Cultural differences between West and East Germans. A country that does not exist: why East Germans are nostalgic for the GDR. Where are the girls more beautiful?

More and more waves of refugees from Asia and Africa are arriving in the Old World to sit on the necks of liberal Europeans

Because of them, the interethnic and criminal situation has recently become more complicated. All this is the result of the European policy of multiculturalism. But not all European countries support it. Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland are already thinking about leaving the European Union if Islamization and the reception of migrants do not stop. Even in Germany there are supporters of leaving the EU. And most of them are in the territory of the former GDR. There they remember with nostalgia the times when the East Germans had their own independent state.

The inhabitants of modern Germany are split not only into Bavarians, Swabians and other Saxons. There people still divide themselves into West and East Germans. Those who lived in the socialist GDR are called “Ossies”, and in the pro-American Federal Republic of Germany they are called “Wessies”. In fact, now these are two completely different people with its own history, culture and mentality. Thus, East Germans retain love and nostalgia for the times when they, together with the USSR, were part of the socialist bloc. Many of them love Russia, Vladimir Putin and support our foreign policy.

Anschluss and occupation

East Germans are unhappy that West Germany took over the GDR in 1990. At that time, the majority of the GDR members actually did not want to lose their independence. The country's authorities were going to sign an equal treaty with Germany on freedom of movement, the demolition of the Berlin Wall and economic cooperation. But the American intelligence services and the traitor Mikhail Gorbachev forced them to accept the occupation.

Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Vladimir Kryuchkov recalled the Soviet-American negotiations:

When, through our channels, through intelligence and counterintelligence, we received materials about Gorbachev’s negotiations in Reykjavik, Malta and other places, we were amazed at the themes and content of these conversations. Even then they spoke openly about the sale of the GDR.

Today, Europeans are outraged by the reunification of Crimea with Russia. But in the GDR they didn’t even allow a referendum to be held! They simply abolished all government bodies, extended the German Constitution to new lands, and replaced the GDR mark with the currency of the Federal Republic of Germany. In the first years of the unified state, almost two million GDR members lost their jobs. Production fell by half, and 85 percent of the entire industry was taken over by the West Germans.


Demonstration in Dresden against Islamization and the policies of Frau Merkel. Image: Daria Aslamova/Komsomolskaya Pravda

Party purge

The cleansing of the state apparatus began immediately. Most officials were fired due to unreliability. Then they destroyed the army - the second most powerful among countries Warsaw Pact. Many professors and teachers were expelled from the universities of the GDR without retaining their seniority. All employees of higher education institutions were ordered to fill out questionnaires and provide details of their political views. Now it was necessary to inform on your colleagues if they had statements against the occupation of the GDR. The old textbooks were replaced, now they told how badly the GDR lived under the tutelage of the Soviet Union, everything was redone to American standards. But the GDR education system was considered one of the best in the world!

Workers poured out of Germany and instantly grabbed all the high-paying positions. East Germans now took less prestigious jobs or joined the army of the unemployed.
- Imagine people who worked all their lives, and then they were told that no one needed them, that socialism was nonsense. They lost their jobs and, in a moral sense, got punched in the face. It was a difficult time, a collapse of illusions, - a member of the Saxony parliament from the Alternative for Germany party recalls that time. Jörg Urban.


Regain independence

Citizens of the former GDR and West Germany immediately began to despise each other, a tension that can still be felt today. East Germans view their Western compatriots as arrogant and greedy, always using East Germany for their own mercantile ends. And the "Wessies" see the "Ossies" as lazy people who are incapable of making money. In addition, West Germans are more susceptible to liberal propaganda. They do not understand the conservative views of their fellow citizens, who do not want to see gay parades and other “achievements” of democracy in their cities.

Migrants are also treated differently. While in the West they are welcomed with open arms, in the East of Germany refugees are hated. And the migrants themselves are quickly leaving there, also because the former territory of the GDR is significantly lagging behind in its economic development.

Even now, in different parts of the state, it remains different level salaries and pensions.

Professor Karl Doering assesses the situation this way:
- East Germans are much poorer than Western Germans. A lot of research shows that we are “second class” Germans.

In the east, protest sentiments are becoming more and more popular. There, the ratings of far-right parties and those politicians who support an alliance with Russia rather than EU policies are higher. Recently, radical ideas about restoring the independence of the GDR have been gaining popularity. And if nothing changes in Europe, then such views will have more and more supporters.

By the way

  • The total length of the Berlin Wall, which did not allow unhindered movement from the eastern part of the city to the western and vice versa, was 155 km, of which 127.5 km were with electric or sound alarms. The structure had 259 dog parks, 302 observation towers, 20 bunkers. 11 thousand soldiers served at the wall.

Bear in mind

  • Throughout the territory East Germany Until the 15th century, Slavic tribes lived - Bodrichi and Lyutich; later they assimilated and began to consider themselves Germans. The only one Slavic people, which is still preserved in Germany, are the Lusatians, but there are only 50 thousand of them left.

Especially for the Perspectives website

Vera Dubina

Dubina Vera Sergeevna – candidate historical sciences, doctoral student at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences.


In the fall of 1989, most East Germans enthusiastically spoke out for democracy and German unity, making the fall of the socialist regime inevitable. It is all the more striking that today the eastern lands continue to live a special life within Germany, and their inhabitants still do not feel political unity with the west of the country. On the contrary, polls recent years show growing disillusionment with democracy and increasing nostalgia for certain aspects of life in the GDR. What happened in the 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall?


