1, 1699, and in Nizhny Novgorod and lower towns - by January 25, 1700.

All those who wished to enroll as soldiers were offered to be accepted at the gathering yards “without any delay or bribes.”

As a result of the activities of both commissions, 22,514 people were accepted into the new soldiers of Golovin’s commissions, of which 10,727 people were datochnye and 11,787 people were free, and in the Repnin commission 10,720 people. A total of 33,234 people. Of this number, 32,130 people were sent to the army, and 1,104 people to the navy.

From this contingent, 27 new regiments of soldiers were staffed.

Of these: 8 - in Moscow, 9 - in Novgorod and 10 - in lower cities. In addition to the infantry regiments, at this time two dragoon regiments were formed, staffed by boyar and noble children who reported for military service with their datochniki.

Thus, the beginning of the recruitment system was laid by the decree of 1699, but the decree did not allow everyone organizational issues that arose during recruitment.

The decree outlined only common features recruitment system. Subsequent decrees, supplementing the law of 1699, completed the formalization of the recruitment system, which finally took shape only in 1705, when unified principles for recruiting field troops were developed. The garrison troops continued to be recruited in the same way.

The collection of recruits was usually carried out by the Local Order through the so-called stations.

Upon receipt of the decree, people were collected at the stations using census books, and here they were formed into “parties” (teams) of 500-1000 people, sworn in and forced to give so-called “mandatory notes” so that the recruits would not run away.

After this, the recruiting teams were transferred to the Military Order, which sent them to the regiments.

In order to clarify the contingent of service people who were supposed to serve as privates, at the end of 1699, a check of their composition was carried out, as a result of which minors aged 15 years and above were enrolled in the service.

The ongoing war required continuous reinforcements.

In this regard, a number of decrees were issued in 1703. Thus, on July 31, 1703, it was proposed to submit personalized lists of all minors to Moscow, and on October 1, it was ordered to send them to military service.

After the registration, all the youngsters who had not previously appeared at the review were ordered to appear for assignment to the dragoon regiments.

The lack of soldiers forced Peter to issue a decree in 1704 to collect previously released Moscow streltsy and streltsy children to Smolensk and enroll them in field and garrison regiments.

The need to replenish the infantry, which suffered heavy losses during the war, forced the decision to collect one person from two households from the Moscow Yamsk town settlements.

To replenish the fleet personnel, a recruitment was carried out, which provided 1000 sailors.

The transition to a unified recruitment system could not be carried out without a firm record of the people who were subject to enlistment for military service. The government decided to first conduct such a census in the Moscow district. The decree of August 17, 1704 on the general census was intended primarily to solve this problem and, in addition, to streamline the flow of funds for the maintenance of the army. However, this could not be done.

The complexity of the task undertaken forced the census to be temporarily stopped. Despite the lack of accurate data on the number of peasants, the government continued to carry out conscription.

In this decree, which required one person at the age of 20 from every 20 households to be sent as soldiers, the word “recruit” was mentioned for the first time, which included a certain content. Attached to the decree were articles given to the officers regarding the collection of Danish soldiers or recruits.

18 articles outlined the basic principles of the recruitment system. Particularly important was the 12th article, which stated, “if out of all the guards, at stations or in his sovereign service, who dies or kills, or runs away, and instead of those, have as soldiers the same people from whom they will be taken, so that those soldiers will always be fully prepared for his sovereign service.”

It was intended to create permanent recruitment areas in this way. However, this system created uneven replenishment conditions. That is why this order of recruitment was maintained for a relatively short time, and then it was necessary to abandon the tempting system of “immortal recruits” altogether and move on to carrying out widespread recruitment according to special decrees. The recruitment of 1705 was somewhat delayed and was extended until September. Thus, from this set a unified acquisition system was established.

Subsequent recruitments were still carried out by the Local Order.

The unevenness of recruitment had a particularly hard impact on the new provinces, which had to be freed from recruitment. The government shifted the recruitment to the rest of the provinces and proposed to be guided by the census books of 1678, and not by the data of 1710.

Since 1711, recruitments were carried out according to orders of the Senate.

In 1711 several recruitments were carried out. Special recruitments were carried out among clerks, coachmen and monastery servants and courtyard people. The first intake included 4,200 people. And the two subsequent recruitments yielded 47,712 people. In the same year, the government tried to create a reserve of recruits. The decree of 1711 clearly expresses this idea: “for the current real military situation, collect again 25 thousand recruits from all provinces; and 7 thousand horses for the dragoon service.” The decree was confirmed in 1712, and it also determined the norms for reserves in the provinces: “recruits must be collected without any delay, so that in each province there will be a recruit in reserve against the regiments assigned to the province.”

The number of reserves was to be half the number of recruits for the field army.