Twenty years is the threshold when Germans look back and seek to take stock of the unification process. On the eve of November 9, 2009, all the media were full of personal memories of tears of joy shed on both sides of the German-German border in the fall of 1989. However, if at that time this event was accompanied by euphoria on both sides of the German-German border, then 20 years later nostalgic notes almost prevailed in stories about the GDR. Not only the personal memories of East Germans about their childhood, in which “they did not feel so ideologically oppressed,” are imbued with this feeling, but also analytical articles examining, for example, the successfully functioning system technical education GDR. In any major periodical articles like “Germany's Happy Moment of Democracy” were mixed in by a one-to-two ratio with articles with more pessimistic headlines: “Why don't most East Germans see the fall of the wall as the happiest moment of their lives?” or “The revolution was not entirely a success.” Many researchers see the reasons for this pessimism in the incompleteness of the unification and the asymmetrical policy towards the two parts of Germany.

In the fall of 1989, most East Germans came out for democracy and for pan-German unity under the slogans “We are the people” and “We are one people,” thereby cementing the fall of the authoritarian regime of the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany). In a representative survey in 1992, more than 30% of East Germans said they active participation in the protest demonstrations of that time. It is all the more striking that today, 20 years after the “candle revolution,” the inhabitants of the eastern lands still do not feel political unity with West Germany and do not identify themselves with its democratic regime. Polls in recent years show an ever-decreasing support for democracy among the local population and an increasing spread of positive assessments of certain aspects of life in the GDR. So, if in 1990 88% of East Germans spoke out in support of democracy, then in 2002 only 50% did. In 2007, almost two thirds (61%) were dissatisfied with the concrete implementation of democracy in Germany. The relative majority (49%) assesses the experience of the GDR more positively than negatively, and only 16% reject such positive assessments.

The role of East Germans in social political life of a united Germany is very insignificant. Their membership in political parties decreased from 5.1 in 1992 to 2.6% in 2007. In 2006, an even smaller proportion of respondents reported participating in civil initiatives - only 0.9%. What happened in the 20 years after the democratic breakthrough in the fall of 1989?

Many political scientists note the emergence of a separate political culture in East Germany, which differs significantly from the political guidelines of Western Germany. The reasons for this phenomenon are most often cited as, on the one hand, the influence of upbringing in the GDR (socialization hypothesis), and on the other, the economic situation in the new united Federal Republic of Germany (situational hypothesis).

Another explanation for East German “specialness” is offered by a sociologist and researcher at the Mannheim Center social policy Christopher Stavenow. In an article for the Deutsche Archive magazine “Why is Germany still not united? The emergence of a special political culture in the eastern German lands,” he analyzed a complex of factors due to which the eastern and western parts of the country did not become a truly unified whole even 20 years after reunification. First of all, according to Stavenov, the special East German identity is a product not of a special mentality that developed in the GDR, but of a petty-bourgeois social structure, formed due to the constant drain of the middle class and representatives of the upper strata of society. That is why the East German states still lack an elite layer capable of leading the transition of the former GDR lands to a market society and democracy. In many regions of East Germany, economic, social and cultural life bears the stamp of decline. Most of the management personnel come from West German lands.

East German industry is also in the hands of West German or foreign concerns. Unemployment in the east is higher and the standard of living is significantly lower than in the western part of the country. As a result, most East Germans feel like second-class citizens, which is inseparable from their distinct identity, as is their constant recourse to memories of the GDR.


The mental and social heritage of the GDR and the autumn of 1989
.

The GDR had a “double political culture”, which was determined by the different political ideas of the leaders and the led. Political scientists proceed in their research from the fact that the real political culture had little in common with the official ideology. Socialist culture was accepted by society where it connected with the long tradition of authoritarian political culture in Germany, with its classic models of submission to a higher authority: obedience, discipline and willingness to submit. The preservation of this tradition was facilitated by characteristic of the real political culture of the GDR - a withdrawal into private life typical of the Hoenikker era. Citizens of the GDR created free space for themselves in privacy in exchange for formal compliance with political demands and responsibilities. The consequence of this was the complete displacement of the individual from the socio-political process.

As a result of the modernization of society, the seemingly stable order began to shake by the end of the 1980s. Personal contacts and Western media brought East Germans into the orbit of Western civilization. Openness towards the West became characteristic of GDR society starting with the generation of youth of the 60s, who, like their Western peers, wore long hair, listened to Western rock music and sought to freely express their personality. In addition, from a socio-economic point of view, the GDR was the same modern industrial state as West Germany, with its characteristic strong social policies, the development of education, the use of female labor and the liberalization of the private sphere. The consequence of this openness was a change in values ​​and a pluralism of forms of private life. In 1990, post-material values ​​(freedom and personal self-realization) were as widespread in the GDR as in the Federal Republic of Germany. This change in values ​​undermined the frozen socialist system, which was unable to satisfy the growing needs of the citizens of the GDR for self-realization.

Thanks to this situation, the weak opposition in the GDR managed to mobilize a large part of the population against the regime. Of course, Stavenov insists, it was an antagonistic partnership. At the initial stage, the opposition strove for a democratic reform of socialism, for some kind of third way between capitalism and socialism with democratic elements at its core. The majority of citizens, on the contrary, from the very beginning preferred an early unification with Germany and the introduction of a single currency.

The events of the autumn of 1989 became an act of awakening of civil society, a push towards “political self-organization.” On local and regional level civil initiatives, working groups and various kinds of commissions filled the power vacuum that arose immediately after the revolution. A considerable part of the population stood up to defend their interests and actively participated in resolving public issues, such as, for example, depriving the state security service of power. This showed that subjects who had seemingly completely retreated into the private sphere could also behave as rights-conscious citizens.

Only later did the key weaknesses of the newly minted East German civil society become visible. He lacked a new elite that would be based on a broad base and would be ready to take over power. Although the opposition, which gradually turned into a civil movement, managed to sweep away the old regime, it did not have a realistic concept for further development. Vague ideas about reformed socialism contradicted the sentiments of most of the population of the GDR. Moreover, the civic movement was characterized by anti-statism, which made it even more unable to assume responsibility and political leadership.

Stavenow partly explains this weakness of the elite by the division of Germany as a result of World War II, after which many dissatisfied people had the opportunity to leave the eastern zone for the west. Thus, as a result of emigration, East Germany lost its urban intelligentsia and the propertied middle class. Namely, these social groups represent a natural counterweight to state pressure and form the stronghold of civil society in many countries. In the former GDR, a social stratification emerged consisting solely of various lower class factions and one select managerial elite. This led to the fact that after the changes of 1989-90. in the GDR, unlike Poland and Hungary, there were no visible signs of restructuring or universally recognized elites.


Economic and social turnaround after German reunification

The GDR, Stavenow and other modern German authors admit, was characterized as a “society of workers” for a reason - work had enormous value there and provided a worthy social position. The transition from a planned economy to a market economy resulted in a transition for the citizens of the GDR from a “society of workers” to a “society of the unemployed.” In West Germany, the formation of a democratic political culture occurred at one time on the basis of economic recovery. In the former GDR, the new post-communist order was identified with the massive destruction of old economic structures associated with the previous regime, in whose place nothing new arose.

From 1990 to 2002, the number of people employed in East Germany fell from 8.6 to 6.1 million. Despite all the government's social measures, the percentage of unemployed in the East by 2009 remained twice as high as in the West (14.2% versus 7.1%). Factory shutdowns and mass layoffs became a key part of the early years of a unified Germany for East Germans and an integral part of their collective memory.

On the issue of adopting a new political system Such experience plays a significant role. Unemployment in the East - in contrast to the western part of Germany - arose as a result of a social change and is perceived as an integral part of it. Previously, personal labor merit acted as a guarantee of the progress of “socialist society” and had symbolic capital in accordance with this important role. Utility for society, the high status of the worker and an egalitarian policy - these social attitudes were central in the GDR. Based on them, losing a job means not only a loss of stability and security, but also a fundamental loss of self-worth.

After reunification, the population of the former GDR began to decline rapidly, and not only because of the fall in the birth rate. The lack of job prospects led to mass migration of East Germans to the western part of the country. The population of the eastern lands decreased by 1.5 million people, that is, by about 10%. But demographic regression was only one aspect of the unprecedented process of “shrinking” that engulfed the former GDR. This is how sociology professor Wolfgang Engler described this phenomenon: “The impoverishment of East Germany is a process of steady reduction and a predictable result - reduction in all respects. Population, cities, factories, people on their social scale - everything is decreasing." And given the enormous importance of enterprises in the social life of the GDR, the economic collapse and crisis of the post-communist period meant not only industrial, but also cultural and social impoverishment of the region.

Stavenov proposes to consider the process of “shrinking” of East Germany also from the point of view of the deficit of the elite in the territory of the former GDR. Civil society and opposition elites—if they emerged at all—were still very weak in 1990. For this reason, there was no serious representation of the interests of the GDR in the unification process. Therefore, the shock therapy of the East German economy, which led to a reduction in state-owned enterprises by 80-90%, was perceived by the population as external pressure.


The emergence of a distinct East German identity

The obvious victory of the Alliance for Germany (48% of the members of this organization come from the CDU and the Democratic Front) in the elections to the People's Chamber in March 1990 showed that the majority of the population of East Germany wanted to join the Federal Republic of Germany after the collapse of the GDR. And subsequently, more than 90% of citizens of the former GDR assessed the unification as correct solution. At the same time, East Germans did not dissolve into West German society, but retained a special identity. Thus, in 2008, only 42% of East Germans identified themselves with citizens of a united Germany, while 75% identified themselves with representatives of East Germany. There are many reasons for the manifestation of this special East German identity.

The unification of Germany was asymmetrical in nature: it was not the unification of two countries, but the entry of the GDR into the federation of West German states. This principle was approved by the elected representatives of the people of both states (the Bundestag and the People's Chamber), who concluded a unification agreement on the basis of Article 23 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time, they deliberately refused the opportunity (also provided by the constitution, Article 146) of developing a new constitution based on the decision of a popular referendum. The chosen path allowed West Germany to maintain its entire institutional structure in transition period and implement rapid unification. But this pragmatic decision placed a heavy burden on German internal unity.

The need to adapt to West German orders led to the fact that soon after unification, former citizens of the GDR felt “colonized.” East Germans were expected to quickly adopt Western values, lifestyles and work styles, which in reality corresponded to the colonialist mindset.

Colonization, Stavenow believes, was expressed primarily in the devaluation of many aspects of the life of citizens of the former GDR. The delegitimation of the SED regime and the subsequent revaluation of all previous standards in favor of the adoption of the West German way of life led to the “disenfranchisement” of East Germans within a united Germany. Unlike other countries of the socialist camp, where only the old political elite was replaced, the GDR also parted with the functional elite (in the economy, in management, in the education system - wherever the new West German qualification standard came into force). On the one hand, the replacement of elites was intended to remove the ballast of the old order , and on the other hand, to increase their efficiency and professionalism. At first, the population of the former GDR also found this necessary. However, the replacement of elites was not limited to the first years after the unification, but continued at least until 2003. Thus, at the end of 2003, in the territory of the former GDR, 38% of lower-level managers (for comparison: in 1997 - 21%), 48% of enterprise directors (in 1997 - 43%) and half of department heads came from West German states.