It was proposed to keep recruits at stations in the Moscow, Siberian, Kyiv, Azov, Smolensk, Kazan and Arkhangelogorod provinces and “train them in military art, so that they are in every readiness for service.”

But in 1713, recruitment under this decree was suspended, and again it was decided to recruit regiments from all over the state.

Since 1724, the distribution of recruits was carried out not from house to house, but from person to person. The transition to such a system became possible after the first revision, completed in 1721.

The levies fell heavily on the serfs and state peasants.

The army absorbed the best elements of the village.

The main form of protest against lifelong military service was escape.

Escapes of recruits also occurred in subsequent years. The government resorted to the most severe measures. Military courts sentenced fugitive recruits to whipping, exile to hard labor and even death.

So, in 1701, Peter ordered runaway recruits to be hanged by lot or sent to hard labor. In 1702, he wrote to boyar T. Streshnev: “When you receive this letter, please immediately find these damned fugitives..., having found everyone, beat them with a whip and cut their ears, and in addition, on the 5th of the lot, send them to Taganrog...”

Decrees on severe punishments for fugitives were issued almost every year.

However, harsh measures did not lead to the desired results. The escapes continued. The concerned government decided to study the reasons for the mass escapes.

A special investigation conducted in 1710 showed that recruits were afraid of the prospect of lifelong service and the inhumane treatment they received during recruitment. According to the instructions of the government, attention was paid to better maintenance of recruits and the responsibilities of the population were somewhat eased.

At the end of 1712, the government announced that the conditions for recruiting would be improved, and took upon itself the supply of recruits along the route.

While improving recruitment conditions, the government at the same time gave instructions to strengthen monitoring of recruits.

In an effort to improve the situation of the recruits, the government for a number of years issued decrees on the forgiveness of fugitives and on their voluntary appearance.

Returning fugitives were not hanged, but were sent to Azov, Siberia or St. Petersburg to serve their service. All cases of fugitive recruits were handled by a special court at the Military Collegium, which was called the Lower Military Court.

Summing up the manning of the Russian army in the first quarter of the 18th century, the following should be noted:

The recruiting system significantly changed the face of the Russian army.

In the class army, soldiers were recruited mainly from serfs and state peasants, and officers were recruited from nobles.

Recruits were taken on for lifelong service. After taking the oath, they themselves and their children ceased to be serfs. This, of course, was not universal conscription, as noble military historians tried to portray the recruitment system, for the entire burden of recruitment fell on the peasants. The clergy were exempted from military service, and the merchants were paid off and thereby introduced elements of bourgeois relations into the recruitment of troops.

Already at the beginning of the century, the government’s attitude to the issue of recruitment was determined.

It viewed conscription duties in relation to peasants not as personal, but as zemstvo or communal. The government considered the legal entity to be “yards”, and later “taxable souls”, united in a community. Having presented the requirement to supply a certain number of recruits, the government did not care about how the community would organize the selection and in what order the recruits would be distributed among families.

The communities developed a system of priority for families when supplying recruits.

These spontaneously formed rules of “Russian recruitment” were then used by the ruling circles to their advantage. The landowners turned the community (the world) into an instrument of influence on the peasants, allowing them to keep them in line. In the army, the communal principle was also used in the interests of the ruling classes. It made it possible to unite soldiers into artels and oblige them to mutual responsibility.

At the same time, such a selection system played a significant role in strengthening camaraderie among the soldiers, who looked at their unit as “the world,” which increased the morale of the troops.

During the first quarter of the century, the forms of troop mobilization were completely determined.

The collection of recruits took place in the provinces and provinces, and from the 20s, the regiments received their own districts and were replenished on a territorial basis. Beginning in 1716, each regiment assigned officers to a special command to deliver its recruits. The recruits then went directly to the regimental commanders, who distributed them at their discretion. Recruitment made it possible to significantly increase the size of the army and make it combat-ready.

The constant replenishment of the army with untrained recruits created many difficulties: it was necessary to annually train the field army in the basics of military service.

Recruit(from the French récruter - to recruit troops) - a person accepted into military service through conscription or hiring.

• 1. History
• 2 Recruit regiments
• 3 Recruit set
• 4 Recruit families
• 5 Schools
• 6 Famous Recruits
• 7 In other countries
• 8 See
• 9 Literature

Story

Main article: Recruitment duty

In the Russian army and navy (Armed Forces) from 1705 to 1874 - a person enrolled in the armed forces under conscription, to which all tax-paying classes (peasants, townspeople, etc.) were subject and for whom it was communal and lifelong and they supplied a certain number of recruits (military personnel) from their communities. The recruitment of serfs into the armed forces freed them from serfdom.

The nobility was exempted from conscription duties. Later, this exemption was extended to merchants, families of clergy, honorary citizens, residents of Bessarabia and some remote areas of Siberia.