The privatization of former “socialist property” also increased the feeling of colonization in the former GDR. As a result of privatization, only 5% of this property remained with East Germans, 85% fell into the hands of West Germans and 10% went to foreign citizens. In this regard, one cannot simply dismiss the assessments of left-wing scientists from the Berlin-Branderburg research center, who qualify East Germany as “a region with a capitalist market economy without its own capital and its own capitalists.” Sociologist Paul Windolf was able to show that some areas of the East German economy are much more "capitalist" than the social market economy of West Germany. Most East German enterprises have lost their technological and economic independence and function as “satellites” of several Western concerns, dependent on their owners in everything. Göttingen sociologist Berthold Vogel also assesses the situation in East Germany as a product of a “dependent economy”.

The noted asymmetry of the social and economic situation in Germany and the experience of colonization experienced by East Germans explain why the vast majority of them feel discrimination. Since 1990, more than 80% of East Germans regularly describe themselves as “second-class citizens” in surveys, believing this to be a consequence of unification. Since the mid-90s, even long-term German development forecasts predict that the eastern states will remain lagging in the future. Responsibility for this lies with the West German states.

Thus, a special East German identity has emerged, for which maintaining a distance from West Germany plays an important role. At the same time, East Germans who feel like “second-class citizens” may be at risk of losing self-esteem as part of their social identity. According to Henry Tajfel's theory of social identity, the population derives its social self-esteem from comparison with those of higher status. social groups. For East Germans, such a high-status group is the West Germans, belonging to which is practically excluded for the former. Therefore, East Germans form their own identity, which is based on a positive assessment of East German stereotypes, on the one hand, and the devaluation of the West German group, on the other.

It is against this background that changes in the political orientation of East Germans are taking place. The increasingly positive assessment of life in the GDR, the spreading negative assessment of democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany and, in general, the weakening of trust in democracy as an exemplary form of government can be seen as part of the East Germans' self-assertion strategy.

The depreciation of democracy, in turn, blocks the development in the East of an active civil society, the potential of which was so clearly demonstrated in the fall of 1989. Then the East Germans showed O greater readiness for protest and activity in the demonstration movement compared to Western Germans. In subsequent years, the participation of residents of the eastern lands in political life turned out to be very passive. But to improve the quality of economic and social transformation in the eastern lands, passive discontent and even protest are not enough. What is also needed is the active participation of East Germans themselves in civic initiatives and the ability to take responsibility for political decisions and constructive participation in a democratic executive branch. It would be wrong to attribute the shortcomings in the development of the East German lands only to the legacy of the GDR. The authoritarian political culture of the GDR was accompanied by progressive trends towards change that gave rise to the autumn of 1989. And today, despite all the negative prophecies of sociologists, the modern east of the country has by no means returned to the former practice of the GDR, where citizens hid from politics, each in their own niche. However, the social legacy of the GDR - primarily the emigration of the middle and upper classes - hinders the development of democratic potential. In the territory of the former GDR, a new elite capable of leading its development has not yet formed. This further reinforces the overall asymmetry between the two parts of a reunified Germany.

The political demarcation of the eastern and western states turns an unfavorable situation for the GDR into a vicious circle of problems: East German poverty leads to a refusal of responsibility for change, which, in turn, slows down the overcoming of this poverty. The situation is aggravated by the social weakness of the elites of the former GDR and the desire of East Germans to isolate themselves from their Western fellow citizens. The former GDR needs an entrepreneurial spirit - not only in business, but also in the social and political spheres. The middle and upper classes, traditionally the bearers of this entrepreneurial spirit, left the territory of the GDR after reunification, and the old socialist elites lost their status. We can only hope for a transformation of consciousness that will give East Germans individuals capable of acting effectively in the new economic and political context.


Notes:

Bettina Westle, Sigrid Roßteutscher Politische Kulturen im vereinten Deutschland 1992, Umfrage-Studie, Datenehebung: EMNID, Bielefeld, Zentral-Archiv-Studiennr.: 2809.

Comparative national Election Project 1990 (CNEP) http://ww.cnep.ocs.ul.pt/content/02-data/docs_cnep_i_ii/grid_cnep_i_ii.asp ; Political Attitudes, Political participation and Voter Conduct in United Germany 2002, http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp (24.8.2009)

Pressemeldung d. Bundesmin. f. Verkehr, Bau und Stadentwicklung (BMVBS), Nr. 159/2009.

Politische Kulturen im Geeinten Deutschland 1992, http://ees.nsd.uib.no/index.jsp?year=2003&module=download& module=download&country=DE; European Social Survey 2002/2003, http// ees.nsd.uib.no/index.jsp?year=2003&country=DE&module=documentation (24.8.2009).

Christoph Stawenow Warum ist Deutschland noch nicht zusammengewachsen? Zur Entstehung einer politischen Teilkultur in den neuen Bundesländern. In: Deutschlad Archiv. Zeitschrift für das vereinigte Deutschland. No. 5, 2009. pp. 781-787.

Wed. Ralf Rytlewski Soziale Kultur als politische Kultur. In: Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Jacob Schissler Polititsche Kultur in Deutschland. Opladen 1987, S.245f.

Wolfgang Bergem Tradition und Transformation, Opladen 1993, S.39.

Wed. Wolfgang Engler Die ostdeutschen. Kunde von einem verlorenen Land, Berlin 1999, S.307f, und Stefan Wolle Die heile Welt der Diktatur. Alltag und Herrschaft in der DDR 1971-1989, Berlin 1999, S. 180f.

Thomas Gensicke Die neuen Bundesbürger. Eine Transformation ohne Integration, Opladen 1998, S. 129f.

Anja C. Baukloh u.a. Was geschah mit den früheren Oppositionsgruppen der DDR? Transformation und Institutionalisierung politischer Bewegungen in Ostdeutschland, in: Wolfgang Schluchter (Hg.) Der Vereinigungsschock. Vergleichende Betrachtungen zehn Jahre danach, Weilerswist 2001. S.73ff.