Since 1793, the indefinite period of service was limited to 25 years, from 1834 - to 20 years, followed by a stay on the so-called indefinite leave for 5 years. In 1855 - 1872, 12-, 10- and 7-year service periods were successively established and, accordingly, 3, 5 and 8 years of leave were established.

Recruitment sets were not produced regularly, but as needed and in varying quantities.

Only in 1831 were annual recruitments introduced, which were divided into regular: 5-7 recruits per 1,000 souls, reinforced - 7-10 people and emergency - over 10. In 1874, after the start of the military reform of Alexander II, conscription was replaced by universal military service, and the word "recruit" was replaced by the word "recruit". In the USSR and modern Russia the term “liable for military service” is applied to persons subject to service and called up for service.

Recruit regiments

After the introduction of the recruitment system for staffing the armed forces, all regiments were divided into field and garrison.

The garrison regiments were training, and for replenishment field units-- reserve.

Peter I developed a system in which each recruit had to go through field regiments, garrison regiments (from 1764 garrison battalions), service in civil departments (watchman, messenger, from 1764 in a disabled team), settlement, dismissal for his own support, or to a monastery or almshouse.

The goal of the recruitment system is the fullest use of human resources.

Recruitment set

A personal decree on the recruitment of recruits was issued in the 18th century in September-October (less often in July-August), in the 19th century - in the 30th century. 40s (July), 1844-1855 - different times (most often July-August-September), 1862-1873. - mostly October-November. The recruitment was supposed to take place within 2 months.

Recruits had to be at least two arshins and two vershoks (155 cm) tall, healthy and not disabled.

Each recruit had to have clothes, shoes and food with him. The delivery of recruits to the place of service was ensured by “teachers”: Cossacks allocated by the voivodeship office and soldier teams.

According to the standards of 1766, there were two old soldiers for every 10 recruits, one non-commissioned officer for every 20 recruits, and one chief officer for every 50 recruits.

It was supposed to travel to the place of duty by “direct routes”; in good weather it was supposed to cover 20-30 versts. In bad weather, crossings were reduced by half. Every third day was set aside for rest. Roll call was held twice a day. To prevent escapes, the Senate in 1738 introduced the practice of cutting foreheads at county recruiting points.

Upon arrival at the scene, a medical examination was carried out. Up to 10% of recruits turned out to be unfit for service due to illness or young age (there are known cases of recruiting 14-year-olds).

Before being distributed among the regiments, the recruits were read military articles weekly and were taught daily drill and rifle techniques. In the barracks it was commanded “not to waste money and provisions and not to waste them on drink.”

Caricature of the recruitment institute.

Recruit families

Recruits, as a rule, were single, but the wives of recruits were allowed to follow their husbands to the place of service.

During his service, a soldier could get married with the permission of his regimental superiors. In 1798, 29% of soldiers in the Irkutsk garrison regiment had families. Soldiers' children from 2 to 6 years old received government support.

Schools

At first, there were numerical and, in 1732, regimental or garrison schools under the regiments. Boys began education at the age of 7, and orphans began earlier, as they had no means of food.

After entering school, state support ceased, and a salary was paid instead. In 1731, in the first year - 1 ruble 35 kopecks; after training in writing, singing, arithmetic, music, plumbing and clerking, the salary increased to 1 ruble 59 kopecks per year. After studying geometry and fortification, the salary increased to 2 rubles 7 kopecks per year. In addition, every month a schoolchild was entitled to two quadrangles of flour (two pounds), 1/8 of a quadrangle of cereals, and 2 pounds of salt.

Once every three years, a uniform, a sheepskin coat, trousers, and a hat were issued. Every year, material was supplied for ties, two shirts, two ports, two pairs of shoes with buckles and stockings. Third grade students were given a red cloth to wear on the collar of their caftan.

By decree of September 3, 1736, the education of soldiers' children became compulsory. Those who evaded were subject to a fine of 100 rubles. Since 1721, each garrison regiment created 50 places for soldiers’ children in digital schools.

According to the decree of September 2, 1732, there were 8 student places per company and 64 places per regiment. Since July 1735, it was allowed to accept over-class students. In 1744, digital schools were combined with garrison schools, and everyone was allowed to study in them at their own expense.

Soldiers' children entered service at the age of 15. Those fit for height and age were sent to regiments, the rest were assigned to clerks, apprentices of mechanics and blacksmiths, to non-combatant ranks.

In 1805, all soldiers' children were given the name cantonists.

Famous Recruits

• Dostoevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich
• Shevchenko, Taras Grigorievich

In other countries

IN armed forces in some other states, recruits are those who have the lowest military rank(English)

Recruit means literally “recruited”, “recruited” - that is, a person who has already been accepted into the service, but has not yet received even basic training).

see also

• Military rank
• Table of ranks
• Recruit army
• Military duty
• Person liable for military service
• Recruiting Sergeant (English Burletta)

Literature

• Beskrovny L.G. “The Russian Army and Navy in the 18th Century.”

  Moscow, 1958

• Bykonya G.F. “Cossacks and other service population of Eastern Siberia in the XVIII - early XIX century. Demographic and class aspect." Publishing house Krasnoyarsk ped.

  University named after V. P. Astafieva. Krasnoyarsk, 2008. ISBN 978-5-85981-287-5

• Hiring a recruit in the middle of the 19th century in Arkhangelsk province. Arkhangelsk, 1912 (Electronic copy of the book)

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The military reform of Peter I included a set of government measures to reorganize the army recruitment and military administration system, create a regular navy, improvement of weapons, development and implementation of a new system of training and education of military personnel.

During Peter's military reforms, the previous military organization was abolished: the noble and streltsy army and the regiments of the “new system” (military units formed in the 17th century in Russia on the model of Western European armies). These regiments went to form the regular army and formed its core.

Peter I introduced new system recruitment of the regular army. In 1699, conscription was introduced, legalized by the decree of Peter I in 1705. Its essence was that the state forcibly annually recruited a certain number of recruits into the army and navy from the tax-paying classes, peasants and townspeople. From 20 households they took one single person between the ages of 15 and 20 (however, during the Northern War, these periods were constantly changing due to a shortage of soldiers and sailors). By the end of Peter’s reign, the number of all regular troops, infantry and cavalry, ranged from 196 up to 212 thousand people.

Along with the reorganization of the land army, Peter began to create a navy. By 1700, the Azov fleet consisted of more than 50 ships. During the Northern War it was created Baltic Fleet, which by the end of the reign of Peter I consisted of 35 large linear outer ships, 10 frigates and about 200 galley (rowing) ships with 28 thousand sailors.

Under Peter I, the army and navy received a uniform and harmonious organization, regiments, brigades and divisions were formed in the army, squadrons, divisions and detachments were formed in the navy, and a single dragoon type cavalry was created. To manage the active army, the position of commander-in-chief (field marshal general) was introduced, and in the navy - admiral general.

The treasury did not have the necessary funds, and the construction of the fleet was entrusted to the so-called “companies” (companies) - associations of secular and spiritual landowners. With the outbreak of the Northern War, the focus shifts to the Baltic, and with the founding of St. Petersburg, shipbuilding is carried out almost exclusively there. By the end of Peter's reign, Russia had become one of the strongest naval powers in the world, having 48 ships of the line and 788 galleys and other ships.

The beginning of the Northern War was the impetus for the final creation of a regular army. Before Peter, the army consisted of two main parts - the noble militia and various semi-regular formations (streltsy, Cossacks, foreign regiments). The revolutionary change was that Peter introduced new principle recruitment of the army - periodic convocations of the militia were replaced by systematic recruitment. The recruitment system was based on the class-serf principle. Recruitment sets extended to the population who paid taxes and carried out state duties. In 1699, the first recruitment was carried out; from 1705, recruitment was legalized by a corresponding decree and became annual. From 20 households they took one single person between the ages of 15 and 20 (however, during the Northern War, these periods constantly changed due to a shortage of soldiers and sailors). The Russian village suffered the most from the recruitment drives. The recruit's service life was practically unlimited.

Officers The Russian army was replenished by nobles who studied in the guards noble regiments or in specially organized schools (pushkar, artillery, navigation, fortification, Marine Academy etc.) . In 1716, the Military Charter was adopted, and in 1720, the Naval Charter, and large-scale rearmament of the army was carried out. By the end of the Northern War, Peter had a huge, strong army - 200 thousand people (not counting 100 thousand Cossacks), which allowed Russia to win a grueling war that lasted almost a quarter of a century.

When the first infantry regiments of the regular army were formed in 1699, the regiment's staff consisted of 12 companies (there were no battalions yet). The regiment consisted of 1000-1300 personnel. The dragoon regiments consisted of 5 squadrons, 2 companies each. There were 800-1000 people in the dragoon regiment. In 1704, the infantry regiments were reduced to 9 companies - 8 fusilier companies and 1 grenadier company, consolidated into 2 battalions. At the same time, the number was established: in the infantry regiments - 1350 people, in the dragoon regiments - 1200 people.

During the war, the available number of people in the regiments did not exceed 1000 people.

In 1706-1707 Grenadier companies were removed from the infantry and dragoon regiments. The infantry regiments consisted of 8 companies; the dragoons continued to be ten companies strong.