Sigrid Meuschel Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft in der DDR. Zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der DDR, Frankfurt a.M. 1992, S. 326.

Ehrahrt Neubert Es kann anders werden. Opposition und Wiederstand in Thüringen 1945-1989, Berlin 2005. S.237.

Ehrahrt Neubert Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949-1989, Berlin 1997. S.895.

Lothar Probst Ostdeutsche Bürgerbewegung und Perspektiven der Demokratie, Köln 1993, S. 151.

Rudolf Woderich Mentalitäten im Land der kleinen Leute. In: Michael Thomas Abbruch und Aufbruch. Sozialwissenschaften in Transformationsprozess, Berlin 1992, S.80.

Simone Bark, Dietrich Mühlberg, Arbeiter-Bilder und Klasseninszenierungen in der DDR. Zur Geschichte einer ambivalenten Beziehung, in: Peter Hübner u.a. (Hg.) Arbeiter im Staatssozialismus, Ideologischer Anschpruch und soziale Wirklichkeit, Köln 2005, S. 163-189.

Gunnar Winkler (Hg.) Sozialreport 2004. Daten und Fakten zur sozialen Lage in den neuen Bundesländern, Berlin 2004. S.169

Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Der Arbeits- und Ausbildungsmarkt in Deutschland. Monatsbericht März 2009, S.16.

Right there. P. 223.

Engler, Die Ostdeutschen als Avantgarde, S. 102.

Michael Vester Politische Kultur und soziale Wandel. Lebensweltliche und politische Mentalitäten vor und nach der deutschen Vereinigung, in: Die real-existierende postsozialistische Gesellschaft. Chancen und Hindernisse für eine demokratische politische Kultur. Hg. Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Branderburg. Berlin, 1994. S.40f.

The People's Chamber is the parliament of the GDR. Note translator

Oskar Niedermayer, Bürger und Politik. Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen der Deutschen, Wiesbaden 2005. S. 105.

Reinhard Liebscher Sozialreport 2008, http://www.stz-ev.de/Publikationen/Sozialreport/SR_2008/SR2008.pdf, S.42 (5.8.2009)

Lepsius M. Reiner Die deutsche Vereinigung: Ergebnisse, Optionen und Entscheidungen, in: Schluchter (Note 14) S. 61f, Jürgen Kocka Vereinigungskrise. Zur Geschichte der Gegenwart, Göttingen 1995, S.137.

Michael Lukas Moeller/Hans-Joachim Maaz, DIE Einheit beginnt zu zweit. Ein deutsch-deutsches Zwiegespräch, Reinbek 1993, S.137.

Windolf, S. 410

Henri Tajfel/John. C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in: Stephen Worchel/William G. Austin (eds.) Psychology of Intergroup Relations, Chicago 1986, pp. 7-24.

Germany celebrates 25 years of unification. Research and sociological surveys show that differences (at least external) have almost been erased, but the Germans have not yet become a single nation. Conclusion: for true “unity” we need at least another twenty years. That is, a change of generation.

Demographics matter in this matter, and quite a bit. For young people born on the eve or immediately after the unification of the country, Germany has always been united and they do not know any other. When last year, while preparing the SB project “Without iron curtain“, I was in Berlin during the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the leader of the “Left Party” faction in the Bundestag (64 seats in parliament, the largest opposition faction) Gregor Gysi (son of a minister in the government of the GDR, who has never lost after the unification of the country elections to the Bundestag) admitted that his 18-year-old daughter is not too interested in history and what the GDR is. This is indicative: for young people there is one Germany - united and indivisible, but those who managed to be at least a pioneer in the GDR (there they were young Thälmannites, but that’s not the point) are much more critical of the unification. Or rather, not to the unification itself - this is a blessing for a divided nation, no one doubts this - but to what happened after it. And demographics matter again here. In the first few years after the unification, almost 14.5 million Germans from the eastern (former GDR) lands moved to the west of the country. Naturally, in search of a better, as we usually say, share. The young and able-bodied left, while the elderly and sick remained. And also - a completely unexpected effect of unification - German women living in the east (they say, seduced by the delights of the free world hitherto unknown to them) began to give birth less. As a result, today the average age of residents of the eastern regions of Germany is higher (significantly) than residents of the western regions. True, West Germans complain that Eastern Germans have larger pensions. But this is not entirely true: it’s just that women in the GDR (as in the USSR - many probably remember) worked all their lives, and therefore earned pensions. Western German women stayed at home, raising their children, and therefore their pensions are ridiculous - they have to rely on their husbands.

But wages in the east are lower: workers in eastern regions a German earns about three-quarters of what a Western German brings home. And this is actually an excellent indicator, because immediately after the merger the difference was more than twofold. So practical German women, when getting married, prefer men from Western regions, who are considered more enterprising, educated and have a better chance of making a good career (and earning big money, of course). These ideas are, of course, subjective, but it is a fact that men from West Germany are still richer than their compatriots from the eastern regions. Of the 500 richest people in Germany, only 20 live in the eastern regions (and even then 14 of them in West Berlin).

At the heart of the wage problem, experts explain, are differences in enterprises: in the eastern lands (which many call “new” even 25 years later), enterprises are mainly small, medium-sized and agricultural - where do high wages come from? Large industry - in western regions, no one went to the eastern ones. Or rather, they did, but in a unique way: factories and factories were privatized (often for a symbolic 1 mark) and... closed. I met East Germans whose stories were written like carbon copies: I worked at a factory, it was privatized and closed, I was left without a job, and for several years I was looking for a new one.