The grenadier companies were consolidated into separate grenadier infantry and dragoon regiments. In 1711, a new state was introduced, according to which an infantry regiment consisted of 2 battalions, and a battalion - of 4 companies. The regiment consisted of 40 staff officers and chief officers, 80 non-commissioned officers, 1,120 combat soldiers, 247 non-combatant soldiers. In total, the infantry regiment had 1,487 officers and soldiers.

The dragoon regiment consisted of 5 squadrons, each squadron had 2 companies. The regiment consists of 38 staff officers and chief officers, 80 non-commissioned officers, 920 combat soldiers, 290 non-combatants. In total, the dragoon regiment had 1,328 officers and soldiers.

It must be admitted that the staff of the infantry regiment was somewhat unsuccessful. The regiment is weak. Given the inevitable shortage in war, its actual strength was about 1,000 people; the two-battalion regiment organization limited the possibilities of tactical combinations. A three-battalion organization would be more flexible.

The dragoon regiment was somewhat large compared to the infantry. On the other hand, the five-squadron composition of the regiment made it difficult to manage, and the number of companies in the squadron (2) was clearly insufficient.

In 1712, the first artillery regiment was formed. It consisted of 1 bombardier, 6 gunners and 1 miner company, "engineer" and "pony" captains, second captains, lieutenants, second lieutenants, conductors and battery masters *. Thus, the regiment united artillery and engineering troops.

* (Complete collection of laws Russian Empire, ed. 1830, vol. IV.)

The material part was stored in the arsenal. During the campaign, the guns were transported on horses, which were taken from the peasants as needed.

In 1705, Peter issued a decree according to which regular riding and horse composition. This achieved a permanent organizational unification in the artillery of people, equipment and horses. In Western European armies, such an order was established only in the middle of the 18th century.

Peter I retained the regimental artillery that existed in the regiments of the “new system”; each infantry and dragoon regiment received two 3-pound cannons. The Russian army was ahead of the army in terms of the introduction of horse artillery Western Europe for half a century, if we consider Peter’s reform as the beginning of horse artillery. But from the previous presentation we saw that regimental artillery was already in the Reitar and Dragoon regiments of the “new system” even before Peter.

The number of regiments remained the same in peacetime and war time.

In 1699, as already noted, new 27 infantry and 2 dragoon regiments were formed. To this we must add the already existing 4 regular infantry regiments - Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky and the former regiments of the “new system” of Lefort and Gordon.

Thus, by the beginning of the war with the Swedes in Russia there were 31 infantry and 2 dragoon regiments.

In 1701, Boris Golitsyn formed 9 dragoon regiments. In 1702, from the regiments of the “new system” of the Novgorod and Kazan categories, the Apraksin Corps was created, consisting of 5 infantry and 2 dragoon regiments. In the same year, 4 infantry regiments were formed from former Moscow streltsy, and in 1704, 2 more infantry regiments were formed from streltsy.

By 1706, another 10 infantry and 15 dragoon regiments had been formed. Thus, in 1706 there were a total of 2 guards, 48 ​​infantry and 28 dragoon regiments in the army.

In 1710, the number of regiments was reduced to 2 guards and 32 infantry regiments due to the fact that 16 infantry regiments located in Izhora were transferred to garrison regiments. The number of dragoon regiments increased to 38.

The development of the Russian army under Peter I can be traced using the following table (data are given only for field troops).

1 Of these, 5 are grenadier regiments.

2 Of these, 3 are grenadier regiments.

In addition to the listed field troops, Peter I also formed garrison troops. By 1724 there were 49 infantry and 4 dragoon regiments.

Having captured the southwestern shores of the Caspian Sea, Peter I formed 9 new infantry regiments of the so-called Persian, or grassroots, corps to guard them.

Consequently, if we take into account all the formations of the regular army, we can say that by the end of the first quarter of the 18th century in Russia there were 2 guards, 5 grenadiers, 40 field infantry, 9 infantry regiments of the Persian corps, 49 garrison infantry regiments, 3 grenadier dragoons, 30 dragoons field and 4 dragoon garrison regiments. In total there were 105 infantry and 37 dragoon regiments.

The regular strength of the combat infantry was: field 59,480 people, Persian corps 11,160 people, garrison troops 60,760 people. Total infantry 131,400.

There were cavalry: field 34,254 people, garrison 4,152. Total 38,406 people.

The entire combat strength of the army numbered 170,000 people, and with non-combatants - 198,500 people. These figures do not take into account the personnel of the artillery regiment and central departments.

The highest organizational units in the army were divisions, or generalships. Divisions included different numbers of infantry and cavalry regiments, depending on the tasks facing the divisions. The composition of the regiments was also inconsistent.

In 1699, from the beginning of the formation of the army, three generalships were established - Golovin, Weide and Repnin, each of which included from 9 to 11 regiments. During the war, an intermediate formation between the regiment and the division was introduced - a brigade, which included 2 - 3 infantry or cavalry regiments. Several brigades made up a division.