East Germans do not like that all their achievements (and they were) were thrown overboard and were not useful in their new life. “It was not unification, but an Anschluss,” they say bitterly. To West Germans, the cost of unification (they, of course, insist on “unification”) seems prohibitively high. Although this is where demographics come into play: young people are not familiar with this price (in the literal sense - a special tax was introduced in Germany).

In general, this weekend in Germany they will drink (they even created a special “Unification Wine” from all the grape varieties growing in the country) to their youth. An excellent toast for a silver wedding, by the way.

7.1. The German Democratic Republic - in jokes, and not only. The Rich Heritage of the Ministry of Love

Live in western lands Germany looks more attractive. People here are more prosperous and cheerful than in the lands of the former GDR. The President of Russia in one of his speeches mentioned that “in Germany there was a division into Westerners and Easterners, people of the first and second categories appeared.” Are there really second-class Germans who are worse than first-class ones?

So far we have been talking about the morals of Germans in general, although there are differences between the inhabitants of different parts of the country. They say that if a fly gets into a mug of beer, a Prussian will pour out the beer and demand a new portion. The Bavarian and the Swabian will pull out the fly. But the Bavarian will throw it away and continue drinking, and the Swabian will make her spit out the beer back. It is believed that the natives of Northern Germany are laconic and businesslike, the Bavarians are cheerful and warm-hearted, and the inhabitants of the Rhine Valley are the most open and friendly. All these differences, however, are insignificant compared with those that are characteristic of West and East Germans, that is, residents of pre-unification Germany and the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). The former in Germany are called "Wessi" (from the word Westen - west), and the latter - "Ossi" (from Osten - east).

To understand the differences between them, we will have to remember something from German history. After World War II, the German people found themselves the subject of a grand experiment. It was divided and tested by two different economic systems: the market (capitalist) economy in the west of the country and the socialist economy in the east. And even Berlin was divided by a wall. Among the countries of the socialist camp, the GDR had the highest output per capita and the highest standard of living. Therefore, to Soviet tourists it seemed like a land of abundance. Yet the people of the GDR were envious of the quality of life in the West. In addition, the country lived on debt and was doomed.

Typical are the anecdotes about the shortage of goods in the GDR, where many things had to be “obtained” rather than bought. For example, cousins, one from the east, the other from the west, met in Berlin. In parting, Vessy says: “Write to me how you are doing.” “It’s not easy,” answers “Ossie,” “everything goes through censorship here.” “It’s nothing,” says “Wessy,” “if everything is okay, write to me in black ink, and if there are problems, in green.” A month later, “Wessy” receives a letter in black ink: “Everything is wonderful with us. Things are getting better in the country. People are happy. You can buy anything: butter, eggs, oranges, fresh fish. Unfortunately, only green ink is not available.”

Here's another joke: Honecker lies on the beach and sees the sun rise. “Good afternoon, dear sun,” Honecker greets him. “Good afternoon, Comrade Chairman of the State Council,” the sun answers. “I wish you a successful, pleasant day, Comrade Chairman!” In the evening, when the sun sets, Honecker thanks him: “Thank you, dear sun, it was a really pleasant day!” “Fuck you...” answers the sun. “I’m already in the West!” Humor, like ours, helped people survive all difficulties, and in life problems did not always look funny.

Why did the inhabitants of the GDR seek to leave their homeland? Of course, people wanted to earn more, live better, freely buy any goods, and not stand in lines. But the main thing was different. Freedom deficit. East Germans were not free to travel and go abroad to the West, unlike West Germans who traveled all over the world. The GDR authorities were afraid of their citizens and did not trust them.

Flight from the GDR - both legal and illegal - gradually became widespread. Indignation of the population with the existing order in the country, mass demonstrations demanding reforms and a growing flow of immigrants to the West led to a peaceful revolution in the fall of 1989. On October 3, 1990, Germany was reunified. The GDR ceased to exist, and 5 new eastern states became part of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Berlin Wall was torn down. To this day, souvenir shops sell tiny, coin-sized pieces of it, starting from five euros apiece.

An investigation into the activities of the Ministry of State Security of the GDR - an analogue of our KGB - showed that it tried to suppress any opposition in the bud and entangled the entire country in a network of informants. Residents called it “Stasi” - a word derived from Staatssicherheitsdienst (state security service). Here is a typical anecdote about the Stasi. A musician on a tram reads the score. A Stasi man notices the encryption and detains the musician on suspicion of espionage. The detainee tries to explain that this is a Bach fugue. The next day, the musician is called to the boss, and he yells: “Stop being so dark, your Bach has already confessed!”

An amazing coincidence - in 1949, the year of the birth of the GDR, George Orwell’s prophetic novel “1984” was published, in which the author wrote: “... The Ministry of Truth contained three thousand offices above the surface of the earth and a corresponding root system in the depths... The Ministry of Love, which was in charge law enforcement, instilled fear. There were no windows in the building... It was possible to get there only by going through a whole labyrinth of barbed wire, steel doors and camouflaged machine gun nests. Even the streets leading to the outer ring of fences were patrolled by black-uniformed, gorilla-faced guards armed with jointed batons.” Life has even surpassed Orwell's fantasy. The Stasi was truly omnipotent.

During the revolution in the GDR, rebels seized Stasi buildings throughout the country. They achieved the dissolution of the Stasi and the investigation of its crimes. The legacy of the “Ministry of Love” turned out to be considerable: millions of personal dossiers on residents of the GDR, and even the Federal Republic of Germany - on almost everyone, except infants and old people.

Now the Stasi archives have been opened - more than a million people have already viewed their files. People, immersed in reading thick cases, were dumbfounded. Imagine the state of a person who suddenly finds out that his best friends betrayed him for many years, that he was spied on by his schoolmates, teachers, and even relatives.