Thus, organic compound Peter did not create all types of troops. There were no such formations in Western European armies. They first appeared only almost a hundred years later, in the army of the French bourgeois revolution of 1789 - 1794.

The Cossack troops remained in the same organizational state, only their numbers decreased significantly as a result of losses in the war, after the betrayal of Mazepa and the Bulavin uprising on the Don. Instead of 50,000 Ukrainian Cossacks, by the end of the first quarter of the 18th century there were 15,000; There were 5,000 Don Cossacks instead of 14,000.

The ratio of military branches in the army of Peter I compared to the pre-reform army changed dramatically. In the pre-reform army, infantry was only slightly superior in numbers to cavalry. It was not yet the main branch of the military. In Peter's army there were 131,400 infantry people, and only 38,406 cavalry people, i.e. 23 percent of the total number of troops. If we take the field troops, then even then the cavalry will be only 38 percent.

Thus, by the end of the first quarter of the 18th century, the post-reform Russian army represented a great force - the regular troops alone had 170,000 combat personnel, and with non-combatant troops - 198,500 people. The Russian army was the largest army in Europe; the Prussian army alone by 1740 numbered 86,000 people, the Austrian and French had about 150,000 people by the end of the first quarter of the 18th century. The Russian army became the most powerful army in Europe, not only in numbers, but also in moral and combat terms.

Peter I adopted the most advanced weapon of that time for his army - a gun.

The gun (fusil) - fusee, with a flintlock, was invented in 1640 in France. It was much more convenient to handle than a heavy musket with its long barrel. However, the range of the gun was less than that of the musket.

The latter had an aiming range of up to 600 steps, and the gun hit only 300 steps. The accuracy of the gun was also less than that of the musket. But the gun had less weight. It was much faster in firing and easier to use. The relatively light weight of the gun made it possible to attach a bayonet to it, which solved the problem of creating universal firearms and bladed weapons.

In the armies of Western Europe, the gun was considered mainly as a hunting weapon. There they preferred to arm the infantry with long-range and heavy muskets that did not have bayonets.

The gun was appreciated primarily by the soldiers themselves. The military leadership for a long time did not want to introduce it into service with the army and defended the old models. IN late XVII century, the organizer of the French regular army, Minister of War Lavoie, even issued orders prohibiting the use of guns in the infantry, and demanded that army inspectors strictly monitor the implementation of these orders.

The best European armies at that time, such as the French and Swedish, early XVIII centuries were armed with muskets, and one third of the infantry were armed with pikes. Only a few fusilier regiments were formed, intended for a strong fire strike at short notice.

Peter's merit lies in the fact that, earlier than any of his contemporaries, he understood the importance of a gun in the conditions of linear tactics and boldly introduced it into mass armament of the army.

Peter did not immediately manage to rearm his army. Russian factories did not yet know how to make guns. In Western Europe, there was no mass production of guns and therefore it was impossible to immediately purchase the required number of them to arm the first formations of Peter the Great's regular army. In the regiments besieging Narva there were still many soldiers armed with muskets and even pikes. Only in subsequent years, with the establishment of rifle production in Russia, was the rearmament of the army completely completed.

However, as a relic of the old distrust of the bayonet, at first the army still had swords in service with the infantry. They subsequently disappeared from service.

Peter's cavalry - the dragoons - also received a gun, in addition to having a broadsword and two pistols. Such weapons made it possible to use cavalry on a wider scale than in the armies of Western Europe, where most cavalry did not have guns.

Peter's dragoons, dismounted, could fight against the enemy, who consisted of all types of troops. This was the case near Kalisz, where Menshikov, having only dragoons, defeated the Polish-Swedish army, which consisted of all branches of the army; So it was with Lesnaya.

There were dragoons in Western European armies, but they made up a small part of the cavalry and could perform limited tasks,

With regard to cavalry, Peter managed to choose the most advanced of all existing types, capable of performing numerous tasks and corresponding to the conditions of the theater of military operations.

Peter paid special attention to artillery. He created his own, original, perfect for his time samples of artillery pieces. Peter demanded from the artillery, along with firepower, great tactical mobility and agility. The regimental artillery (3-pounder) had good mobility. The regimental cannon weighed 9 pounds.

The field artillery was also significantly lighter, but still did not have sufficient tactical mobility due to the unsuccessful design of the carriage. 6-pound guns weighed from 36 to 46 pounds; 12-pound guns with a carriage - 150 poods. To transport a 12-pound gun, at least 15 horses were required. If the carriage design had been more advanced, then only 6 horses would have been needed to move such a weapon.

The 9-pound mortar already weighed 300 pounds, its mobility was low.

According to the statement in 1723, the artillery listed:

1) siege - 120 18 - 24 pound guns, 40 5 - 9 pound mortars;

2) field - 21 guns 6 - 8 - 12-pounders;

3) regimental - 80 3-pound guns.

It should be noted that the regimental and field artillery in the list apparently was not fully taken into account. According to the state, there were 2 guns per regiment, therefore, for 105 infantry and 37 dragoon regiments there should have been 284 guns of regimental artillery alone.

There are mentions that during the war some infantry and dragoon regiments had more than two guns.

For example, the grenadier regiment of Repnin’s division had 12 “screw-mounted arquebuses.”

A powerful industrial base allowed Peter I to create strong artillery. Throughout the 18th century, Russian artillery remained the most numerous and technically advanced artillery in the world.

Peter I paid great attention to the form and quality of uniforms. The infantry and cavalry were dressed in caftans, green for the infantry, blue for the cavalry. The soldiers also had felt hats, cloth raincoats in inclement weather, stockings and shoes.

It cannot be said that such uniforms were comfortable in the Russian climate. The soldiers suffocated in their thick cloth caftans in the summer and froze in the winter under their cloth cloaks.

Peter put up with all this, apparently wanting to emphasize with new uniforms the difference between his army and the old, pre-reform Moscow army.

Let's start with the myth that Peter the Great allegedly created a regular army in Russia. But this is completely untrue. The creation of a regular army in Russia began in Time of Troubles and completed in 1679–1681. In 1621, just 8 years after Mikhail Fedorovich’s accession to the throne, Anisim Mikhailov’s son Radishevsky, clerk of the Pushkarsky order, wrote the “Charter of military, cannon and other affairs related to military science" - the first military regulations in Russia. The Charter of Anisim Radishevsky began to be written back in 1607; it generalized the experience of the Time of Troubles and contained translations of many foreign books. On the basis of almost 663 articles of the new Charter, the regular army of the Romanov era began to form. Half a century before the birth of Peter.

According to the Charter, the Streltsy troops and noble militia were retained in the army, but in parallel with them, “regiments of a foreign system” were introduced: soldiers, (infantry); dragoons (horseback); Reitarsky (mixed). According to this Charter, the ranks are “voivodship” and “general”. A well-ordered hierarchy of lieutenants, captains, colonels, topped by generals, helps control troops and psychologically facilitates rapprochement with Europe. The charter determined who they are, colonels and lieutenants, and what place they occupy in the hierarchy, and foreign words I used them only when it was difficult to do without them.

In 1630, the army consisted of the following groups of troops:
Noble cavalry - 27,433
Sagittarius - 28,130
Cossacks - 11,192
Pushkari - 4136
Tatars -10 208
Volga peoples - 8493
Foreigners - 2783
Total 92,500 people

The composition of the army is traditional irregular troops, except for mercenary foreigners. The government, preparing for the war for Smolensk, intends to change this tradition, and in April 1630, an order was sent to all districts to recruit homeless nobles and boyar children into the military service, and then everyone who wanted it. This gave an excellent result, and soon 6 regiments of soldiers were created - 1,600 privates and 176 commanders. The regiment was divided into 8 companies. Average command staff:
1. Colonel
2. Lieutenant Colonel (large regimental lieutenant)
3. Maeor (watchman or okolnichy)
4. 5 captains
Each company had:
1. Lieutenant
2. Ensign
3. 3 sergeants (Pentecostal)
4. Quartermaster (officer)
5. Kaptenarmus (watchman under arms)
6. 6 corporals (esauls)
7. Doctor
8. Clerk
9. 2 interpreters
10. 3 drummers
11. 120 musketeers and 80 spearmen

In December 1632, there was already a Reitar regiment of 2000 people, in which there were 12 companies of 176 people each under the command of captains, and there was a dragoon company of 400 people. By 1682, when Peter was 4 years old, the formation of foreign regiments as the basis of the Russian army was completed.

And Peter allegedly destroyed the completely medieval noble militia and the useless archers.
But the noble militia has not been medieval for a long time, since 1676. Peter, indeed, began to disband the Streltsy troops after the Azov campaigns. But after Narva, having become convinced of the qualities of the Streltsy army, he interrupted the disbandment. The Streltsy took part in both the Northern War and the Prut Campaign of 1711. Until the 1720s, there was, in the words of an authoritative reference book, “a gradual absorption of the Streltsy by regular troops.”
But this is part of the regular central army. And before late XVIII Servicemen of the old services have lived to this day, and among them are city archers. As they carried out police service, they carried out the entire 18th century.