The declassification of the dossier turned the fates of many upside down. If involvement in the activities of the Stasi is revealed, the official is immediately fired, and politicians lose their popularity. The Germans legalized lustration, that is, former spies were forever blocked from accessing public service. A state security worker cannot even become a kindergarten teacher there or a singing teacher in a rural school. And even if former spies are already retired or receiving benefits from the state, this assistance to them may be reduced.

Thus, Germany drew a line under its past and excluded the repetition of such crimes in the future. Contrary to some prophets, no acts of violence, no civil war no documents emerged as a result of declassification.

7.2. The difficult path to unity - from euphoria to reality

United Germany became the first country in terms of population and third in territory in Europe. Berlin became its capital again. On the day the Berlin Wall fell, the happiness of all Germans knew no bounds. But no one expected that the path to unity would be so difficult and would require such sacrifices and costs. After the euphoria, sobering set in. The poll results are striking: about 80% of Germans agree that German reunification was the right step, but half of them believe that they personally lost from it. And what has it come to! - every fifth German would prefer to return the Berlin Wall back. Many residents of the former GDR now feel like strangers in their country, second-class citizens. On the other hand, an astronomical amount of money flows annually from West to East to boost the economy. And some West Germans also wonder: was such a unification necessary?

Note that it was not a synthesis of two systems. In contrast, the East German socialist economy was rebuilt along Western, market lines. The Ossies had to adapt, and the Wessies dictated their terms in everything.

“Ossies” rushed to buy themselves what they had long dreamed of - a car, a VCR or a trip to a long trip, often on credit. From gas and electricity bills to food, living costs have approached those of the West. Debts appeared, fear of losing my job and apartment.

What did the Ossies gain from the unification? They became freer, less dependent on the state, and goods from all over the world became available to them. “The freedom to travel is great, but what does it do for those who don’t have the money to go on holiday? To find a job, I wrote 40 applications, and everything was useless,” nurse Amelie, who came to West Germany from the GDR, tells us. Is she happy that she moved? “In general, yes,” she answers. “Although I have a feeling that people here only think about money all the time.”

We met a family from Thuringia in West Germany. Her husband Rudolf was previously the director of a furniture factory in the GDR. Raw materials for it were previously supplied from the USSR, but without it production stopped. His wife Magda, who worked as a head teacher at the school, was a member of the ruling Communist Party (SED) and because of this also lost her job. This is typical of perestroika in the GDR - all members of this party were removed from leadership positions. The couple moved to the West and, not without difficulty, found work there: he became a consultant on enterprise management, and she became a teacher at the People's Evening University.

On the territory of the GDR, the transition from state ownership to private ownership began. Who could privatize all this? East Germans, who had little money, were left with only small businesses like pharmacies and greengrocers. Large enterprises were bought up by entrepreneurs from the West. The East Germans were outraged by this “selling out of the GDR” and turning them into second-class citizens in the service of “Wessi” - first-class citizens. Many businesses have closed. Why? Many of them turned out to be uncompetitive and lost the sales market in the USSR and other socialist countries. Every second East German lost his job. Due to rising rents, people were often forced to look for cheaper apartments.

When carrying out transformations in the eastern lands, it was decided, as it is sung in the Internationale, before building new world, destroy old world to the ground. The principle prevailed: everything reminiscent of the GDR must be destroyed. For many East Germans, everything that surrounded them in the past is crumbling. “I was recently in my homeland, Frankfurt an der Oder,” says 53-year-old Caroline. - Where I lived is now empty. Of the many lines of houses, only one remains, the school is closed due to lack of students, the bakery windows are blind and dirty.”

“The bosses from the West are firing us in full force,” says 54-year-old worker Paul from the GDR. Teacher Volker (38 years old) says that the majority have gotten better financially, but psychologically the opposite: “Before there was no unemployment, and rents were lower. Now the work has become more intense. People began to help each other less. Everything became about money.” The East Germans had to face a lot of difficulties. All the laws have changed, and even the streets have been renamed.

After unification, the population of the lands of the former GDR decreased by 1 million people. The "Ossies" who moved to West Germany, with a few exceptions, live, according to my observations, much more modestly than the "Wessies." After all, they arrived there without capital. Pensioner Elke, whose son found himself unemployed in the West, tells me: “The system here is bad, it’s not a social market economy, it’s capitalism.” Residents of the former GDR, after disappointment in socialism, begin to become disillusioned with the opposite system.

West Germans reproach East Germans: “You live at our expense!” They have to finance their “poor relatives,” who certainly want to catch up with them in terms of living standards. West Germans experienced a shock - for the first time in many years, their level of well-being ceased to rise regularly.

Almost half of the adult population of the eastern lands lives on social benefit. The most painful difference still remains - there are twice as many unemployed in the East as in the West.

And yet, despite all the difficulties, there has already been considerable success in unifying the country. The incomes of the “Aussies” and “Wessies” are increasingly equalizing. Now older East Germans - pensioners and even the unemployed - can afford to travel to France or Spain. Previously, they could not even dream about this.

The East of Germany has become the most dynamic region in Europe. Some cities of the former GDR, previously polluting water and air, have become models of environmental cleanliness. Görlitz, a small town on the Neisse River, has recently been called the most beautiful in Germany. There you can see wonderful baroque facades, fabulous ancient palaces and fountains, romantic streets and courtyards. In addition to the state, some unknown philanthropist allocates half a million euros every year for the restoration of architectural monuments of this city. One can imagine how he walks around the city unnoticed by everyone and enjoys its beauty.