Some are also convinced that Peter invented the baguette bayonet and shooting with plutongs. (Every innovation in Russia that occurred during the Petrine era is immediately attributed to Peter)
Shooting with plutongs was invented in 1707 by Marquis Sebastian le Pierre Vaux Ban, Marshal of France, famous Marshal of Louis XIV.
Previously, one line would come forward, shoot, and leave. The 2nd rank advanced, etc... Now one rank lay on the ground, the 2nd knelt, and the 3rd fired while standing. The intensity of the fire attack increased sharply, and such shooting began to be adopted by all armies. Russian too.

It would be more correct to call a baguette a bayonet. It was invented in the city of Bayonne, in the French Pyrenees. Local residents, professional smugglers, needed protection from French and Spanish border guards. Well, they came up with a bayonet that, after firing, can be inserted into the barrel of a gun. Considering that several minutes passed between shots, the advantage was given to the one who could instantly turn his gun into a spear.

Peter actually used the bayonet under the Russian pseudonym baginet, and the only army reform that he actually carried out is connected with this. It is surprising why supporters of Peter and the reforms he carried out do not use this example. After all, after the terrible defeat of the Russian army from the Swedes in Grodno in 1706, Peter, indeed, reformed the army.
Then, in January 1706, Charles XII, having lost 3,000 soldiers frostbitten and sick, with a sudden rush surrounded and blocked the Russian army in Grodno. It was possible to withdraw the army from complete defeat only in the spring, taking advantage of the ice drift and throwing more than a hundred cannons into the river. Because of the ice drift, Karl could not cross to the other side of the Dvina and pursue the fleeing Russians.

Until this time, the army created by Fyodor Alekseevich and his generals in 1679–1681 fought. The Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments were formed according to all the rules of this army: the same uniforms, the same metal helmets, the same 20 or 30% of the available personnel - spearmen, without firearms. Now Peter completely removed the spearmen, replacing them all with musketeers, introducing the bayonet-baginet. And he introduced soft cocked hats instead of helmets, green uniforms, which the guards were proud of even under Catherine: they say, our uniform was introduced by Peter the Great!

Some military historians believe that here, too, Peter did not act independently. In all European armies of that time, the helmet disappeared as an unnecessary detail, and the baguette was introduced everywhere. Peter was just playing pranks on Europe once again.

Not only did the Naryshkins’ reign turn out to be like a steamroller for the army: the nobles who supported the Naryshkins sought “relaxations” and, according to Prince Ya.F. Dolgorukov, “unthinking, they ruined everything established by the previous tsars.” Peter, if he wanted to fight, had to start a lot all over again. And accustom the local cavalry to the order introduced in 1681, and create new “regiments of foreign order.”

It was possible, of course, to call up those who had already served in such regiments, but Peter took a different path. In 1698–1699, he began to enroll freed slaves, peasants, and even serfs into the regiments without the consent of the owners. Such an army, according to the Austrian Korb, was “a rabble of the worst soldiers recruited from the poorest mob.” In the kinder words of the Brunswick envoy Weber, “the most sorrowful people.”

Peter's first army in the Northern War was composed in a similar way: 29 new regiments of freemen and datochny, 1000 people each, were attached to 4 old regiments, 2 guards and 2 personnel. Narva discovered their fighting quality.

True, the “second army of Peter” was not recruited from the most the best people. Selecting and training the “best” takes time, and in just 10 years of war, recruitment pumped out about 300,000 recruits from a population of 14 million. If in 1701 the regular army complex was 40,000 people, then in 1708 it was 113,000 people.

By the end of Peter’s reign, there were already from 196 to 212 thousand regular troops in the Russian Empire, and 110 thousand Cossacks and foreigners who fought “in their own formation” - Bashkirs, Tatars and peoples of the Volga region. This horde of armed men in 1712 was commanded by two field marshals, Menshikov and Sheremetev, and 31 generals, of which only 14 were foreigners.

Huge recruitment packages were needed not only to replenish the army, but also to cover colossal losses, which Peter’s army carried even in peacetime - from hunger and cold. Weber believed that for every one killed in battle, two or three died from cold and hunger, sometimes even at assembly points. Because, having captured a recruit, they put shackles on him and made a tattoo in the shape of a cross on his right hand. (All that remained was to assign numbers to the recruits instead of names)

And the recruits were kept “... in great crowds, in prisons and prisons, for a considerable time, and thus exhausted on the spot, they were sent, without considering, according to the number of people and the distance of the journey, with one unfit officer or nobleman, with insufficient food; Moreover, having missed a convenient time, they will lead to a cruel thaw, which is why many illnesses occur on the road, and they die untimely, while others flee and join the thieves' companies - neither peasants nor soldiers, but they become ruiners of the state. Others would willingly go into service, but when they first see such disorder among their brethren, they fall into great fear.”
This quote is not from the writings of Old Believers or disgraced nobles, it is from the report of the Military Collegium to the Senate in 1719. The report was required after in 1718 there were 45 thousand “unrecruited recruits” in the army and 20 thousand on the run.