There was a lot of good things in the GDR that were later lost. These are universal employment and a real right to work, albeit with lower labor productivity, a smaller gap between rich and poor, a high level of social security, a sense of confidence in tomorrow and as a result of this, a higher birth rate, less selfish and selfish, more friendly relations between people. There were well-organized assistance for families with children, a free system of nurseries and kindergartens, extended school days, education and health care. Now you have to pay for everything.

The majority of residents of the former GDR (73%) believe that socialism was a good idea but poorly executed.

Based on the experience of the Germans, then perhaps the ideal slogan for society would be: “Within the framework of a market economy, there is more socialism.”

7.3. “Ossi” and “Wessi” - “wall in the heads”

The Berlin Wall has collapsed, but, as the Germans themselves admit, there still remains “a wall in our heads.” Let me give you an example: a company from both parts of the city gathered in Berlin, but the guests did not sit down the way the hosts wanted. “Wessy” and “Ossie” sat separately and had little contact with each other. It is curious that there are very few marriages between “Ossies” and “Wessies”.

Most Wessies have a sense of superiority towards Ossies and show no interest in their lives. Businessman Harald says: “I feel more at home in Paris than in Leipzig.”

West and East Germans lived for a long time in two completely different worlds. Hence two different ways of thinking and popular expressions - Besser-Wessi (West German, who always knows better what to do) and Jammer-Ossi (East German, inclined only to whine). This, of course, is not always the case, but there is some truth in it.

What are the main differences between "Ossie" and "Wessey"? Most unemployed people in eastern Germany blame their situation on those “up there” – the state, rather than themselves. “Ossies” feel like victims of society, capitalism, and everything connected with the West. “Vessies” believe that the virus of socialism lives in their minds with its constant question: “What should the state give me?” “Wessy” has its own opinion on any issue. They are more enterprising and get involved in everything, even if they do not have enough knowledge and experience to do so.

It is more difficult for people from the former GDR to live in a unified country. In the West, entrepreneurial spirit was needed to make a career, while in the East, adaptability and obedience were valued. Previously, the “Ossies” lived in constant fear of the authorities, but now they have different fears. They are afraid of everything: rising prices (with relatively low inflation), criminals (although the crime rate is relatively low) and strangers (although there are very few foreigners in the east of the country). "Ossies" prefer other newspapers and books than "Wessies" and other goods. Many people feel nostalgic for the GDR.

My friend Jurgen from Berlin says he is part of the largest East German party. Which one? The one who does not participate in elections. More than half the population of the former GDR belongs to it. This is typical - if “vessies” want to change something in the life of society, they create civil movements and fight to solve problems. On the contrary, the Ossies are accustomed to the fact that nothing depends on them anyway, and they prefer to complain about their fate.

How to imagine a typical "Wessy"? According to sociological surveys, many West Germans are self-confident, somewhat selfish, arrogant and arrogant, and are also prone to rapid manifestations of hostility. Unfortunately, I have observed these last traits in some officials in their interactions with foreigners.

How do you imagine a typical Ossie? He is more conservative and has a complex towards the West: “You won’t buy us with your sausage!” “Ossies” are more sociable than “Wessies”; they are more likely to receive guests at home or go on visits. They spend more time at home - playing with children, making something or working in their garden. They are more interested in politics and read newspapers more often. Ossies are more likely to care about the people around them. And “Wessies” play more sports and go to restaurants more often. “Ossies” are more responsive, softer in character, they have warmer relationships in the family, with friends and relatives. This is understandable: under conditions of pressure from the state, family and friendly relationships acquired special importance.

"Ossies" are more open in character. When getting acquainted, they do not think about whether it will bring them financial benefit or useful connections. However, we also found wonderful friends among the West Germans.

Both spend their leisure time differently. On Sunday, many West Germans will go to church with their families, while East Germans would prefer to go to the store. Only a third of East Germans believe in God, not three-quarters of the population as in the West.

How do "Ossies" and "Wessies" relate to each other? In some ways this is reminiscent of the relationship we have between the majority of the population, the “Soviet”, and the “new Russians”. According to the West Germans, the Ossies are inert, they have forgotten how to really work like Germans. Former director furniture factory in the GDR, Rudolf told me that almost only women worked there. If someone suddenly says that cheap bananas were thrown away in a store nearby, the entire factory becomes empty - everyone runs to the store. The workers endlessly asked for time off work time home to care for the child, and the director had no right to fire anyone.

"Wessies are so neat, so aloof, so insincere, so arrogant and arrogant," says a 17-year-old schoolgirl from East Germany. She is offended when past life they want to cross it out. “We weren’t tortured for days at all. We lived too, and it wasn’t so bad,” she says indignantly.

Many "Ossies" consider "Wessies" to be cynics, deceivers, misers and Abzockers - insidious grabbers. And most importantly, the East German does not understand why he should work more than his colleague in the West, but receive only about 80% of his salary. And it is difficult for a West German to understand why the East pays this 80% if labor productivity is only 70% of the West.

An engineer from the former GDR states: “In the West they value money, in the East they value character.” It is easier for us to find mutual understanding with the East Germans: we lived in the same system. It is curious that the best German jokes, so similar to ours, were born in the GDR. A student from Russia says: in Leipzig - in the land of the former GDR - at a stop, when trying to buy a tram ticket, for some reason her card did not work, and she ended up as a hare on the tram. And the controller (“Ossie”) didn’t fine her! And in Munich, where she studies, none of the “Wessy” would forgive her.

Despite all these problems, relations between the Ossies and the Wessies are gradually improving. Bruno, a leading engineer at one of the West German companies, told me that their company willingly hires East Germans. Because, he explains, they are better able to work in a team and are less inclined to push others with their elbows. One country, but two peoples? Yes, but not forever. “Ossie” and “Wessey” will eventually come to unity and mutual understanding, although it seems that the “wall in the heads” will last for a long time.